Hi Jeff K., Jon, List, Here are a few quick responses about measurement.
1. I was a graduate student at UNC--Chapel Hill, but John Roberts arrived some time after I finished the Ph.D. We did have the opportunity to talk about his work on measurement and the laws of nature during a conference, and there are a number of significant differences between his positions on both measurement and the laws of nature and the positions Peirce developed. In short, Roberts claims that many of the key questions about the foundations of measurement and the nature of the laws of nature (e.g., the symmetries involved, the binding force of the laws, the relations between the laws) can be answered within the special sciences. He is loath to turn to what he calls "speculative metaphysics" for the answers to these kinds of questions. Time and again, he suggests that the positions he is developing are not inconsistent with a modern Humean outlook in the philosophy of science. Peirce, on the other hand, claims that the methods of the special sciences are ill-equipped to answer a number of key questions about both measurement and law. My sense is that Peirce has a considerably more systematic approach in separating different parts of the questions and in trying to answer some parts using the methods of phenomenology, other parts using the methods of normative sciences, and other parts using the methods of metaphysics. 2. Peirce claims that scientific inquiry will tend to converge on a true explanation of what is really the case. He suggests that it is a significant scientific question as to what kinds of measurements should or shouldn't be used for different kinds of observable phenomena. In fact, he suggests that the question is just as basic as asking what kind of classificatory systems should or shouldn't be applied to one or another case of a given phenomena. Let's ask: what is necessary for different lines of inquiry--drawing on different kinds of observations-- to converge in the long run on one stable answer to any meaningful question about what is really the case? I tend to think that Peirce is drawing an a particular understanding of the foundations of scientific measurement as he develops an answer to this kind of question. 3. For my part, I think there is a lot going on that is of philosophical interest in Peirce's understanding of measurement. I've taken a particular interest in his understanding of the place of topology and projective geometry in setting up different metrical geometries. For instance, Peirce seems to place great weight on Cayley's discovery in the sixth memoir on quantics that the projective conception of the absolute can be used to understand the relationship between different kinds of metrical geometries. Klein generalizes this discovery using the tools of group theory in order to clarify and deepen our understanding of the relationship between elliptical, parabolic and hyperbolic systems of metrical relations. This is just one key point that Peirce makes, but I think it is significant because of the analogy that he draws between the geometric conception of the projective absolute and the philosophical conceptions of truth and reality. It is also significant because Peirce is drawing on the mathematical understanding of the symmetries involved (e.g., reflection, translation, rotation) as a basis for clarifying key relations and permissible transformations in his theory of logic--including, for instance, his development and interpretation of the existential graphs. 4. As Jon points out, many people agree with Quine in thinking that the identification of the real numbers with the geometric conception of the line was a significant development in our understanding of measurement. That, at least, is the assumption made by many mathematicians, philosophers and scientists since the mid-point in the 19th century. I wonder what is really gained by making such an identification? Peirce is careful to point out that great geometers such as Euclid were circumspect in their attempts to get to the root of mathematical conceptions that have proven to be central in the development of an adequate metrical understanding of continuous systems--including conceptions such as quanta, magnitude, straight, infinite, connected, etc. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Kasser,Jeff [[email protected]] Sent: Sunday, April 20, 2014 10:00 PM To: [email protected] Subject: RE: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science Hi Jeffrey and other Peircers. Your question about the foundations of measurement is above my pay grade, I'm sorry to say. Do I remember correctly that you're a Chapel Hill Ph.D., Jeffrey? Do you have any views about connections between Peirce and John Roberts' work on explaining laws of nature in terms of groundings for measurements? I'm only dimly familiar with Roberts' work, but measurement and laws of nature get pretty close to the heart of Peirce's concerns. I thought I might toss a couple of other questions in before we fully yield to the Chapter 7 folks. Both of these hearken back to my introductory message. First, Kees contrasts the doubt-belief theory with epistemic agnosticism, which he characterizes as the view that inquiry should proceed undisturbed by passions. I think that this is intriguing and insightful and I'd like to hear more about it. Peirce is sometimes contrasted with James precisely in terms of the latter's insistence on the appropriateness and inescapability of our "passional nature." And Peirce's distrust of individual idiosyncrasies in the JSP papers of the 1860's and especially in *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* can seem to stand in some tension with the doubt-belief theory's tolerance for conative influences on belief. I don't think that any of these considerations indicate that Kees is wrong, but I do think that we could learn a thing or two by thinking about how to situation "Fixation" with respect to some of James's provocative statements about temperament and our willing nature, and I think that we could learn a different thing or two by making it explicit how "Fixation" can be reconciled with some of the earlier and later works. Kees uses epistemic agnosticism in his characterization of the a priori method in "Fixation," which brings me to my second question. Kees explains that this third method of fixing belief "appeals particularly to those who see a strong divide between reason and passions, and who then consider it our main task to free thought from the pernicious influence of the passions" (p. 97). Again, this can sound a bit like James engaging Clifford, but the other question I want to raise concerns how importantly different the a priori method is from its predecessors. Kees tends to emphasize its distinctness, arguing that the a priori method appeals to the content of the belief in trying to settle opinion. Hence the a priori method is like science and unlike the other two in being a genuine method of inquiry. I think that this is tricky and intriguing stuff. Peirce seems to guide us in both directions, saying in the same paragraph that the a priori method "is far more intellectual and respectable from the point of view of reason" than the other two and also that it "does not differ in a very essential way from that of authority." I look forward to our discussion of Chapter 7, whether or not we pick up these loose ends from Chapter 6. Jeff K. ________________________________________ From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, April 17, 2014 11:14 PM To: [email protected] Subject: RE: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science List, I'd like to ask another question about the topic of chapter 6. This question is not about the "Fixation of Belief." Rather, it is about a part of the philosophy of science that does not figure prominently in Kees's discussion. In the first half of the 20th century, a methodological dispute arose between those who were engaged in the special sciences of physics and psychology. At the time, physics was considered a "hard" science because it was based on observations involving exact measurements. The second was considered a "soft" science because it appeared to be based on observations that did not seem to be amenable to such an exact treatment. In time, as the debate came to a head, a expert panel of experts in measurement was asked to take a closer look at the issues. See, for instance, Stanley Smith Stevens, "On the theory of scales of measurement" (1946).. In order to sort out a number of the contested issues, Suppes, Luce, Krantz and Tversky engaged in an ambitious attempt to examine the foundations of measurement in a more systematic and thorough manner. Let's state the question in general terms. What position does Peirce take with respect to the foundations of measurement? If we look at Peirce's work in mathematics generally and on measurement theory in particular, we see him trying to provide a coherent framework for understanding foundations of key conceptions, such as quantity, order, magnitude. How does his position compare to the accounts that have been developed in the 20th century by the likes of Stevens, or by Suppes, Luce, Krantz and Tversky? --Jeff
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