No apologies needed. I have no copy of the book at hand so I was raking my brain wondering how I could have screwed up so badly. In my opinion too the PM clearly falls within speculative rhetoric. I'm glad that Ben found I had not, though running through the quotes I think that I should have made myself clearer.
Cheers, Kees Sent from my iPhone > On Apr 23, 2014, at 6:58 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > Kees, List, > > I want to, and as profusely as possible, apologize for repeatedly and > erroneously stating that Kees places pragmatism in speculative grammar when > he explicitly says, near the end of the chapter, that "pragmatism is a > strictly regulative principle in the normative science of logic, or, to be > more precise, in speculative rhetoric" (123-4). > > What threw me off was his writing earlier in the chapter that pragmatism is > grounded in speculative grammar, which is quite a different matter (thanks to > Ben for bringing this to my attention). I translated that 'grounded' into > 'situated' in my thinking and promptly forgot the quotation from 123-4 above. > > The passage by which I led myself astray is as follows: > > For the purpose of grounding pragmatism [. . .] all we need is [speculative > grammar], as pragmatism follows straightforwardly from Peirce's definition of > the sign, which falls within the purview of speculative grammar. In Chapter 5 > we saw that Peirce defined the sign as anything that is so determined by an > object and so determines an interpreter that the latter is thereby determined > mediately by the object that determines the sign. . . From this, Peirce > argues, we can conclude that "the meaning of any sign is its rightful > effect". . . (117) > > Shortly after Kees quotes Peirce: > > The being of a symbol consists in the real fact that something surely will be > experienced if certain conditions be satisfied. Namely, it will influence the > thought and conduct of its interpreter. Every word is a symbol. Every > sentence is a symbol. Every book is a symbol. Every representamen [or sign] > depending upon conventions is a symbol. (CP4.447) > > And in the same paragraph Kees comments: > > Peirce ground pragmatism not in any laws of metaphysics or psychology but in > "a logical and non-psychological study of the essential nature of signs" > (NEM2;520F) (118). > > So, again, my deepest apologies to Kees. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > >> On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 12:16 PM, Cornelis de Waal <[email protected]> wrote: >> Gary, List, >> >> >> >> First of all, of course, many thanks to Gary for kicking off Chapter 7 and >> another apology for remaining relatively quiet. Simply too much is happening >> this spring. >> >> >> >> I think that my response to Gary’s first question is very much along the >> lines of what Ben Udell writes. The comment that the PM "leaves no >> intellectual conception, philosophical or scientific, untouched, and as a >> result it causes the entire fabric of thought to shift in significant >> ways"is not meant to put the PM somehow at the foundation of all thought. >> That would most certainly be wrong. My inspiration was a very different one. >> One of my gripes with people, especially non-pragmatists, discussing the >> pragmatist conception of truth, is that they treat it as a position that can >> be isolated from the broader philosophical orientation called pragmatism and >> subsequently evaluated against other positions, such as foundationalism, >> coherentism, and reliabilism. This ignores the fact that the pragmatist >> conception of truth is a product of applying the PM to an abstractly defined >> concept of truth, and that this same strategy must be used not just for the >> term truth, but for all (intellectual) concepts that feature into the >> argument. So to properly evaluate the pragmatist conception of truth one >> also need to apply the PM to concepts such as foundation, coherence, >> reliability, etc. The pragmatic maxim is a general maxim applying to all >> intellectual concepts, and it does not allow you to just pick and choose. >> >> >> >> To this a few points should be added. First, the PM is only one of three >> methods of getting our ideas clear and builds on the other two. There are >> certainly cases where using the first or second method suffices or is >> preferable. Second, we should keep track of where the PM features within the >> division of the sciences. Gary objects that the PM would not be >> “foundational in relation to the sciences which precede logic.” I agree, but >> if you want to talk about these sciences you should ensure that the terms >> you use are clear, and for the pragmatist using the PM will typically be the >> preferred way of doing this. This raises the interesting question whether it >> is even possible to talk about these sciences without hopelessly distorting >> them in the process. It is quite clear that Peirce thinks such is the case >> when we try to talk about the phaneron. Third, it is sometimes preferable to >> have one’s terms be vague. This is the position Peirce takes, for instance, >> toward God. >> >> >> >> One of the problematic links in the division of the sciences is the one, >> discussed by Gary in his second post, between phaneroscopy and the other >> positive sciences. How can we extract anything out of the phaneron? I agree >> with Gary that I don’t say much about it, and as far as I know neither does >> Peirce. This is certainly an area that needs significant work by further >> fleshing out phaneroscopy, as Gary and André have been trying to do, and by >> doing the same for esthetics. >> >> >> >> As for my criticism of Perry, there is, I think, a distinction to be made >> between James’s pragmatism being the product of him misunderstanding Peirce >> and James developing his own pragmatist position from his Metaphysical club >> discussions with Peirce, Greene, Wright, and others, and subsequently, or >> concurrently, misunderstanding Peirce’s views. I think Perry, and Gary too, >> lean to the former while I’m more inclined to opt for the latter. Much is >> written on Peirce’s influence on James, but James’s influence on Peirce >> should certainly not be underestimated. I like to think of them as two great >> thinkers who deeply influenced each other while also misunderstanding one >> another. >> >> >> >> Cheers, >> >> >> >> Kees >> >> >> From: Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> Reply-To: Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> Date: Tuesday, April 22, 2014 12:45 AM >> To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> >> Cc: Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]>, K <[email protected]> >> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 7, Pragmatism >> >> List, >> >> I'll continue now with section 7.1, an analysis of "How To Make Our Ideas >> Clear," which Kees calls "a sustained attempt at a methodology" for doing >> just that. >> >> According to Peirce we enter each inquiry with a jumble of confused ideas >> concerning whatever topic we are inquiring into, so that it behooves us to >> clarify each important idea: 'idea' defined by Peirce as "an immediate >> object of thought." Kees links this to phenomenology by stating that, for >> Peirce, making our ideas clear involves "the process of extracting something >> from the phaneron so that it optimally serves some cognitive purpose." >> >> This may well be. But how does this 'extraction' occur given that the >> phaneron is one? Andre de Tienne has argued that a second branch of >> phenomenology is needed, one which he calls (while suggesting that the term >> is inexact, which it most surely is) Iconoscopy, a science in part meant to >> connect the myriad objects to the three universal categories discovered in >> the phaneron. (I have argued that yet a third branch of phenomenology may be >> required in "the process of extracting something from the phaneron [to >> serve] some cognitive purpose," a phenomenological science which analyzes >> trichotomic relations involving all three categories, what I've called >> Category Theory ever since Joe Ransdell referred to it as such in commenting >> on the tricategorial diagrams (trikons) which appeared in my first paper and >> ppt slides on the topic). >> >> I would be interested in what Kees and others see involved in this process >> moving from the phaneron to what is extracted from it "for cognitive >> purposes." It is, for example, presently unclear to me whether Iconoscopy >> and Category Theory need employ only a logica utens, or whether they >> retrospectively, as it were, employ a logica docens, specifically, Peirce's >> logic as semeiotic (once it is sufficiently developed). >> >> The chapter continues with a discussion of the three grades of clearness of >> an idea as outlined in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (and. much later, in "A >> Neglected Argument for the Reality of God"). These 'grades' may, I think, be >> associated with the categories (reading 1ns -> 2ns -> 3ns): >> >> (1ns) familiarity with/recognition of a concept >> |> (3ns) enlivening the abstract def. by developing habits of conduct >> following the PM >> (2ns) "an abstract logical analysis of the concept into its ultimate >> elements" (CP6.481), i.e. an abstract definition >> >> Kees emphasizes that a "pragmatistic definition" will therefore necessarily >> be "open-ended" in the sense that we can always come to know more about the >> object, knowledge which might then modify the definition. Still, even a >> pragmatistic definition--as a mere "jumble of particulars" (CSP)--would make >> for a very poor kind of concept clarifier. So, for Peirce, the several parts >> must must be connected in a kind of diagram (icon), one which will tend to >> have an influence "creative of a living mind." >> >> This would all seem to follow naturally from considering that logic as >> semeiotic, influenced by normative esthetics and ethics, is concerned with >> thought capable of self-control, which takes the form of developing habits >> of thought directed towards the end of achieving greater reasonableness. The >> PM is applied by Peirce exclusively to "intellectual", which is to say, >> general concepts, such that the only meaning which a concept can have is in >> its conceivable effects upon conduct. By 'practical' in this context Peirce >> does not at all refer to physical actions dependent on brute force (2ns), >> but rather on establishing exactly those habits tending toward furthering >> the development of reasonableness (3ns) in oneself and in the world >> (involving also social habits which, as Kees insightfully notes, tend to >> shape us more than we shape them, this paralleling Peirce's notion that we >> are in ideas more than they are in us). >> >> This section of the chapter concludes with one of Peirce's definitions of >> pragmatism which elucidates his notion of 'practical' for pragmatism: >> >> [Pragmatism is] the doctrine that the conceivable practical consequences >> (i.e. consequences for rational conduct) completely exhaust the INTELLECTUAL >> meaning of any concept. >> >> Again, 'practical' here cannot be taken to refer to particular acts or >> observations. On the other hand such general conceptual habits can be >> brought to bear on situations in the actual world. Peirce illustrates this >> from time to time, here in a homely boyhood story concerning his brother, >> Herbert, and involving a fire in the family kitchen. >> >> The result [of developing intellectual habits of possible deliberate >> conduct] will be that when a similar occasion actually arises for the first >> time it will be found that the habit of really reacting in that way is >> already established. I remember that one day at my father's table, my mother >> spilled some burning spirits on her skirt. Instantly, before the rest of us >> had had time to think what to do, my brother, Herbert, who was a small boy, >> had snatched up the rug and smothered the fire. We were astonished at his >> promptitude, which, as he grew up, proved to be characteristic. I asked him >> how he came to think of it so quickly. He said, "I had considered on a >> previous day what I would do in case such an accident should occur." This >> act of stamping with approval, "endorsing" as one's own, an imaginary line >> of conduct so that it shall give a general shape to our actual future >> conduct is what we call a resolve. It is not at all essential to the >> practical belief, but only a somewhat frequent attachment (CP5.538). >> >> This is not meant to be exactly an illustration of the application of the PM >> (something Phyllis will take up later in the Chapter 7 discussion), but I >> think it is sufficiently analogous to one as to 'flesh out', as it were, a >> maxim which can at first glance appear extraordinary abstract, the original >> famous one sentence statement of it containing the word 'conceive' or >> 'conception' five times! In any event, each time I reflect on the above >> Herbertian example I think of Bain's definition of belief with which we >> began the discussion of this chapter, namely, that upon which one is >> prepared to act. >> >> i think that what Peirce means in saying in the last sentence quoted above >> that the 'endorsement' of ones belief "is not at all essential to the >> practical belief, but only a somewhat frequent attachment," is that at least >> some of our pragmatic beliefs develop without our needing to say to >> ourselves the equivalent of "Yes, this I firmly believe and do intend to act >> upon when a situation warrants it," although this can and often enough does >> occur. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> >> >>> On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 1:28 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> List, >>> >>> Welcome to the discussion of Chapter 7 of Peirce: A Guide for the >>> Perplexed. I'm very much looking forward to co-emceeing this discussion >>> with Phyllis Chiasson as I consider her to be something of an expert in >>> Peirce's pragmatism, especially when one considers it, as Peirce did in the >>> 1903 Harvard Lectures, as "the logic of abduction." While over the years >>> I've read a number of her papers, articles, and encyclopedia entries, I am >>> only now reading her book, Peirce's Pragmatism:The Design for Thinking. >>> While I've just begun it, I can already say that I regret not having read >>> it earlier. >>> >>> Our plan is for me to introduce in two posts the first half of the chapter >>> comprising a brief reflection on the history of pragmatism, and then >>> section 7.1, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." Several days later Phyllis will >>> do something similar with 7.2, Proving pragmatism, and 7.3, Some >>> applications of the pragmatic maxim. This is an exceedingly rich chapter in >>> which Kees brings together a number of salient points from the chapters >>> preceding it while explicitly anticipating the next, the penultimate >>> chapter, "Truth and reality." >>> >>> One of the things which I most admire about Kees' book is that, in this >>> regard analogous to good criticism (and whether or not one fully agrees >>> with any particular interpretation or not), his explication and analysis >>> lead one into the work, Speaking personally, such an approach makes me want >>> to reread and more deeply reflect on some of the seminal works Kees >>> considers, something which I've been doing. I have found that, looking at >>> the book as a whole, I tend to agree with his interpretations more often >>> than I disagree with them. Yet, and I think that this was brought home to >>> me by Joe Ransdell, discussion is most fruitful in those, shall we say, >>> crevices or even crevasses of analysis where we find ourselves not in >>> complete agreement with or even quite opposed to another's thinking. So, >>> the following remarks are meant to be taken in that spirit. >>> >>> Kees begins with the familiar "legend" that modern pragmatism has its >>> origins in the discussions of The Metaphysical Club (TMC) in Cambridge >>> (which included Peirce, of course, but also William James, Chauncey Wright, >>> Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., and others), most particularly in their >>> reflections on Bain's definition of belief as "that upon which a man is >>> prepared to act." Indeed, Peirce will remark that his pragmatism almost >>> necessarily follows from Bain's definition, and not only pragmatism, but >>> his theory of inquiry as well. >>> >>> As Kees notes, the notion that Peirce is the father of pragmatism very >>> likely comes from William James' pointing to the pragmatic maxim (PM) as it >>> was first articulated in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" in James' widely >>> discussed 1898 Berkeley Union address. Kees claims that the singular >>> importance of the PM is that it "leaves no intellectual conception, >>> philosophical or scientific, untouched, and as a result it causes the >>> entire fabric of thought to shift in significant ways." Thus, it is in fact >>> as uniquely important as James considered it to be. >>> >>> My first question is, What can we think of this very broad claim as to the >>> foundational character of the PM for all of science, philosophy, and >>> thought generally? Does Kees perhaps go too far here? If so, in what >>> direction(s)? If not, what are the implications of the PM being this >>> foundational for present and future thought and inquiry? >>> >>> My own sense is that even in the sciences of discovery that it is difficult >>> to see how the PM is foundational in relation to the sciences which precede >>> logic (I might also disagree with Kees as to which branch of logic as >>> semeiotic the PM belongs, something I'll comment on when we get to 7.3) and >>> especially his claim that it is foundational to theoretical mathematics >>> (despite Kees' discussion of π in 7.3, which seems to me to apply more to >>> applied than to pure mathematics) and most especially to phaneroscopy. For >>> example, Kees quotes Peirce in 7.2 to the effect that pragmatism "is a >>> study guided by mathematics" (118, emphasis added). In another place Peirce >>> says that the express purpose of the PM is to clarify words and concepts in >>> metaphysics. Now once that is accomplished one can readily see how it might >>> effect sciences further down in his classification of sciences, notably, >>> the special sciences. But "all intellectual conception, philosophic or >>> scientific"? >>> >>> The chapter continues with a brief history of late 19th century pragmatism >>> and how, for better or for worse, James' version dominated the intellectual >>> scene. His metaphor of truth as the "cash value" of ideas appeared crass >>> and materialistic to many thinkers (then and now), perhaps contributing to >>> the fact that pragmatism in all its forms was poorly received by the >>> philosophical community even though, as Kees notes, both men argued that it >>> was indeed a very old and even noble idea, Peirce even finding it >>> adumbrated in Jesus' saying: "by their fruits you may know them." >>> >>> Kees concludes this prefatory segment of the chapter by commenting on >>> James' biographer, Ralph Barton Perry's notion, that modern pragmatism was >>> formed "as a result of James' misunderstanding of Peirce." Contra Perry, >>> Kees argues that when one looks at James' early work one finds his >>> pragmatism already formed well before Peirce had published his famous >>> essay. He judges James' version of pragmatism to be just "another strand" >>> of it, probably conceived during the years of TMC. That this version gained >>> great popularity, almost completely overshadowing Peirce's--and yet was so >>> far from Peirce's own understanding of the doctrine as to, shall we say, >>> intellectually lead astray--famously caused Peirce to rename his doctrine >>> 'pragmaticism', a word "ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers." >>> >>> It seems to me. whether or not James developed his pragmatic ideas early >>> on, that Perry makes a good point, namely, that James, lacking thorough >>> training in the modern logic of his era, found it most difficult to grasp >>> Peirce's pragmatistic conceptions (consider, for example, James' remarks >>> about the incomprehensibility of Peirce's 1903 lectures on pragmatism in >>> letters written at that time). And so, even if both men were influenced by >>> Bain's dictum during the days of TMC, James, in promulgating his own >>> (again, as Kees correctly notes, nominalistic) brand of pragmatism, while >>> yet conflating his idiosyncratic conception with Peirce's radically >>> different one, did Peircean pragmatism a disservice. It is my sense that >>> classical pragmatism was, as Perry argues, indeed formed under James', not >>> Peirce's, ideas. In never truly grasping Peirce's doctrine, while yet >>> ascribing the seminal pragmatic idea to him (and associating his own work >>> with that), James strongly impeded--and, I believe, even to the present >>> day--the fullest comprehension and furthest development of Peircean >>> pragmatism. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary >>> >>> Gary Richmond >>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>> Communication Studies >>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> >> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or >> "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go >> to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY >> of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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