List, I'll continue now with section 7.1, an analysis of "How To Make Our Ideas Clear," which Kees calls "a sustained attempt at a methodology" for doing just that.
According to Peirce we enter each inquiry with a jumble of confused ideas concerning whatever topic we are inquiring into, so that it behooves us to clarify each important idea: 'idea' defined by Peirce as "an immediate object of thought." Kees links this to phenomenology by stating that, for Peirce, making our ideas clear involves "the process of extracting something from the phaneron so that it optimally serves some cognitive purpose." This may well be. But how does this 'extraction' occur given that the phaneron is one? Andre de Tienne has argued that a second branch of phenomenology is needed, one which he calls (while suggesting that the term is inexact, which it most surely is) *Iconoscopy*, a science in part meant to connect the myriad objects to the three universal categories discovered in the phaneron. (I have argued that yet a third branch of phenomenology may be required in "the process of extracting something from the phaneron [to serve] some cognitive purpose," a phenomenological science which analyzes trichotomic relations involving all three categories, what I've called *Category Theory* ever since Joe Ransdell referred to it as such in commenting on the tricategorial diagrams (trikons) which appeared in my first paper and ppt slides on the topic). I would be interested in what Kees and others see involved in this process moving from the phaneron to what is extracted from it "for cognitive purposes." It is, for example, presently unclear to me whether Iconoscopy and Category Theory need employ only a logica utens, or whether they retrospectively, as it were, employ a logica docens, specifically, Peirce's logic as semeiotic (once it is sufficiently developed). The chapter continues with a discussion of the three grades of clearness of an idea as outlined in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (and. much later, in "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God"). These 'grades' may, I think, be associated with the categories (reading 1ns -> 2ns -> 3ns): (1ns) familiarity with/recognition of a concept |> (3ns) enlivening the abstract def. by developing habits of conduct following the PM (2ns) "an abstract logical analysis of the concept into its ultimate elements" (CP6.481), i.e. an abstract definition Kees emphasizes that a "pragmatistic definition" will therefore necessarily be "open-ended" in the sense that we can always come to know *more* about the object, knowledge which might then modify the definition. Still, even a pragmatistic definition--as a mere "jumble of particulars" (CSP)--would make for a very poor kind of concept clarifier. So, for Peirce, the several parts must must be connected in a kind of diagram (icon), one which will tend to have an influence "creative of a living mind." This would all seem to follow naturally from considering that logic as semeiotic, influenced by normative esthetics and ethics, is concerned with thought capable of self-control, which takes the form of developing habits of thought directed towards the end of achieving greater reasonableness. The PM is applied by Peirce exclusively to "intellectual", which is to say, *general* concepts, such that the only meaning which a concept can have is in its conceivable effects upon conduct. By 'practical' in this context Peirce does not at all refer to physical actions dependent on brute force (2ns), but rather on establishing exactly those habits tending toward furthering the development of reasonableness (3ns) in oneself and in the world (involving also social habits which, as Kees insightfully notes, tend to shape us more than we shape them, this paralleling Peirce's notion that we are in ideas more than they are in us). This section of the chapter concludes with one of Peirce's definitions of pragmatism which elucidates his notion of 'practical' for pragmatism: *[Pragmatism is] the doctrine that the conceivable practical consequences (i.e. consequences for rational conduct) completely exhaust the INTELLECTUAL meaning of any concept.* Again, 'practical' here cannot be taken to refer to particular acts or observations. On the other hand such general conceptual habits can be brought to bear on situations in the actual world. Peirce illustrates this from time to time, here in a homely boyhood story concerning his brother, Herbert, and involving a fire in the family kitchen. *The result [of developing intellectual habits of possible deliberate conduct] will be that when a similar occasion actually arises for the first time it will be found that the habit of really reacting in that way is already established. I remember that one day at my father's table, my mother spilled some burning spirits on her skirt. Instantly, before the rest of us had had time to think what to do, my brother, Herbert, who was a small boy, had snatched up the rug and smothered the fire. We were astonished at his promptitude, which, as he grew up, proved to be characteristic. I asked him how he came to think of it so quickly. He said, "I had considered on a previous day what I would do in case such an accident should occur." This act of stamping with approval, "endorsing" as one's own, an imaginary line of conduct so that it shall give a general shape to our actual future conduct is what we call a resolve. It is not at all essential to the practical belief, but only a somewhat frequent attachment (CP5.538).* This is not meant to be exactly an illustration of the application of the PM (something Phyllis will take up later in the Chapter 7 discussion), but I think it is sufficiently analogous to one as to 'flesh out', as it were, a maxim which can at first glance appear extraordinary abstract, the original famous one sentence statement of it containing the word 'conceive' or 'conception' five times! In any event, each time I reflect on the above Herbertian example I think of Bain's definition of belief with which we began the discussion of this chapter, namely,* that upon which one is prepared to act*. i think that what Peirce means in saying in the last sentence quoted above that the 'endorsement' of ones belief "is not at all essential to the practical belief, but only a somewhat frequent attachment," is that at least some of our pragmatic beliefs develop without our needing to say to ourselves the equivalent of "Yes, this I firmly believe and do intend to act upon when a situation warrants it," although this can and often enough does occur. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 1:28 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]>wrote: > List, > > Welcome to the discussion of Chapter 7 of *Peirce: A Guide for the > Perplexed*. I'm very much looking forward to co-emceeing this discussion > with Phyllis Chiasson as I consider her to be something of an expert in > Peirce's pragmatism, especially when one considers it, as Peirce did in the > 1903 Harvard Lectures, as "the logic of abduction." While over the years > I've read a number of her papers, articles, and encyclopedia entries, I am > only now reading her book, *Peirce's Pragmatism:The Design for Thinking*. > While I've just begun it, I can already say that I regret not having read > it earlier. > > Our plan is for me to introduce in two posts the first half of the chapter > comprising a brief reflection on the history of pragmatism, and then > section 7.1, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." Several days later Phyllis will > do something similar with 7.2, Proving pragmatism, and 7.3, Some > applications of the pragmatic maxim. This is an exceedingly rich chapter in > which Kees brings together a number of salient points from the chapters > preceding it while explicitly anticipating the next, the penultimate > chapter, "Truth and reality." > > One of the things which I most admire about Kees' book is that, in this > regard analogous to good criticism (and whether or not one fully agrees > with any particular interpretation or not), his explication and analysis > lead one *into* the work, Speaking personally, such an approach makes me > want to reread and more deeply reflect on some of the seminal works Kees > considers, something which I've been doing. I have found that, looking at > the book as a whole, I tend to agree with his interpretations more often > than I disagree with them. Yet, and I think that this was brought home to > me by Joe Ransdell, discussion is most fruitful in those, shall we say, > *crevices > *or even *crevasses of analysis* where we find ourselves not in complete > agreement with or even quite opposed to another's thinking. So, the > following remarks are meant to be taken in that spirit. > > Kees begins with the familiar "legend" that modern pragmatism has its > origins in the discussions of The Metaphysical Club (TMC) in Cambridge > (which included Peirce, of course, but also William James, Chauncey Wright, > Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., and others), most particularly in their > reflections on Bain's definition of *belief* as "that upon which a man is > prepared to act." Indeed, Peirce will remark that his pragmatism almost > necessarily follows from Bain's definition, and not only pragmatism, but > his theory of inquiry as well. > > As Kees notes, the notion that Peirce is the father of pragmatism very > likely comes from William James' pointing to the pragmatic maxim (PM) as it > was first articulated in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" in James' widely > discussed 1898 Berkeley Union address. Kees claims that the singular > importance of the PM is that it "leaves no intellectual conception, > philosophical or scientific, untouched, and as a result it causes the > entire fabric of thought to shift in significant ways." Thus, it is in fact > as uniquely important as James considered it to be. > > My first question is, What can we think of this very broad claim as to the > foundational character of the PM for *all* of science, philosophy, and > thought generally? Does Kees perhaps go too far here? If so, in what > direction(s)? If not, what are the implications of the PM being > *this*foundational for present and future thought and inquiry? > > My own sense is that even in the sciences of discovery that it is > difficult to see how the PM is foundational in relation to the sciences > which precede logic (I might also disagree with Kees as to which branch of > logic as semeiotic the PM belongs, something I'll comment on when we get to > 7.3) and especially his claim that it is foundational to theoretical > mathematics (despite Kees' discussion of π in 7.3, which seems to me to > apply more to applied than to pure mathematics) and most especially to > phaneroscopy. For example, Kees quotes Peirce in 7.2 to the effect that > pragmatism "is a study *guided* by mathematics" (118, emphasis added). In > another place Peirce says that the express purpose of the PM is to clarify > words and concepts in *metaphysics*. Now once *that* is accomplished one > can readily see how it might effect sciences further down in his > classification of sciences, notably, the special sciences. But "*all > intellectual conception, philosophic or scientific*"? > > The chapter continues with a brief history of late 19th century pragmatism > and how, for better or for worse, James' version dominated the intellectual > scene. His metaphor of truth as the "cash value" of ideas appeared crass > and materialistic to many thinkers (then and now), perhaps contributing to > the fact that pragmatism in all its forms was poorly received by the > philosophical community even though, as Kees notes, both men argued that it > was indeed a very old and even noble idea, Peirce even finding it > adumbrated in Jesus' saying: "by their fruits you may know them." > > Kees concludes this prefatory segment of the chapter by commenting on > James' biographer, Ralph Barton Perry's notion, that modern pragmatism was > formed "as a result of James' misunderstanding of Peirce." Contra Perry, > Kees argues that when one looks at James' early work one finds his > pragmatism already formed well before Peirce had published his famous > essay. He judges James' version of pragmatism to be just "another strand" > of it, probably conceived during the years of TMC. That this version gained > great popularity, almost completely overshadowing Peirce's--and yet was so > far from Peirce's own understanding of the doctrine as to, shall we say, > intellectually *lead astray*--famously caused Peirce to rename his > doctrine 'pragmaticism', a word "ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers." > > It seems to me. whether or not James developed his pragmatic ideas early > on, that Perry makes a good point, namely, that James, lacking thorough > training in the modern logic of his era, found it most difficult to grasp > Peirce's pragmatistic conceptions (consider, for example, James' remarks > about the incomprehensibility of Peirce's 1903 lectures on pragmatism in > letters written at that time). And so, even if both men were influenced by > Bain's dictum during the days of TMC, James, in promulgating his own > (again, as Kees correctly notes, nominalistic) brand of pragmatism, while > yet conflating his idiosyncratic conception with Peirce's radically > different one, did Peircean pragmatism a disservice. It is my sense that > classical pragmatism *was*, as Perry argues, indeed formed under James', > not Peirce's, ideas. In never truly grasping Peirce's doctrine, while yet > ascribing the seminal pragmatic idea to him (and associating his own work > with *that*), James strongly impeded--and, I believe, even to the present > day--the fullest comprehension and furthest development of Peircean > pragmatism. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >
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