Hi John, In the second Critique, Kant provides a four-fold classification of possible material practical principles. The division is based on two distinctions: internal v. external, and subjective v. objective.
As an example of a view that tries to ground morality on internal objective principles, Kant offers the example of Christian Crusius, who was a Protestant Theologian. The arguments Crusius gives for having faith in the goodness of God are grounded in rational principles. The rational principles that serves as the grounds of faith in god are held to be necessary truths of reason. As such, these kinds of arguments are a nice example what Peirce calls the a priori method. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: John Collier [[email protected]] Sent: Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:05 AM To: [email protected] Subject: RE: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science Jeff, List, Well, there is faith. But it is also not very self correcting. I say "not very" since I agree with some that faith is grounded in fear and hope. Resolution of fears or limitations of hopes can alter faith. On a separate issue, I think a close reading of FoB indicates that Peirce thinks that each of the methods for the fixation of belief might have its place. I certainly rely on authority a lot, for example, and sometimes I am (I think not irrationally) stubborn. The a priori is a dimension that is foreign to me. John At 12:25 AM 2014-04-12, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: >Sam, Ben, Jeff K., List, > >You point out that "An interesting >interpretation of the moral dimension of FoB is >to be found in the 5th Chapter of Richard >Smyth’s <Reading Peirce Reading>, where Smyth >draws an extended comparison between Peirce’s >argumentative strategy in FoB and the >argumentative strategy Kant uses in his ethics, >particularly the second Critique." A nice way >to test this reconstruction of Peirce's argument >is to ask if the list of methods is meant to be >a complete of the major classes of methods, or >if there is a larger list of possible methods >for fixing belief--some of which he does not consider in this essay. > >The basic gist of Smyth's reconstruction of the >argument is that Peirce is employing a Kantian >strategy, and that the target of his argument is >any philosophical position to tries to ground >the methods of inquiry on material practical >principles. As such, he thinks that Peirce is >borrowing the strategy Kant uses in his ethics >and is putting it to work in his theory of >logic. As such, Peirce is arguing that the >scientific method is the only one that is >grounded on an understanding of the requirements >of logical inquiry as *formal* constraints on >our conduct. As you suggest, the defect of all >material practical principles is that, in one >way or another, they are all based on a >principle of self-love. That is, they all rely >on a pattern of justification that is based on >the idea that the fact that someone has a desire >for X is a good enough reason to adopt X as an >end. Kant points out that this kind of >principle does not function as an >imperative. As such, it is does not function as >a rational constraint on deliberation. When >Peirce claims that we should adopt those ends >that can be consistently pursued, it certainly >has echoes of Kant's claims that moral duties >are grounded on rational constraints of consistency. > >Here is a follow up question that is designed to >see who agrees and who disagrees with this >reconstruction of the argument in >"Fixation": Do you think Peirce's list of >tenacity, authority and the a priori methods is >exhaustive of the major classes of material >principles that one might claim are fundamental >in a normative theory of logic? Or, is this >list of three methods for fixing belief only a >partial list of the possible alternatives to the scientific method? > >I think it is worth noting that, if it is a >partial list, it would be hard to see how Peirce >could argue that the scientific method is the >only method that admits of any distinction of a >right and a wrong way of fixing beliefs. At >most, he could argue that the scientific method >is the only one of the four that he considers >that admits of such a difference, but that >others methods he has not considered might admit of the same difference. > >--Jeff > >Jeff Downard >Associate Professor >Department of Philosophy >NAU >(o) 523-8354 >________________________________________ >From: Sam Bruton [[email protected]] >Sent: Thursday, April 10, 2014 2:03 PM >To: Benjamin Udell; [email protected] >Subject: RE: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal >Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science > >Ben, Jeff, Jeffrey, List, > I appreciate Ben’s reconstruction and > interpretive remarks thanks. With regards to > Jeff’s question about the role of ethics in > FoB, and at the risk of stating the obvious, > paragraph 5.387 seems to me simply shot through > with ethical claims that are clearly distinct > from the various efficiency-related points that > also run through the essay, e.g., “what is more > wholesome than any particular belief is > integrity of belief, and that to avoid looking > into the support of any belief from a fear that > it may turn out rotten is quite as immoral as > it is disadvantageous.” And at the end of the > para., “one who dares not know the truth and > seeks to avoid it, is in a sorry state of mind indeed.” > So perhaps I’m missing the point at > issue, but my simple-minded reconstruction is > that Peirce is arguing that anyone who > experiences doubts (i.e., virtually all of us) > is committed to an interest in arriving at the > truth, or caring about the truth, or something > like that. For all such people, there is an > essentially moral obligation not to avoid > looking at the truth, i.e., an obligation not > to adopt one of the failed three methods > described in the essay. It’s an assertion of > the moral status of epistemic responsibility. Or at least that’s how I take > it. > An interesting interpretation of the > moral dimension of FoB is to be found in the > 5th Chapter of Richard Smyth’s Reading Peirce > Reading, where Smyth draws an extended > comparison between Peirce’s argumentative > strategy in FoB and the argumentative strategy > Kant uses in his ethics, particularly the > second Critique. Hints of that strategy can be > seen in Peirce’s passing reference to the > “costs” of the method of science, and his > praise of the advantages of the other three > methods. Like a commitment to morality, the > method of science may require sacrifice of personal interests. > Hopefully someone else can take these thoughts further. Sam > >From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[email protected]] >Sent: Wednesday, April 09, 2014 2:12 PM >To: [email protected] >Subject: Re: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal >Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science > > >Jeff, Jeffrey, Sam, list, > >Jeff, I have trouble making more of Peirce's >esthetic and ethical frames of inquiry in "The >Fixation of Belief." When the inquirially good >is the inquirially efficient (apart from >countervailing moral concerns such as >involuntary tests of people), it seems a simple >Peircean genus-species relation of the good to >the true. Insofar as theoretical inquiry is >subject to extra-inquirial ends, the ethical and >esthetic issues get more complex, and this >happens inevitably. A lot may be implicit, but >the explicit statements toward the end of >"Fixation" seem to sum up pretty well the >esthetic and ethical frames as conceived of in >that article. But I think that the problem is >probably just me, in need of an IQ boost. > >Anyway, in "Fixation" he is trying to get away >from, or perhaps to _precede_, metaphysical >nominalist-realist arguments over truth, the >real, etc., so he pursues the issues in terms of >belief, belief's security, a hypothesis that >there are reals, etc., and even denies that >anybody cares about truth _per se_. In later >years he embraces the inquirial importance of a >hearty will to truth, and even disparages the >idea of beliefs (in some sense) in genuine >science. But in those later years it is still >essentially truth as eventually distinguished >from falsehood and defined in "Fixation" and >"How to Make Our Ideas Clear" - e.g., that >opinion which, unlike a false opinion, will not >steer one wrong in what one aims at, and the >final opinion that _would_ be reached by >sufficient inquiry - it is truth so >distinguished and presuppositionally defined >that he embraces as inquiry's end. He does not >come to drop the idea that belief and doubt are >important terms in which to understand the ideas >of truth and inquiry - for example in the 1902 >Carnegie application. Thus truth is a belief's >ideal security or 'stability' as some put it - >but it's a stability not only in actual >situations but across would-be situations as >well. I think that Peirce is quite right to see >modal realism as a necessary implication of his kind of pragmatism. > >Peirce in later years allows of practical >certainty, as opposed to theoretical certainty. >A practical general certainty would still in >principle be 'falsifiable', i.e., testable for >falsity, at least by critical discussion. >Otherwise it would be a belief that makes no >practical difference, and thus, as you put it, >not to be prized, not worth having. One might >say that an in-principle untestable belief lacks >all intellectual _vividness_, at least at heart. >It's interesting how you link this with how we >don't value that which comes to us inevitably >and free of cost, risk, etc. I wish that I had >thought of that; you've traced a connection from >logic back through ethics to esthetics. > >There's another point that I can make, however. >In "Fixation", Peirce argues that the scientific >method is, _among the four methods that he >outlines_, the only one that leaves room for its own misapplication. > >Peirce's big picture of inquiry methods is part >of an even bigger picture of methods of learning >and development cognitive and otherwise, which >beckons when one starts to consider esthetic and >ethical frames of inquiry, a bigger picture that >people like me, who are far less encyclopedic >than Peirce, find it helpful to thematize and explore now and then. > > From here onward, my post becomes something of > a ramble. Those who continue should not worry > too much about what I'm 'driving at'. > >One could outline further methods - e.g., the >method of struggle, trial as combat - which >could be seen as a >not-generally-obviously-infallibilistic genus of >which the method of (despotic) authority is an >infallibilistic species, a species such that one >side in combat has become dominant and seemingly >infallible. Then there is the method of >trial-and-error, which is fallibilistic, and is >the method of 'men of experience', whom >Aristotle rated below artisans and scientists, >because the 'men of experience' are least able >to give an account of their supposed knowledge. >Yet Peirce defines a scientific intelligence as >an intelligence capable of learning from >experience. One could argue that the method of >trial-and-error is a rudiment of scientific >method, in a way trial-and-error, especially as >involving personal stakes (even if 'only' those >of one's time, energy, reputation, etc.), is the >struggle-level of scientific inquiry. However, >struggle as trial-and-error is also, in addition >to that, a way of learning not so much >cognitively as volitionally, i.e., some sort of >strengthening or unshackling of virtues or >character strengths, particularly in areas, >arenas so to speak, where the struggle element >is predominant - conflicts for power and >freedom, competition for means and wealth, >more-or-less cultural rivalries for glory, >glamour, and at least non-eclipse, and >more-or-less societal disputes for standing, >honor, legitimacy. From these one could derive >conceptions of (infallibilistic) inquirial >methods of authority - authority of power, >authority of wealth, authority of glamour >(obviously related to the method of the _a >priori_), and authority of status (like the >traditional 'argument from authority', known in >Latin as _argumentum ad verecundiam_ (respect, >reverence, etc.)), which settle opinions by the >wrongs of coercion, corruption, emotional >manipulation, and delusion. Anyway, while all >inquiry involves learning, there is a broad >sense of 'learning' such that not all learning >is cognitive (and even cognitive learning is not >always particularly inquirial or >opinion-fixative even when it is a bit of struggle, e.g., rote memorization). > >Among the methods of authority, perhaps the >biggest temptation in discovery research is the >method of status, especially when it is a method >of _self_-deception, such that one grants >oneself a status of greater knowledgeability, >etc., than one fairly has; it's a temptation of >the intelligent; magicians find it easier to >bewilder or beguile 'smart' people than to do so >with 'stupid' people, by whom magicians mean, >the people who are unimpressed and chuckle, >"well, you did it somehow" (but those people are >obviously smart enough in another way). As >Feynman said, the person whom it is easiest for >one to fool is oneself. Peirce focuses, near the >end of "Fixation," on the closing of one's eyes >or ears to the information or evidence that >might bring one the truth particularly when one >should know better. This closing of one's >perception, in sometimes less guilty ways, plays >a particularly vulnerable role in the method of >tenacity because it is there unprotected by >folds of authority or of aprioristic emulation >of some fermented paradigm; instead there is to >keep practicing and repeating one's initial >opinion, it seems a bit like the gambler's >fallacy, boosted sometimes by some initial luck. >Well, practice and repetition of something that >has shown _some_ success is the core >practical-learning method, not inevitably >infallibilistic, of artisans and more generally >practitioners productive and otherwise; to which >method they add the appreciational method of >devotees (including the religious) - >identification (appreciation) and imitation >(emulation) and, these days, the methods of >reflective disciplines as well (sciences, fine >arts, etc.). What I'm getting at is that some >infallibilistic methods of inquiry can be seen >as misapplications, or at least as echoes, of >methods that have some validity outside of >inquiry as the struggle to settle opinion, and >thus have validity in applications in inquiry >(e.g., one needs to keep _in practice_ in doing >math, etc.), as long as those applications are >not confused with inquiry itself. Anyway, one's >barring of one's own way to truth inhabits the >core of all infallibilistic inquiry. Perhaps one >can reduce all logical sins to this, as long as >one remembers the difference between logical sin >and other logical errors, errors sometimes imposed on one. > >Best, Ben > >On 4/9/2014 1:09 AM, Kasser,Jeff wrote: > >Sorry. I originally sent this only to Ben. > >Sent from my iPhone >Begin forwarded message: > >From: "Kasser,Jeff" ><[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > >Date: April 8, 2014 at 10:54:58 PM MDT >To: Benjamin Udell <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > >Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science > >Hi Ben, Sam, Jeffrey, et al. > >I like Jeffrey's question about the status in >Peirce's argument of the claim that the >scientific method is the only method that leaves >room for its own misapplication. And I like the >answer Ben gave below. Peirce rightly prefers >overlapping strands of argumentation to a single >line of reasoning, but it's hard to resist >raising questions about what in "Fixation" depends on what. > >I tend to trace his argumentative resources back >to the doubt-belief theory. I think Peirce >wants to come as close as he can to deriving >such things as fallibility and openness to >improvement from those resources centered on >Section III of the paper. For belief to be worth >wanting, it has to be something that can go >wrong. Any game that makes it trivially true >that I win every time isn't worth playing, and >if there's no prospect at all of going wrong, >there's no real sense in which one can claim to >be right. So belief couldn't be satisfactory >unless it were, in principle at least, open to >correction. I can use a method that as a matter >of fact guarantees that I can't go wrong, but I >can't think of myself as doing that w/o >undercutting the very notion of success. So such >methods as authority can be used but can't be >voluntarily and clear-headedly adopted. This >comes close to building the hypothesis of >reality into the notion of belief, but Peirce >does that a couple of times in "Fixation," so far as I can tell. > >I'd like to hear and talk more about how you see >the role of ethics and esthetics in the argument >of "Fixation," Ben. I think you and I agree that >the contrast between the efficiency aspects of >the argument and the normative appeals involved >isn't as clear as it's often been taken to be. > >Best to all, > >Jeff >________________________________________ > >From: Benjamin Udell [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> ] >Sent: Tuesday, April 08, 2014 11:10 AM >To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> >Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science > >Jeffrey, Jeff, > >Off to an excellent start! > >Jeffrey, you wrote, > >[Peirce] says: “This is the only one of the >four methods which presents any distinction of a >right and a wrong way.” (EP, vol. 1, 121) >What is Peirce saying here? Let us try to >clarify the bases of this claim. In a number of >places, including the lectures in Reasoning and >the Logic of Things, he stresses and develops >the idea that the scientific method is >self-correcting. I’d like to ask a question >about the relationship between these two claims. > >Peirce means that, of the four methods, the >scientific method is the only one whereby >inquiry, according to the method's own account, >can go wrong as well as right; scientific method >alone among them presupposes, or hypothesizes, >that there are real things that are what they >are independently of the opinion of particular >minds or communities - hence the scientific >method's fallibilism. According to each of the >other three methods' own accounts, inquiry by >the method in the account cannot go wrong. On >the other hand, scientific method is like the >other methods in that, according its own >account, inquiry by it can go right - hence, the >scientific method's rejection of radical >skepticism, a rejection also expressed in the >opposition to merely quarrelsome or verbal >doubt. The scientific method's supposition of >real things, external permanency, to be cognized >albeit fallibly, is what gives it hope of >inquiry's not floundering in opinion's >vicissitudes. The scientific method takes >fallibility as well as the possibility of >success into account by having inquiry genuinely >address genuine doubts. By this it can improve >the security of beliefs, sometimes by changing >them. It lets such doubts in, instead of leaving >them to accrue against overall scientific method itself. > >It seems to me that the claim that the inquirer >is fallible but has the potential for success is >the basis for the scientific method's claim that >inquiry should be self-critical and >self-corrective. The argument does not seem to >me to run in the opposite direction. > >Near the end of "The Fixation of Belief" Peirce >does frame inquiry in terms of ethical and >esthetic issues, even though he did not at that >time regard the studies of esthetics and ethics >as preceding the study of logic. > >http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html > >But, above all, let it be considered that what >is more wholesome than any particular belief is >integrity of belief, and that to avoid looking >into the support of any belief from a fear that >it may turn out rotten is quite as immoral as it >is disadvantageous. The person who confesses >that there is such a thing as truth, which is >distinguished from falsehood simply by this, >that if acted on it should, on full >consideration, carry us to the point we aim at >and not astray, and then, though convinced of >this, dares not know the truth and seeks to >avoid it, is in a sorry state of mind indeed. > >Yes, the other methods do have their merits: a >clear logical conscience does cost something -- >just as any virtue, just as all that we cherish, costs us dear. [....] > >"...immoral...", "Just as any virtue..." - those words point to ethics. >"...just as all that we cherish..." - those >words point to esthetics (in Peirce's sense of 'esthetics'). > >Now, in ethics there is usually the idea of a >struggle, e.g., in virtue ethics, courage is due >boldness (or at least due confident behavior) >despite pressure to do otherwise; prudence is >due caution despite contrary pressure; and so >on. In the above-quoted passage, Peirce sees >issues of struggle, costs, and trade-offs >reaching into issues of one's most general >values, i.e., the esthetic level. "The Fixation >of Belief" starts with the idea of inquiry as >struggle, and this struggle is also a case of >ethical right and wrong and of esthetic good and >bad, in Peirce's view at that time, even though >he didn't yet see the studies of esthetics and >ethics as preceding that of logic. > >As regards your last paragraph, the scientific >method's fallibilism about opinion seems quite >thoroughgoing enough to apply to premisses, >conclusions, methods, etc., since all premisses, >conclusions, and methods that are actually >adopted are adopted on the basis of actual >opinions. The infallibilism of the other three methods seems likewise. > >Best, Ben > >On 4/7/2014 3:12 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > >List, > >In addition to joining Jeff K. in looking >forward to the prospect of bouncing ideas off >each other as we explore this chapter of the ’ ><Guide for the Perplexed>, I’d like t0o start by >saying that I found his introductory remarks >about “The Fixation of Belief” clear and to the point. > >For the sake of getting the discussion started, >I’d like raise a question about a claim Peirce >makes in part V of the essay. He says: “This >is the only one of the four methods which >presents any distinction of a right and a wrong way.” (EP, vol. 1, 121) > >What is Peirce saying here? Let us try to >clarify the bases of this claim. In a number of >places, including the lectures in Reasoning and >the Logic of Things, he stresses and develops >the idea that the scientific method is >self-correcting. I’d like to ask a question >about the relationship between these two claims. > >Peirce seems to suggest that the self-correcting >character of the scientific method is quite >remarkable because it is able to correct for three kinds of errors: >1) in the premises (i.e., the observations) >we’ve used as starting points, >2) in the conclusions we’ve drawn (i.e., >the beliefs we’ve formed) in our scientific reasoning, >3) and in the method itself. > >I want ask a question about these three >different kinds of error. Call them, if you >will, observational errors, errors in our >conclusions, and methodological errors. How >might the claim that the scientific method is >the only one that admits of any distinction of a >right and wrong way be used in arguments to >support each of these three claims about the >self-correcting character of scientific >inquiry? My hunch is that the other three >methods he is considering—tenacity, authority >and the a priori methods--fail on each of these three fronts. > >Yours, > >Jeffrey D. > >Jeff Downard >Associate Professor >Department of Philosophy >NAU >(o) 523-8354 >________________________________________ >From: Kasser,Jeff >[[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> ><mailto:[email protected] > ] >Sent: Monday, April 07, 2014 10:55 AM >To: Jeffrey Brian Downard >Cc: Peirce List >Subject: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science ---------- Professor John Collier [email protected] Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier
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