Vinicius, Gary, List, Thank you for this explication, Vinicius! Much appreciated.
I remain skeptical about the distinction as drawn. But I am content to simply disagree, and would just like to say some things about my disagreement. I don't expect a response since this is beyond a discussion of Kees' book. And since you would prefer to avoid technical language, I will respect your wish, though I wonder if the distinction between dynamic and immediate object would be pertinent to a discussion on misrepresentation. Now knowing that this is not exactly a distinction drawn by Peirce, but possibly suggested by his semiotics, I feel a little more confident in saying some things. For one, I had thought that, for Peirce, truth is always the truth of a proposition. Hence, it's not quite right to say that there is such a thing as a "false index." I found the 'false index' all the more confusing since it seemed based in the misinterpretation of the icon; although I suppose Vinicius would maintain that the icon was fake, thus a case, not of misinterpretation, but of misrepresentation. But since the problem is with qualities taken to misrepresent the index, it seems to me still that this is a problem with comprehension or depth, not extension or breadth. Yes, I understand that because of the misrepresenting of the index by the icon, that the index will wrongly be assumed into the wrong symbol, thereby causing (or so I gather) that the right symbol will continue to have a lack of extension, which is how misrepresentation occurs according to Vinicius' account. At least, this is what I come up with, when I think it out abstractly. What I maintain is that in the cases discussed it is the proposition that is false, which is a joining together of two terms, one representing the subject and the other the predicate, and that it is the joining of the two, rather than either term specifically, which is false. Also, there is some mention about how to avoid misrepresentation and misinterpretation. In particular, "You avoid misinterpretation if you correctly signify its real characters (comprehension), but now perception must be a collective endeavor. It must be part of the commens, the sum of all synthetical propositions gathered during inquiry by a community of interpreters." Well, but the sum of all synthetical propositions not only includes real characters (comprehension), it also includes real things (extension). So we should expect that extension is also important in interpretation. To put the matter more concretely with respect to the examples: In the new case of the Brazilian misrepresented to be an Aborigine: If we were to state the proposition, "This man is an Aborigine," we should have a false proposition, because the man indexed and the Aborigine quality are not genuinely connected in reality. But the man is not a false index because of the falsity of the proposition. At most we could say that two symbols, one representing the man and the other the Aborigines, have been wrongly informed, the tentative symbol for the man wrongly including in its depth "Aborigine" and the symbol "Aborigines" wrongly including in its breadth the man indexed. But the qualities of the icon are what they are, and cannot be in themselves 'fake'; nor can the index be false, if it is genuinely an index at all. It should further be noted that, in virtue of the false proposition, which relates the sign to its interpretant, and not in virtue of a fake icon or false index, that a misinformed interpretation brings about misunderstanding of the object, i.e. mistaking the Brazilian man dressed for carnival for an Australian Aborigine. As an added note about the fake icon: We would imagine such a proposition as "These qualities are the qualities of an Aborigine, therefore this person is an Aborigine." The proposition is clearly false in this case, and it is this proposition which is assumed virtually asserted by the icon which makes the icon to be understood as fake. But such a proposition understood to follow from the icon is not the icon itself; it is a certain interpretation of the icon, developed in association with other signs, which turns out to be false. But the icon, representing the qualities to be what they are, is innocent of this misinterpretation, and with the right collateral experience might be understood to not be fake at all. As to perception, which, given its treatment above, I take to be a source of motivation behind the ideas of fake icons and false indices, a perceptual judgment will nevertheless take the form of a virtually asserted proposition, and so it is this perceptual judgment which is false, even if we cannot help asserting it at the time it is made. So if one were to say, in experiencing the Brazilian but perceiving an Aborigine, that the qualities experienced were those associated with an Aborigine, leading to the false index of the experienced Brazilian, I should have to say that it was the act of judgment which caused the experienced qualities to seem those of an Aborigine, and not the qualities themselves; an act of judgment which is in turned followed by the act of judgment that determines these qualities, having just been judged to be those of an Aborigine, to be of the man just now experienced. Although, I am a little doubtful whether to consider a perceptual judgment as a virtually asserted proposition, given the idea by Peirce that perceptual judgment shades into hypothetical inference, the difference mainly being that we can control the conclusion of a hypothetical inference, and given what he says in the following quote regarding abduction: Abduction cannot be absolutely bad. For sincere efforts to reach the truth, no matter in how wrong a way they may be commenced, cannot fail ultimately to attain any truth that is attainable. Consequently, there is only a relative preference between different abductions; and the ground of such preference must be economical. That is to say, the better abduction is the one which is likely to lead to the truth with the lesser expenditure of time, vitality, etc. (NEM 4:37-38, 1902; see also CP 7.220n18, 1901; RTL , pp. 141-142, 1898) This might be taken to suggest that perceptual judgments also cannot be absolutely bad, therefore saying they are straightforwardly false might not be quite right. In the reverse case of the Aborigine being mistaken for a Brazilian man dressed for carnival, it goes pretty much the same: There is a false proposition, and this proposition leads to misinterpretation, which leads to the misunderstanding in interaction with the Aborigine. As for the bioethics cases: I question the attempt to say that the medical staff conducted themselves appropriately when a mistake was made due to the malfunctioning of a medical apparatus. Certainly, I can see from an ethical point of view that the idea is that the staff are not blameworthy in such a case. But really, what we have is a false proposition such as "This apparatus will not malfunction," which we might say was virtually asserted, and the staff interpreted the apparatus incorrectly because they held to a false proposition unwittingly; which means that their interpretation, in truth, was misinterpretation of the apparatus. If they had known the truth, they would have acted appropriately to it, ideally. Also, when an apparatus malfunctions, it may then also be the fault of the staff for not appropriately checking the apparatus in question prior to the procedure. So the staff are not absolved just because they acted as though the apparatus was going to function appropriately; it may just be that inquiry into the matter beforehand could have prevented the medical mistake. In the latter case of there not being sufficient knowledge of the case under consideration, I'm unsure here of why misinterpretation is the right way to think of this. It sounds like it was, to some degree, an experiment, which would entail a specific hypothesis that guided the inquiry and which was put to the test. If the test failed--a tragedy in the nature of the case, surely, if the kind of thing to undergo review by an ethics board thereafter--then it was a matter of holding to a false proposition about the situation, and acting on the false proposition. If there was no clear proposition, then it should be clear that no action could have taken place at all. If action took place in interpreting the situation, then a proposition was somewhere (virtually) asserted and acted upon. The point is that this could just as equally be construed as misrepresentation as it could be misinterpretation, and I don't find the distinction helpful in this case. As for the clock and weathervane examples: When just happening to tell the right time, or just happening to point in the direction of the wind, I don't see that either such case could be identified as either misrepresentation or misinterpretation. If the proposition determined is "It is six o'clock" or "The wind is north-west," these propositions will be true. But if the proposition is "The clock says six o'clock, therefore it is six o'clock," then the proposition is false, even though the antecedent and the consequent in the proposition are true; likewise in the case of the weathervane. Both in the case of the broken clock and broken weathervane, the more developed sign which says propositionally that they are themselves adequate justification for believing a certain time or wind direction obtains will turn out false upon further inquiry when they are discovered to be broken. I was, to be honest, a little hopeful about getting a better understanding about how information works in semiosis, and I suspect that getting clearer about it would in turn make misrepresentation/misinterpretation/misinformation clearer as well. At this time, I remain skeptical of splitting information apart into synthetic extension and synthetic comprehension and attempting to identify two separate ways or sources of being misinformed, when I would expect on the one hand that information, as a product of synthetic extension and synthetic comprehension, should be considered in whole with regard to the problem of true representation, and on the other hand that information problems are probably a lot more complicated in the later theory of information, for example icons can include metaphors and diagrams now, not just qualitative resemblance of characters, and information applies now to propositions and arguments as well as to terms. -- Franklin On Mon, Mar 31, 2014 at 3:50 PM, Vinicius Romanini <[email protected]>wrote: > Frank, Gary, list > > Since I raised the question about misrepresentation and misinterpretation > "en passant", without going into further analysis, I might indeed have > instilled more doubts than clearing the mist (as Deely would put). As I > first say, my opinion that misrepresentation is lack of information on the > extension (breadth) of a term, while misinterpretation is lack of > information on the comprehension (depth) is based on the following > reasoning, which I will try to keep as much as possible to level of a > non-technical discussion. Peirce does not draw this distinction so clearly, > but i think it is implicit in his semeiotic. > > The received view about logical extension and comprehension when Peirce > began his doctrine of signs was that they were a commutative and reversible > operation like breadth x depth. > > The term "man" when at its maximum extension would cover human being (be > it living, death at yet to be born). Its comprehension would then be at its > minimum: rational. So whenever someone says "is rational" to something, he > would be signifying something that is a "man". And whenever someone would > point at something and say "man", he would be denoting something that is > "rational". > > If you zoom in and cover less extension, what we get is that you also > increase the comprehension. So I say "Brazilian man", I restricted the > extension and now get a comprehension that also includes "a male human born > in Brazil, Latin American, Portuguese speaker and son on). > > We have then something like a rubber band. If you stretch it, it covers > more Area but gets thinner (less depth). If you contract it, it covers less > Area, but you get a thicker depth. > > Peirce found out that semeiosis implies growth, learning, development. > This is information. > But he also found out that only symbols grow. Symbols are concepts > (grounded by ideas), words, but also propositions, assertions, books, a > library and, if we get serious, the whole universe. Whatever is growing, > becoming more complex, is also internalizing information. > > Information implies symmetry breaking, non-commutative processes, > arrow-directness, finious process, final causation, purpose, teleology, > association of ideas in the mind. > > So instead of a rubber band, now you have a protoplasm band. It feels, it > generalizes feeling, it produces sensations (new predicates), it breaks old > habits and acquire new ones. That is information: an increase of either > comprehension or extension without the diminishing of the other. So you get > a thicker band, or a larger area, without having to lose on the other side. > > All living beings produce information, which also means that there is a > sense in which the whole universe is a living being - at least a semeiotic > living being. > > The question is: how is information produced? By perception, for sure, > because perception is the only door for novelty, freshness, pure chance, > tychism. > > Symbols, when they get to their maximum extension, tend to become > exhausted, the habit they carry is stiff, almost a rule of thumb, > stereotypes, prejudices. They need a new injection of perceptual judgments > to shake their souls. > > That's what percepts do: they are firstness and reactions among firstess. > No symbolic content. In the perceptual judgement, novelty enters the mind, > curious facts are perceived and call for new hypothesis which will > transform our old concepts into more developed ones. > > Symbols grow when you expose them to real life. In a contextual situation, > hic et nunc, a concept you have about "man" (for instance) receives the > indexical shock of a perceptual presence of a man that was not part of you > conception yet. Let's say you meet an Australian aborigene for the first > time. It's presence is indexical, but brings along with it all sorts of new > qualities: color of skin, dust covering the body, a particular smell, > accent, body tatoos etc. > > So both extension and comprehension were augmented. > > That is a new cognition. An index and a symbol are attached. It is like > putting a quantifier in a logical symbol to denote a specific element of a > kind. > > New cognitions are always inferential, and must always begin with > hypotheses (the perceptual judgment). The symbol we are talking about now > is an argument, moved by purpose, capable of self-control and retroduction > for continuous corrections and production of new hypothesis. > > That all above being said, we can now talk about misrepresentation and > misinterpretation. > > Misrepresentation is false information on the side of extension (the > subsumption of the object under a concept). Let's suppose that the > Australian aborigine was fake. Actually, it was a Brazilian man dressed for > carnival. The indexical element was real (perceptually existent), but the > icon was fake (the perceived qualities were not genuine). Nevertheless, the > interpretation was not wrong. It would not be fair to condemn the > interpreter that was fooled by a false index. The interpreter did his job > as he should have done. Perceptual judgements are fallible, an so are our > cognitions. That's the core of Peirce's fallibilism. > > When taken to a judge, you would swear that the mistake was not your > fault. You just could not help it. The blame is to be put in whoever set up > to falsely represent the real. You misrepresented the real, but your > interpretation was correct. > > Misinterpretation is false information on the side of comprehension (the > knowledge that allows a community to recognize the unique characters of a > member of a class). Now let's suppose that Australian aborigine was real. > The sign then indicates with true information (the index and the icon are > both real), but the interpreter now thinks that it is someone dressing a > phantasy, that it's a practical joke, it's someone having fun in carnival. > That might put him in trouble. > > You avoid misrepresentation when you can correctly denote (indicate) if an > object of your perception belongs or not to a the extension of the > concept. For instance, had you arrived earlier on the scene, you would have > observed the Brazilian man dressing up as the aborigene, and > misrepresentation was eliminated. > > You avoid misinterpretation if you correctly signify its real characters > (comprehension), but now perception must be a collective endeavor. It must > be part of the commens, the sum of all synthetical propositions gathered > during inquiry by a community of interpreters. So you ask the person who he > is. Or ask people around you to check if your interpretation is backed with > other people's. Different sensations must be gathered and united. > > These differences may seem just logical quibbles for some, but they are > actually crucial when you have to deal, for instance, with bioethical > issues. A medical mistake might be caused by misrepresentation (some > medical apparatus was not working properly but the conduct was taken > correctly in a particular state of information). Or the apparatus was fine > but there was not sufficient knowledge about the case, even if a group of > doctors gathered to discuss it trying to avoid mistakes. On the second > case, an ethical committee usually deliberate about the whole situation. > > This distinction has clearly pragmatic effects, an I propose that it > should be adopted. > > We know that even a broken clock is "right" twice a day. If it stopped at > 6, and someone ask you what time it is and you happen to look at the broken > clock showing 6 precisely when, by pure chance, is really 6 pm, then was it > a misrepresentation or a misinterpretation of the real time? The same about > the weathervane. > > Vinicius > > > > > 2014-03-31 13:22 GMT-04:00 Frank Ransom <[email protected]>: > >> Gary F., List, >> >> Thank you for the effort, Gary. Actually, since you mentioned that >> understanding the motivation of my questions is somewhat difficult, perhaps >> it would prove helpful to present that motivation more clearly. >> >> In the early theory of information, we have a fairly clear account of >> what information is: information is the information of a symbol, expressed >> in the quantity of interpretant, itself understand in terms of whether the >> symbol is used as subject or predicate in synthetic propositions. So >> information is the product of synthetic depth and breadth. I can consider >> any given symbol, consider the characters and things which inform it, and >> thereby understand what the symbol means -- how it is to be interpreted in >> terms of its characters and things. I can also clearly understand that the >> symbol changes according to changes in its information, while still being >> the same symbol. These changes would be understood as occurring through >> inferences, always through either induction or abduction; even though one >> or two of the kinds of inductions and abductions seem very similar to >> deductions because of verbal changes involved. >> >> I'm not entirely sure what's going on with the later theory of abduction, >> though it was the topic in Peirce's philosophy that interested me most >> during my master's studies. If I understand rightly, what would have been >> called abduction in the early theory is later subsumed under induction, in >> particular induction of qualities, so I am no longer certain how inference >> works in the later theory of information. This should serve as an >> indication that something is different about the later theory in more than >> a minor way. >> >> All the more so when we consider the later classifications of signs. We >> know the dicisign will convey information in the later theory, but a >> proposition can only be the dicisign that is also a symbol and legisign. >> Since there are also now dicisigns that are indices and sinsigns or indices >> and legisigns, we now have something besides syntethic propositions to deal >> with (though a proposition will be instantiated in a sinsign). >> >> We also know that icons and indices will determine the information of the >> dicisign, as we might have expected in the early theory as communicating >> characters and things to which the symbol applies. But in the later theory >> icons and indices have become a good bit more complicated, being >> distinguished in a number of ways. It may be doubted whether depth and >> breadth are any longer so easily characterized as referring to characters >> and things, so that the analysis of a proposition's information, not to >> mention of the other dicisigns, will now require something more of an >> elaborate analysis than the breaking it down into characters and things to >> which the terms (and now, in the later theory, the propositions and >> arguments) apply. >> >> So when I see that comprehension/depth is associated with interpretants >> and their misinterpretation, I would like a good bit more to be said about >> how this is to be understood. When I think of the interpretants now, I >> typically think of them in terms of the trichotomy of >> immediate-dynamic-final. But for one thing, the dicisign is not, classified >> as such, an interpretant, but the relation of sign to interpretant. So when >> the misinterpretation occurs, is it in this relation, or is it in the >> interpretants themselves? "Lack of information on the side of interpretant" >> makes it look as though it must be with the interpretants. But which >> interpretant? The immediate, the dynamic, or the final, or two of the >> three, or all three? And, when we consider comprehension/depth, is this >> going to be a more robust understanding of comprehension/depth than we find >> in the early theory relating to the quantity of characters informing the >> symbol? I am somewhat clueless here, so I'm seeking to be better informed >> about what is going on with misinterpretation. >> >> If I my motivation doesn't seem to be showing itself yet in this line of >> thinking, I will put it more explicitly: Information, in the early theory, >> has to do with the meanings of terms and how inductive and abductive >> inferences increase the state of information, reflecting, ideally, an >> increase in knowledge. Information, in the later theory, does not seem >> quite so clear cut; everything is a lot more complicated now, making it >> quite difficult to pull off one clear example of information change or >> growth. In the early theory, I had simply to take a term, consider its >> known characters and things to which it applied, and then develop ideas >> about how it might be expanded through abduction and put them to the test >> through induction. In the later theory, I am rather clueless where to >> begin. I'm not saying this is a bad thing; in some respects I have thought >> the early theory leaning nominalistic, whereas the later theory looks more >> adequate to the challenge of natural classification, i.e. the >> classification of forms operating as final causes in nature. But it's >> always been, from my point of view, unwieldy, and I would like to achieve a >> much improved understanding of it and, with hope, learn to become >> proficient in informational analysis through the later theory -- >> informational analysis, of course, in what would be Peirce's sense of that >> term if he had used it. >> >> I am actually quite glad that Vinicius brought up his point about >> information missing from Kees' book. Then again, since I know of no >> genuinely clear account of how to proceed through an analysis with the >> later theory's developments, perhaps it was better that Kees left it out. >> In any case, I was really more hopeful than anything that I could get a >> clearer account from Vinicius of his fourth point, the one regarding >> information, because if he thinks it should have been included, then >> perhaps he has a much superior grasp of the workings of the later theory >> and knows how it ought to have been presented in Kees' book; and I would >> like to, if I might, get some good hints about those workings. Hence my >> questions, which are somewhat searching, but also have to do with my >> heuristics and information at this point regarding Peirce's semiotic(s), >> which heuristics and information would appear in some way to conflict with >> Vinicius' statement of his own point of view. >> >> Well I hope this helps to understand the motivation behind my inquiry. >> Now I'm going to go check out what Jon Awbrey has offered of his own >> understanding, and will likely reply to him late tonight or tomorrow, >> depending on how long it takes me to get through his readings. >> >> -- Franklin >> >> >>
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