Yeh, I was thinking more in terms of the existential reasons for faith, not the rational ones. I have never found the rational ones the least convincing, though the modal argument can be a source of special amusement. Real feelings might be a basis for true beliefs (though not especially reliable). I think Hume accepted this much for induction.
John -----Original Message----- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: April 12, 2014 5:58 PM To: John Collier; [email protected] Subject: RE: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science Hi John, In the second Critique, Kant provides a four-fold classification of possible material practical principles. The division is based on two distinctions: internal v. external, and subjective v. objective. As an example of a view that tries to ground morality on internal objective principles, Kant offers the example of Christian Crusius, who was a Protestant Theologian. The arguments Crusius gives for having faith in the goodness of God are grounded in rational principles. The rational principles that serves as the grounds of faith in god are held to be necessary truths of reason. As such, these kinds of arguments are a nice example what Peirce calls the a priori method. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: John Collier [[email protected]] Sent: Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:05 AM To: [email protected] Subject: RE: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science Jeff, List, Well, there is faith. But it is also not very self correcting. I say "not very" since I agree with some that faith is grounded in fear and hope. Resolution of fears or limitations of hopes can alter faith. On a separate issue, I think a close reading of FoB indicates that Peirce thinks that each of the methods for the fixation of belief might have its place. I certainly rely on authority a lot, for example, and sometimes I am (I think not irrationally) stubborn. The a priori is a dimension that is foreign to me. John At 12:25 AM 2014-04-12, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: >Sam, Ben, Jeff K., List, > >You point out that "An interesting >interpretation of the moral dimension of FoB is to be found in the 5th >Chapter of Richard Smyth’s <Reading Peirce Reading>, where Smyth draws >an extended comparison between Peirce’s argumentative strategy in FoB >and the argumentative strategy Kant uses in his ethics, particularly >the second Critique." A nice way to test this reconstruction of >Peirce's argument is to ask if the list of methods is meant to be a >complete of the major classes of methods, or if there is a larger list >of possible methods for fixing belief--some of which he does not >consider in this essay. > >The basic gist of Smyth's reconstruction of the argument is that Peirce >is employing a Kantian strategy, and that the target of his argument is >any philosophical position to tries to ground the methods of inquiry on >material practical principles. As such, he thinks that Peirce is >borrowing the strategy Kant uses in his ethics and is putting it to >work in his theory of logic. As such, Peirce is arguing that the >scientific method is the only one that is grounded on an understanding >of the requirements of logical inquiry as *formal* constraints on our >conduct. As you suggest, the defect of all material practical >principles is that, in one way or another, they are all based on a >principle of self-love. That is, they all rely on a pattern of >justification that is based on the idea that the fact that someone has >a desire for X is a good enough reason to adopt X as an end. Kant >points out that this kind of principle does not function as an >imperative. As such, it is does not function as a rational constraint >on deliberation. When Peirce claims that we should adopt those ends >that can be consistently pursued, it certainly has echoes of Kant's >claims that moral duties are grounded on rational constraints of >consistency. > >Here is a follow up question that is designed to see who agrees and who >disagrees with this reconstruction of the argument in >"Fixation": Do you think Peirce's list of tenacity, authority and the >a priori methods is exhaustive of the major classes of material >principles that one might claim are fundamental in a normative theory >of logic? Or, is this list of three methods for fixing belief only a >partial list of the possible alternatives to the scientific method? > >I think it is worth noting that, if it is a partial list, it would be >hard to see how Peirce could argue that the scientific method is the >only method that admits of any distinction of a right and a wrong way >of fixing beliefs. At most, he could argue that the scientific method >is the only one of the four that he considers that admits of such a >difference, but that others methods he has not considered might admit >of the same difference. > >--Jeff > >Jeff Downard >Associate Professor >Department of Philosophy >NAU >(o) 523-8354 >________________________________________ >From: Sam Bruton [[email protected]] >Sent: Thursday, April 10, 2014 2:03 PM >To: Benjamin Udell; [email protected] >Subject: RE: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal >Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science > >Ben, Jeff, Jeffrey, List, > I appreciate Ben’s reconstruction and interpretive remarks > thanks. With regards to Jeff’s question about the role of ethics in >FoB, and at the risk of stating the obvious, paragraph 5.387 seems to >me simply shot through with ethical claims that are clearly distinct >from the various efficiency-related points that also run through the >essay, e.g., “what is more wholesome than any particular belief is >integrity of belief, and that to avoid looking into the support of any >belief from a fear that it may turn out rotten is quite as immoral as >it is disadvantageous.” And at the end of the para., “one who dares >not know the truth and seeks to avoid it, is in a sorry state of mind >indeed.” > So perhaps I’m missing the point at issue, but my >simple-minded reconstruction is that Peirce is arguing that anyone who >experiences doubts (i.e., virtually all of us) is committed to an >interest in arriving at the truth, or caring about the truth, or >something like that. For all such people, there is an essentially >moral obligation not to avoid looking at the truth, i.e., an >obligation not to adopt one of the failed three methods described in >the essay. It’s an assertion of the moral status of epistemic >responsibility. Or at least that’s how I take it. > An interesting interpretation of the moral dimension of FoB >is to be found in the 5th Chapter of Richard Smyth’s Reading Peirce >Reading, where Smyth draws an extended comparison between Peirce’s >argumentative strategy in FoB and the argumentative strategy Kant >uses in his ethics, particularly the second Critique. Hints of that >strategy can be seen in Peirce’s passing reference to the “costs” of >the method of science, and his praise of the advantages of the other >three methods. Like a commitment to morality, the method of science >may require sacrifice of personal interests. > Hopefully someone else can take these thoughts further. >Sam > >From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[email protected]] >Sent: Wednesday, April 09, 2014 2:12 PM >To: [email protected] >Subject: Re: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal >Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science > > >Jeff, Jeffrey, Sam, list, > >Jeff, I have trouble making more of Peirce's esthetic and ethical >frames of inquiry in "The Fixation of Belief." When the inquirially >good is the inquirially efficient (apart from countervailing moral >concerns such as involuntary tests of people), it seems a simple >Peircean genus-species relation of the good to the true. Insofar as >theoretical inquiry is subject to extra-inquirial ends, the ethical and >esthetic issues get more complex, and this happens inevitably. A lot >may be implicit, but the explicit statements toward the end of >"Fixation" seem to sum up pretty well the esthetic and ethical frames >as conceived of in that article. But I think that the problem is >probably just me, in need of an IQ boost. > >Anyway, in "Fixation" he is trying to get away from, or perhaps to >_precede_, metaphysical nominalist-realist arguments over truth, the >real, etc., so he pursues the issues in terms of belief, belief's >security, a hypothesis that there are reals, etc., and even denies that >anybody cares about truth _per se_. In later years he embraces the >inquirial importance of a hearty will to truth, and even disparages the >idea of beliefs (in some sense) in genuine science. But in those later >years it is still essentially truth as eventually distinguished from >falsehood and defined in "Fixation" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" - >e.g., that opinion which, unlike a false opinion, will not steer one >wrong in what one aims at, and the final opinion that _would_ be >reached by sufficient inquiry - it is truth so distinguished and >presuppositionally defined that he embraces as inquiry's end. He does >not come to drop the idea that belief and doubt are important terms in >which to understand the ideas of truth and inquiry - for example in the >1902 Carnegie application. Thus truth is a belief's ideal security or >'stability' as some put it - but it's a stability not only in actual >situations but across would-be situations as well. I think that Peirce >is quite right to see modal realism as a necessary implication of his >kind of pragmatism. > >Peirce in later years allows of practical certainty, as opposed to >theoretical certainty. >A practical general certainty would still in principle be >'falsifiable', i.e., testable for falsity, at least by critical >discussion. >Otherwise it would be a belief that makes no practical difference, and >thus, as you put it, not to be prized, not worth having. One might say >that an in-principle untestable belief lacks all intellectual >_vividness_, at least at heart. >It's interesting how you link this with how we don't value that which >comes to us inevitably and free of cost, risk, etc. I wish that I had >thought of that; you've traced a connection from logic back through >ethics to esthetics. > >There's another point that I can make, however. >In "Fixation", Peirce argues that the scientific method is, _among the >four methods that he outlines_, the only one that leaves room for its >own misapplication. > >Peirce's big picture of inquiry methods is part of an even bigger >picture of methods of learning and development cognitive and otherwise, >which beckons when one starts to consider esthetic and ethical frames >of inquiry, a bigger picture that people like me, who are far less >encyclopedic than Peirce, find it helpful to thematize and explore now >and then. > > From here onward, my post becomes something of a ramble. Those who > continue should not worry too much about what I'm 'driving at'. > >One could outline further methods - e.g., the method of struggle, trial >as combat - which could be seen as a >not-generally-obviously-infallibilistic genus of which the method of >(despotic) authority is an infallibilistic species, a species such that >one side in combat has become dominant and seemingly infallible. Then >there is the method of trial-and-error, which is fallibilistic, and is >the method of 'men of experience', whom Aristotle rated below artisans >and scientists, because the 'men of experience' are least able to give >an account of their supposed knowledge. >Yet Peirce defines a scientific intelligence as an intelligence capable >of learning from experience. One could argue that the method of >trial-and-error is a rudiment of scientific method, in a way >trial-and-error, especially as involving personal stakes (even if >'only' those of one's time, energy, reputation, etc.), is the >struggle-level of scientific inquiry. However, struggle as >trial-and-error is also, in addition to that, a way of learning not so >much cognitively as volitionally, i.e., some sort of strengthening or >unshackling of virtues or character strengths, particularly in areas, >arenas so to speak, where the struggle element is predominant - >conflicts for power and freedom, competition for means and wealth, >more-or-less cultural rivalries for glory, glamour, and at least >non-eclipse, and more-or-less societal disputes for standing, honor, >legitimacy. From these one could derive conceptions of >(infallibilistic) inquirial methods of authority - authority of power, >authority of wealth, authority of glamour (obviously related to the >method of the _a priori_), and authority of status (like the >traditional 'argument from authority', known in Latin as _argumentum ad >verecundiam_ (respect, reverence, etc.)), which settle opinions by the >wrongs of coercion, corruption, emotional manipulation, and delusion. >Anyway, while all inquiry involves learning, there is a broad sense of >'learning' such that not all learning is cognitive (and even cognitive >learning is not always particularly inquirial or opinion-fixative even >when it is a bit of struggle, e.g., rote memorization). > >Among the methods of authority, perhaps the biggest temptation in >discovery research is the method of status, especially when it is a >method of _self_-deception, such that one grants oneself a status of >greater knowledgeability, etc., than one fairly has; it's a temptation >of the intelligent; magicians find it easier to bewilder or beguile >'smart' people than to do so with 'stupid' people, by whom magicians >mean, the people who are unimpressed and chuckle, "well, you did it >somehow" (but those people are obviously smart enough in another way). >As Feynman said, the person whom it is easiest for one to fool is >oneself. Peirce focuses, near the end of "Fixation," on the closing of >one's eyes or ears to the information or evidence that might bring one >the truth particularly when one should know better. This closing of >one's perception, in sometimes less guilty ways, plays a particularly >vulnerable role in the method of tenacity because it is there >unprotected by folds of authority or of aprioristic emulation of some >fermented paradigm; instead there is to keep practicing and repeating >one's initial opinion, it seems a bit like the gambler's fallacy, >boosted sometimes by some initial luck. >Well, practice and repetition of something that has shown _some_ >success is the core practical-learning method, not inevitably >infallibilistic, of artisans and more generally practitioners >productive and otherwise; to which method they add the appreciational >method of devotees (including the religious) - identification >(appreciation) and imitation >(emulation) and, these days, the methods of reflective disciplines as >well (sciences, fine arts, etc.). What I'm getting at is that some >infallibilistic methods of inquiry can be seen as misapplications, or >at least as echoes, of methods that have some validity outside of >inquiry as the struggle to settle opinion, and thus have validity in >applications in inquiry (e.g., one needs to keep _in practice_ in doing >math, etc.), as long as those applications are not confused with >inquiry itself. Anyway, one's barring of one's own way to truth >inhabits the core of all infallibilistic inquiry. Perhaps one can >reduce all logical sins to this, as long as one remembers the >difference between logical sin and other logical errors, errors >sometimes imposed on one. > >Best, Ben > >On 4/9/2014 1:09 AM, Kasser,Jeff wrote: > >Sorry. I originally sent this only to Ben. > >Sent from my iPhone >Begin forwarded message: > >From: "Kasser,Jeff" ><[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > >Date: April 8, 2014 at 10:54:58 PM MDT >To: Benjamin Udell <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > >Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of >Science > >Hi Ben, Sam, Jeffrey, et al. > >I like Jeffrey's question about the status in Peirce's argument of the >claim that the scientific method is the only method that leaves room >for its own misapplication. And I like the answer Ben gave below. >Peirce rightly prefers overlapping strands of argumentation to a single >line of reasoning, but it's hard to resist raising questions about what >in "Fixation" depends on what. > >I tend to trace his argumentative resources back to the doubt-belief >theory. I think Peirce wants to come as close as he can to deriving >such things as fallibility and openness to improvement from those >resources centered on Section III of the paper. For belief to be worth >wanting, it has to be something that can go wrong. Any game that makes >it trivially true that I win every time isn't worth playing, and if >there's no prospect at all of going wrong, there's no real sense in >which one can claim to be right. So belief couldn't be satisfactory >unless it were, in principle at least, open to correction. I can use a >method that as a matter of fact guarantees that I can't go wrong, but I >can't think of myself as doing that w/o undercutting the very notion of >success. So such methods as authority can be used but can't be >voluntarily and clear-headedly adopted. This comes close to building >the hypothesis of reality into the notion of belief, but Peirce does >that a couple of times in "Fixation," so far as I can tell. > >I'd like to hear and talk more about how you see the role of ethics and >esthetics in the argument of "Fixation," Ben. I think you and I agree >that the contrast between the efficiency aspects of the argument and >the normative appeals involved isn't as clear as it's often been taken >to be. > >Best to all, > >Jeff >________________________________________ > >From: Benjamin Udell [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> ] >Sent: Tuesday, April 08, 2014 11:10 AM >To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> >Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of >Science > >Jeffrey, Jeff, > >Off to an excellent start! > >Jeffrey, you wrote, > >[Peirce] says: “This is the only one of the four methods which >presents any distinction of a right and a wrong way.” (EP, vol. 1, 121) >What is Peirce saying here? Let us try to clarify the bases of this >claim. In a number of places, including the lectures in Reasoning and >the Logic of Things, he stresses and develops the idea that the >scientific method is self-correcting. I’d like to ask a question about >the relationship between these two claims. > >Peirce means that, of the four methods, the scientific method is the >only one whereby inquiry, according to the method's own account, can go >wrong as well as right; scientific method alone among them presupposes, >or hypothesizes, that there are real things that are what they are >independently of the opinion of particular minds or communities - hence >the scientific method's fallibilism. According to each of the other >three methods' own accounts, inquiry by the method in the account >cannot go wrong. On the other hand, scientific method is like the other >methods in that, according its own account, inquiry by it can go right >- hence, the scientific method's rejection of radical skepticism, a >rejection also expressed in the opposition to merely quarrelsome or >verbal doubt. The scientific method's supposition of real things, >external permanency, to be cognized albeit fallibly, is what gives it >hope of inquiry's not floundering in opinion's vicissitudes. The >scientific method takes fallibility as well as the possibility of >success into account by having inquiry genuinely address genuine >doubts. By this it can improve the security of beliefs, sometimes by >changing them. It lets such doubts in, instead of leaving them to >accrue against overall scientific method itself. > >It seems to me that the claim that the inquirer is fallible but has the >potential for success is the basis for the scientific method's claim >that inquiry should be self-critical and self-corrective. The argument >does not seem to me to run in the opposite direction. > >Near the end of "The Fixation of Belief" Peirce does frame inquiry in >terms of ethical and esthetic issues, even though he did not at that >time regard the studies of esthetics and ethics as preceding the study >of logic. > >http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html > >But, above all, let it be considered that what is more wholesome than >any particular belief is integrity of belief, and that to avoid looking >into the support of any belief from a fear that it may turn out rotten >is quite as immoral as it is disadvantageous. The person who confesses >that there is such a thing as truth, which is distinguished from >falsehood simply by this, that if acted on it should, on full >consideration, carry us to the point we aim at and not astray, and >then, though convinced of this, dares not know the truth and seeks to >avoid it, is in a sorry state of mind indeed. > >Yes, the other methods do have their merits: a clear logical conscience >does cost something -- just as any virtue, just as all that we cherish, >costs us dear. [....] > >"...immoral...", "Just as any virtue..." - those words point to ethics. >"...just as all that we cherish..." - those words point to esthetics >(in Peirce's sense of 'esthetics'). > >Now, in ethics there is usually the idea of a struggle, e.g., in virtue >ethics, courage is due boldness (or at least due confident behavior) >despite pressure to do otherwise; prudence is due caution despite >contrary pressure; and so on. In the above-quoted passage, Peirce sees >issues of struggle, costs, and trade-offs reaching into issues of one's >most general values, i.e., the esthetic level. "The Fixation of Belief" >starts with the idea of inquiry as struggle, and this struggle is also >a case of ethical right and wrong and of esthetic good and bad, in >Peirce's view at that time, even though he didn't yet see the studies >of esthetics and ethics as preceding that of logic. > >As regards your last paragraph, the scientific method's fallibilism >about opinion seems quite thoroughgoing enough to apply to premisses, >conclusions, methods, etc., since all premisses, conclusions, and >methods that are actually adopted are adopted on the basis of actual >opinions. The infallibilism of the other three methods seems likewise. > >Best, Ben > >On 4/7/2014 3:12 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > >List, > >In addition to joining Jeff K. in looking forward to the prospect of >bouncing ideas off each other as we explore this chapter of the ’ ><Guide for the Perplexed>, I’d like t0o start by saying that I found >his introductory remarks about “The Fixation of Belief” clear and to >the point. > >For the sake of getting the discussion started, I’d like raise a >question about a claim Peirce makes in part V of the essay. He says: >“This is the only one of the four methods which presents any >distinction of a right and a wrong way.” (EP, vol. 1, 121) > >What is Peirce saying here? Let us try to clarify the bases of this >claim. In a number of places, including the lectures in Reasoning and >the Logic of Things, he stresses and develops the idea that the >scientific method is self-correcting. I’d like to ask a question about >the relationship between these two claims. > >Peirce seems to suggest that the self-correcting character of the >scientific method is quite remarkable because it is able to correct for >three kinds of errors: >1) in the premises (i.e., the observations) >we’ve used as starting points, >2) in the conclusions we’ve drawn (i.e., >the beliefs we’ve formed) in our scientific reasoning, >3) and in the method itself. > >I want ask a question about these three different kinds of error. Call >them, if you will, observational errors, errors in our conclusions, and >methodological errors. How might the claim that the scientific method >is the only one that admits of any distinction of a right and wrong way >be used in arguments to support each of these three claims about the >self-correcting character of scientific inquiry? My hunch is that the >other three methods he is considering—tenacity, authority and the a >priori methods--fail on each of these three fronts. > >Yours, > >Jeffrey D. > >Jeff Downard >Associate Professor >Department of Philosophy >NAU >(o) 523-8354 >________________________________________ >From: Kasser,Jeff >[[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> ><mailto:[email protected] > ] >Sent: Monday, April 07, 2014 10:55 AM >To: Jeffrey Brian Downard >Cc: Peirce List >Subject: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science ---------- Professor John Collier [email protected] Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier
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