Gary F., List, Gary, thanks for this message. We seem to see things a bit differently terminologically, and there are a couple of substantive matters upon which we seem to be in disagreement as well. You concluded your interesting comments on the question of moving from the phaneron to what is extracted from it for cognitive purposes:
GF: The connection is that just as phaneroscopy looks for the essential elements of the phaneron, a "scientific definition" aims to identify the essential elements of the concept. So, to begin with, the elements we're looking to extract from the phaneron would seem to analogous to the elements which factor in a "scientific definition". But that doesn't get us very far. You continued: GF: Kees in 7.1 quotes Peirce as saying that "a concept is the living influence upon us of a *diagram*, or*icon*, with whose several parts are connected in thought an equal number of feelings or ideas"; so it makes sense to regard this logical analysis as "iconoscopy" (De Tienne's term), and as a process which moves us from the prelogical into the realm of logic. This forms part of the larger process whose method we call "pragmatism" or pragmaticism, which I think of as cyclic, or spiralling if it makes some kind of progress. While "Iconoscopy" is, indeed, de Tienne's term, you may recall that in his paper on that topic that he finds his own term not quite right: *AdT: The fact is that Peirce often uses the word 'image' in many different contexts, from the mathematical to the psychological through the logical, and that not all of his uses refer to the same thing. But the stronger reason that favors using the word 'image' at this juncture rather than the word 'icon' is precisely that Peirce gave the word 'icon' a technical definition that removes it from the field of phaneral experience to the benefit of semeiotic, while he frequently uses the word 'image' in order to insist on the experiential dimension that accompanies icons, whether it be phenomenological or psychological (de Tienne, in "Iconoscopy between Phaneroscopy and Semeiotic").* Now calling it something like, say, 'imagoscopy', would certainly be to give it a name ugly enough to protect it from kidnappers. Nonetheless, I agree with the thrust of the above quotation, namely, that 'icon' is a technical term in semeiotic, so perhaps less suitable for use in phenomenology. On the other hand, despite his reservations, de Tienne settled on 'iconoscopy'. You continued: GF: I'm reluctant to say anything about "Category Theory" as a further step along the pragmatistic path, for two reasons. One is that the definition we arrive at by logical analysis or "iconoscopy" (such as the definition of *sign* that Peirce works out in MS 318) does not necessarily make explicit use of the three "categories" (though of course they are implicit everywhere in concepts, and there are often good reasons for making them explicit). I'm a bit confused here as you seem to have leaped from iconoscopy to speculative grammar in speaking of a "logical analysis. . .such as the definition of sign that Peirce works out (etc.)" DeTienne writes that iconoscopy does none of the following: "makes assertions, formulates hypotheses, expresses doubts, holds reasonings, or offers interpretations." Rather, the iconoscopist extracts *images* "of things categorial" (de Tienne). My sense is that both phanerscopy and iconoscopy are methodologically studies which individuals take up, who then generalize their findings. In any event, you continued: GF: The other is that I've been reading Zalamea's book on *Peirce's Logic of Continuity*, which has a lot to say about category theory *in mathematics* and how it is related to Peirce's logic and especially to existential graphs. I'm not mathematician enough to follow all of Zalamea's argument, but some of his excitement about Peircean and post-Peircean developments in the graphs has rubbed off on me. One result is that I'm inclined to leave the term "category theory" to the mathematicians rather than apply it to a subdivision of Peirce's classification of sciences. I mentioned once or twice on the list that I met with this kind of terminological argument/resistance regarding my use of the term 'vector' (to refer to one of the six paths possible through a trichotomic relation) from mathematicians attending the ICCS conferences in the first decade of this century. Fortunately, there were a number of folk at those very inter-disciplinary gatherings who defended my use of it, the principal argument being that 'vector' is a term employed not only in mathematics, but also in physics, computer science, nursing, biology, business, etc. The ICCS mathematicians came to agree that they did not have an exclusive claim to that term. So, while mathematicians may want to claim "category theory" as their own exclusive term, I would argue that, as with 'vector', that they have no legitimate right to do so. Additionally, in the context of Peircean phenomenology (or wherever in Peirce's classification of the sciences that category theory may fall), I doubt that there could be any confusion as to what 'category' means in that expression. Finally, and in passing, I earlier noted that indeed it wasn't I but rather Joe Ransdell who first used "category theory" to refer to the analysis of trichotomic relations (that is, 3-category, or tri-categorial relations in Peirce's sense of, especially, genuine trichotomic relations). Btw, Mats Bergman once suggested that I call this science 'Schematology', but I find that term rather too vague, and category theory *much more specific* as to the matter it studies. As for your comments on "the proof of pragmatism," although I tend to agree with them, I'll hold off on discussing them until Phyllis takes it up a bit later in the discussion. Perhaps she'll want to comment on them then. Best, Gary R. GF: As for "the proof of pragmatism," I now see it as a climax of Peirce's whole philosophical journey, and his two major works of around 1906 (MS 318 and the "Prolegoma to an Apology for Pragmaticism") bring together his semiotic, his diagrammatology (work on the graphs and iconicity), his phaneroscopy and his logic of abduction into a unified framework(!) that he calls pragmaticism. The EP2 editors go so far as to say that "his proof is complete" in MS 318 (EP2:398), but the more I pore through his work of this period, the more I think that he showed why it can never be complete, any more than Mind (or Nature) can be complete. *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 11:41 AM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > Returning to Gary's question about moving from the phaneron to what is > extracted from it 'for cognitive purposes' -- I don't know whether my > impressions will advance the discussion, but I might as well voice them > anyway. > > > > First, the act of "extracting" anything from the phaneron is (to me) > essentially the act of making it an object of attention, i.e. focussing on > it as *a* phenomenon of some kind. Then, if we're doing science, the > question of *what* kind arises; and if the object of our attention is a > concept, that question amounts to asking for a definition of it. Peirce > makes it clear in MS 318 (EP2:403) and elsewhere that one frames a > scientific definition by "phaneroscopic" analysis; the quotation marks are > Peirce's, and to me they suggest that the analysis is a logical one in the > sense of *logica docens*, and therefore an outgrowth (rather than a part) > of phaneroscopy in its strict prelogical sense. The connection is that just > as phaneroscopy looks for the essential elements of the phaneron, a > "scientific definition" aims to identify the essential elements of the > concept. > > > > Kees in 7.1 quotes Peirce as saying that "a concept is the living > influence upon us of a *diagram*, or *icon*, with whose several parts are > connected in thought an equal number of feelings or ideas"; so it makes > sense to regard this logical analysis as "iconoscopy" (De Tienne's term), > and as a process which moves us from the prelogical into the realm of > logic. This forms part of the larger process whose method we call > "pragmatism" or pragmaticism, which I think of as cyclic, or spiralling if > it makes some kind of progress. > > > > I'm reluctant to say anything about "Category Theory" as a further step > along the pragmatistic path, for two reasons. One is that the definition we > arrive at by logical analysis or "iconoscopy" (such as the definition of > *sign* that Peirce works out in MS 318) does not necessarily make > explicit use of the three "categories" (though of course they are implicit > everywhere in concepts, and there are often good reasons for making them > explicit). The other is that I've been reading Zalamea's book on *Peirce's > Logic of Continuity*, which has a lot to say about category theory *in > mathematics* and how it is related to Peirce's logic and especially to > existential graphs. I'm not mathematician enough to follow all of Zalamea's > argument, but some of his excitement about Peircean and post-Peircean > developments in the graphs has rubbed off on me. One result is that I'm > inclined to leave the term "category theory" to the mathematicians rather > than apply it to a subdivision of Peirce's classification of sciences. > > > > As for "the proof of pragmatism," I now see it as a climax of Peirce's > whole philosophical journey, and his two major works of around 1906 (MS 318 > and the "Prolegoma to an Apology for Pragmaticism") bring together his > semiotic, his diagrammatology (work on the graphs and iconicity), his > phaneroscopy and his logic of abduction into a unified framework(!) that he > calls pragmaticism. The EP2 editors go so far as to say that "his proof is > complete" in MS 318 (EP2:398), but the more I pore through his work of this > period, the more I think that he showed why it can never be complete, any > more than Mind (or Nature) can be complete. Maybe that's too vague to be > worth saying, but it's all I can manage at the moment! > > > > gary f. > > > > } Experience and scientific understanding are like two legs without which > we cannot walk. [Varela, Thompson and Rosch] { > > www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics > > > > > > *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 22-Apr-14 12:45 AM > > List, > > > > I'll continue now with section 7.1, an analysis of "How To Make Our Ideas > Clear," which Kees calls "a sustained attempt at a methodology" for doing > just that. > > > > According to Peirce we enter each inquiry with a jumble of confused ideas > concerning whatever topic we are inquiring into, so that it behooves us to > clarify each important idea: 'idea' defined by Peirce as "an immediate > object of thought." Kees links this to phenomenology by stating that, for > Peirce, making our ideas clear involves "the process of extracting > something from the phaneron so that it optimally serves some cognitive > purpose." > > > > This may well be. But how does this 'extraction' occur given that the > phaneron is one? Andre de Tienne has argued that a second branch of > phenomenology is needed, one which he calls (while suggesting that the term > is inexact, which it most surely is) *Iconoscopy*, a science in part > meant to connect the myriad objects to the three universal categories > discovered in the phaneron. (I have argued that yet a third branch of > phenomenology may be required in "the process of extracting something from > the phaneron [to serve] some cognitive purpose," a phenomenological science > which analyzes trichotomic relations involving all three categories, what > I've called *Category Theory* ever since Joe Ransdell referred to it as > such in commenting on the tricategorial diagrams (trikons) which appeared > in my first paper and ppt slides on the topic). > > > > I would be interested in what Kees and others see involved in this process > moving from the phaneron to what is extracted from it "for cognitive > purposes." It is, for example, presently unclear to me whether Iconoscopy > and Category Theory need employ only a logica utens, or whether they > retrospectively, as it were, employ a logica docens, specifically, Peirce's > logic as semeiotic (once it is sufficiently developed). > > > > The chapter continues with a discussion of the three grades of clearness > of an idea as outlined in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (and. much later, > in "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God"). These 'grades' may, I > think, be associated with the categories (reading 1ns -> 2ns -> 3ns): > > > > (1ns) familiarity with/recognition of a concept > > |> (3ns) enlivening the abstract def. by developing habits of conduct > following the PM > > (2ns) "an abstract logical analysis of the concept into its ultimate > elements" (CP6.481), i.e. an abstract definition > > > > Kees emphasizes that a "pragmatistic definition" will therefore > necessarily be "open-ended" in the sense that we can always come to know > *more* about the object, knowledge which might then modify the > definition. Still, even a pragmatistic definition--as a mere "jumble of > particulars" (CSP)--would make for a very poor kind of concept clarifier. > So, for Peirce, the several parts must must be connected in a kind of > diagram (icon), one which will tend to have an influence "creative of a > living mind." > > > > This would all seem to follow naturally from considering that logic as > semeiotic, influenced by normative esthetics and ethics, is concerned with > thought capable of self-control, which takes the form of developing habits > of thought directed towards the end of achieving greater reasonableness. > The PM is applied by Peirce exclusively to "intellectual", which is to say, > *general* concepts, such that the only meaning which a concept can have > is in its conceivable effects upon conduct. By 'practical' in this context > Peirce does not at all refer to physical actions dependent on brute force > (2ns), but rather on establishing exactly those habits tending toward > furthering the development of reasonableness (3ns) in oneself and in the > world (involving also social habits which, as Kees insightfully notes, tend > to shape us more than we shape them, this paralleling Peirce's notion that > we are in ideas more than they are in us). > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
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