Jeff, list, You ask:
*Do you share my sense that the upshot of this discussion is that such questions as whether the a priori method is superior to authority and tenacity are generally not well posed? * I'm not sure what you mean by this, Jeff. It seems to me that Peirce poses the question relating to this matter of superiority of ways to fix our beliefs very well, and, further, that he was generous--or, at least, fair--in his description of the first three methods (remembering that he did say that the first two methods must "be given up" and that the a priori method *does not differ in a very essential way from that of authority," *and so we must assume that it must be given up too. You continued: *The a priori method shares with the method of science the important feature of selecting beliefs based on their content rather than on the basis of their convenience and whether they're currently believed. But, given Peirce's rejection of what Kees calls epistemic agnosticism, this strength can, as you put it, prove to be a weakness. What seems like the exercise of reason is often closer to something more like convenience, and so the a priori method lacks a transparency that the earlier methods sometimes possess.* So far so good, I think, at least in a sense, especially if you mean by saying "the a priori method lacks a transparency the the earlier methods sometimes possess" that it is not as crude as those others. Indeed, it is the opposite, it is *artful*. The a priori method is like art (say for a metaphysician, Peirce's example in the quotation I gave in my earlier post) in so far as the artist has *to himself* offered good reasons why, say, the structure, content, and characters of a play conform to a reality that he is quite certain is well expressed through his writing and *will* move his audience. Indeed, as far as I'm concerned, the a priori method works exceedingly well for art. But I share Peirce's final negative evaluation of it because it is too personal a view of reality for the purposes of philosophy, which seeks a more general, a more intellectual truth than the a priori method is capable of providing. (Yet, believe me, the insights and truths which art and sentiment express are some of the most profound Truths we have available, and often *much* more so than mere intellectual Truths--but, again, they are not strictly speaking philosophical/scientific truths; they are more sui generis even when it is possible to extrapolate certain 'truths about humans', say, from them). I'm not sure what to make of your last sentence: *And the weaknesses of the earlier methods, genuine though they are, also involve real strengths, since the fact that something is currently believed is a consideration in its favor.* How is "the fact that something is currently believed [. . .] a consideration in its favor"? This may well be the case for conservative sentiment (in Peirce's sense as expressed in, for example, his discussion of what constitutes "a good mother" in the first of the 1898 Cambridge Conference lectures). But for philosophy and the rest of science, commonsense beliefs relating to intellectual truth with have to be put to the test (critical commonsensism, pragmatism, scientific experimentation, etc.). Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 12:39 PM, Kasser,Jeff <[email protected]>wrote: > I agree with everything you say here, Gary. Do you share my sense that the > upshot of this discussion is that such questions as whether the a priori > method is superior to authority and tenacity are generally not well posed? > The a priori method shares with the method of science the important feature > of selecting beliefs based on their content rather than on the basis of > their convenience and whether they're currently believed. But, given > Peirce's rejection of what Kees calls epistemic agnosticism, this strength > can, as you put it, prove to be a weakness. What seems like the exercise of > reason is often closer to something more like convenience, and so the a > priori method lacks a transparency that the earlier methods sometimes > possess. And the weaknesses of the earlier methods, genuine though they > are, also involve real strengths, since the fact that something is > currently believed is a consideration in its favor. > > Best, > > Jeff K. > ________________________________________ > From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] > Sent: Monday, April 21, 2014 3:28 PM > To: Kasser,Jeff > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: Re: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of > Science > > Jeff, Jeffrey, List, > > I want to take a stab at your second question concerning the a priori > method, Jeff, and in doing that somewhat obliquely respond to Jeffrey's > earlier question as to whether Peirce might have left out some important > other methods--especially for 'doing' philosophy--than the three he gave in > "Fixation" and, perhaps, in that omission undermined the claims he made for > the superiority of the 'scientific method'. [note: I've quoted from > "Fixation" at some length below, so those who are familiar with the article > may skim or even skip over those quotations. The quoted passages can also > be found in EP1:118-123.] > > Jeff wrote: > > Kees explains that this third method [the a priori method] of fixing > belief "appeals particularly to those who see a strong divide between > reason and passions, and who then consider it our main task to free thought > from the pernicious influence of the passions" (p. 97). [. . . ] but the > other question I want to raise concerns how importantly different the a > priori method is from its predecessors. Kees tends to emphasize its > distinctness, arguing that the a priori method appeals to the content of > the belief in trying to settle opinion. Hence the a priori method is like > science and unlike the other two in being a genuine method of inquiry. I > think that this is tricky and intriguing stuff. Peirce seems to guide us in > both directions, saying in the same paragraph that the a priori method "is > far more intellectual and respectable from the point of view of reason" > than the other two and also that it "does not differ in a very essential > way from that of authority." > > I agree with you, Jeff, that it is important to get clear on what the > strengths and weaknesses of the a priori method are as compared with the > other methods, especially the method of science. Early in his discussion of > the a priori method Peirce discusses what at first appears to be a strength > of it. Even before that, however, he remarks that the first two methods > must "both be given up" and that almost in an intellectually developmental > sense that a "different new method of settling opinions must be adopted." > > CP5.382. They will further perceive that such doubts as these must exist > in their minds with reference to every belief which seems to be determined > by the caprice either of themselves or of those who originated the popular > opinions. The willful adherence to a belief, and the arbitrary forcing of > it upon others, must, therefore, both be given up. A different new method > of settling opinions must be adopted, that shall not only produce an > impulse to believe, but shall also decide what proposition it is which is > to be believed. Let the action of natural preferences be unimpeded, then, > and under their influence let men, conversing together and regarding > matters in different lights, gradually develop beliefs in harmony with > natural causes. > > Peirce immediately and quite interestingly, I think, compares the a priori > method to the ways in which art has matured, here considering metaphysical > philosophies (which, he pointedly remarks, "have not usually rested upon > any observed facts") to be one of these art forms: > > This method resembles that by which conceptions of art have been brought > to maturity. The most perfect example of it is to be found in the history > of metaphysical philosophy. Systems of this sort have not usually rested > upon any observed facts, at least not in any great degree. They have been > chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seemed "agreeable to > reason." This is an apt expression; it does not mean that which agrees with > experience, but that which we find ourselves inclined to believe. > > So, this strength for art turns out not to be a strength for any belief > system meant to be built on facticity and in agreement with experience > despite its being "far more intellectual" than the others already discussed > in "Fixation". Yet, while this method is superior to the others, on the > other hand, "its failure has been the most manifest." > > CP5.383. This method is far more intellectual and respectable from the > point of view of reason than either of the others which we have noticed. > Indeed, as long as no better method can be applied, it ought to be > followed, since it is then the expression of instinct which must be the > ultimate cause of belief in all cases. But its failure has been the most > manifest. It makes of inquiry something similar to the development of > taste; but taste, unfortunately, is always more or less a matter of > fashion, and accordingly metaphysicians have never come to any fixed > agreement, but the pendulum has swung backward and forward between a more > material and a more spiritual philosophy, from the earliest times to the > latest. [. . .] We have examined into this a priori method as something > which promised to deliver our opinions from their accidental and capricious > element. But development, while it is a process which eliminates the effect > of some casual circumstances, only magnifies that of others. > > So we are led back to the essential need to fix our (intellectual) beliefs > based on the facts of experience. > > Now, there are some people [. . .] who, when they see that any belief of > theirs is determined by any circumstance extraneous to the facts, will from > that moment not merely admit in words that that belief is doubtful, but > will experience a real doubt of it, so that it ceases in some degree at > least to be a belief. > > Therefore, a method is needed for fixing belief which is not based on what > is agreeable to the reason of any individual or group of individuals, but > "determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency -- by > something upon which our thinking has no effect [. . .] the method [being] > such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same." > > Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in > more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters > are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our > senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as > different as are our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of > the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and > truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason > enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion. The new conception > here involved is that of Reality. > > And the method of science differs from the a priori method, superior > though it may be to the other two methods, in precisely this: > > The very essence of [the a priori method] is to think as one is inclined > to think [. . . ] But with the scientific method the case is different. I > may start with known and observed facts to proceed to the unknown; and yet > the rules which I follow in doing so may not be such as investigation would > approve. The test of whether I am truly following the method is not an > immediate appeal to my feelings and purposes, but, on the contrary, itself > involves the application of the method. > > And, as we discover in the next article in the series, "How To Make Our > Ideas Clear," the "application of the method" involves the application of > the pragmatic maxim. So, as to Jeffrey's question as to whether or not > there are other legitimate methods of fixing belief which Peirce did not > deal with, I would say that the self-correcting method of science will > always prove superior if the goal is the truth of some reality based in > experience (with the exception, I would say, of those truths which can only > be expressed through art--and even a purified religion would be "art > completed" according to Peirce, or sentiment, as considered in the first of > the 1898 lectures). > > Peirce concludes with a plea for the "integrity of belief": > > CP5.387 . . . above all, let it be considered that what is more wholesome > than any particular belief is integrity of belief, and that to avoid > looking into the support of any belief from a fear that it may turn out > rotten is quite as immoral as it is disadvantageous. The person who > confesses that there is such a thing as truth, which is distinguished from > falsehood simply by this, that if acted on it should, on full > consideration, carry us to the point we aim at and not astray, and then, > though convinced of this, dares not know the truth and seeks to avoid it, > is in a sorry state of mind indeed. > > And of course that last idea will lead Peirce exactly to the formulation > of the pragmatic maxim. > > Best, > > Gary > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 1:00 AM, Kasser,Jeff <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Hi Jeffrey and other Peircers. Your question about the foundations of > measurement is above my pay grade, I'm sorry to say. Do I remember > correctly that you're a Chapel Hill Ph.D., Jeffrey? Do you have any views > about connections between Peirce and John Roberts' work on explaining laws > of nature in terms of groundings for measurements? I'm only dimly familiar > with Roberts' work, but measurement and laws of nature get pretty close to > the heart of Peirce's concerns. > > I thought I might toss a couple of other questions in before we fully > yield to the Chapter 7 folks. Both of these hearken back to my introductory > message. First, Kees contrasts the doubt-belief theory with epistemic > agnosticism, which he characterizes as the view that inquiry should proceed > undisturbed by passions. I think that this is intriguing and insightful and > I'd like to hear more about it. Peirce is sometimes contrasted with James > precisely in terms of the latter's insistence on the appropriateness and > inescapability of our "passional nature." And Peirce's distrust of > individual idiosyncrasies in the JSP papers of the 1860's and especially in > *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* can seem to stand in some tension with > the doubt-belief theory's tolerance for conative influences on belief. I > don't think that any of these considerations indicate that Kees is wrong, > but I do think that we could learn a thing or two by thinking about how to > situation "Fixation" with respect to some of James's provocative statements > about temperament and our willing nature, and I think that we could learn a > different thing or two by making it explicit how "Fixation" can be > reconciled with some of the earlier and later works. > > Kees uses epistemic agnosticism in his characterization of the a priori > method in "Fixation," which brings me to my second question. Kees explains > that this third method of fixing belief "appeals particularly to those who > see a strong divide between reason and passions, and who then consider it > our main task to free thought from the pernicious influence of the > passions" (p. 97). Again, this can sound a bit like James engaging > Clifford, but the other question I want to raise concerns how importantly > different the a priori method is from its predecessors. Kees tends to > emphasize its distinctness, arguing that the a priori method appeals to the > content of the belief in trying to settle opinion. Hence the a priori > method is like science and unlike the other two in being a genuine method > of inquiry. I think that this is tricky and intriguing stuff. Peirce seems > to guide us in both directions, saying in the same paragraph that the a > priori method "is far more intellectual and respectable from the point of > view of reason" than the other two and also that it "does not differ in a > very essential way from that of authority." > > I look forward to our discussion of Chapter 7, whether or not we pick up > these loose ends from Chapter 6. > > Jeff K. > ________________________________________ > From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [[email protected]<mailto: > [email protected]>] > Sent: Thursday, April 17, 2014 11:14 PM > To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: RE: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy > of Science > > List, > > I'd like to ask another question about the topic of chapter 6. This > question is not about the "Fixation of Belief." Rather, it is about a part > of the philosophy of science that does not figure prominently in Kees's > discussion. > > In the first half of the 20th century, a methodological dispute arose > between those who were engaged in the special sciences of physics and > psychology. At the time, physics was considered a "hard" science because > it was based on observations involving exact measurements. The second was > considered a "soft" science because it appeared to be based on observations > that did not seem to be amenable to such an exact treatment. In time, as > the debate came to a head, a expert panel of experts in measurement was > asked to take a closer look at the issues. See, for instance, Stanley > Smith Stevens, "On the theory of scales of measurement" (1946).. In order > to sort out a number of the contested issues, Suppes, Luce, Krantz and > Tversky engaged in an ambitious attempt to examine the foundations of > measurement in a more systematic and thorough manner. > > Let's state the question in general terms. What position does Peirce take > with respect to the foundations of measurement? > > If we look at Peirce's work in mathematics generally and on measurement > theory in particular, we see him trying to provide a coherent framework for > understanding foundations of key conceptions, such as quantity, order, > magnitude. How does his position compare to the accounts that have been > developed in the 20th century by the likes of Stevens, or by Suppes, Luce, > Krantz and Tversky? > > --Jeff > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, > send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected]<mailto: > [email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of > the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
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