Gary, list,
I think you're off to a solid start!
You wrote,
> My first question is, What can we think of this very broad claim
as to the foundational character of the [pragmatic maxim] for all of
science, philosophy, and thought generally? Does Kees perhaps go too
far here?
"Foundational" was, I think, not quite the right word, but I find it
difficult to think of the right word in the context that Kees was
discussing. The pragmatic maxim applies to all conceptions, so it's
extremely sweeping. It is not a formal principle in mathematics, but it
is part of the _/logica utens/_. Or at least so Peirce's ideas imply.
Peirce holds that abductive inference is involved in doing mathematics,
and that pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference. Mathematicians
don't often formally express the guesswork that has led them to their
deductive proofs. However, when a proof has not been found for an
important thesis or conjecture, mathematicians often enough state
non-deductive arguments for or against it. I don't know a lot about such
arguments, but I think think that they do often enough consider the
implications of a claim's truth/falsity for nontrivial mathematical
structures, especially ones that have already been the object of
considerable study; such implications seem a mathematical version of
'practical implications'.
Best, Ben
On 4/21/2014 1:28 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
List,
Welcome to the discussion of Chapter 7 of Peirce: A Guide for the
Perplexed. I'm very much looking forward to co-emceeing this
discussion with Phyllis Chiasson as I consider her to be something of
an expert in Peirce's pragmatism, especially when one considers it, as
Peirce did in the 1903 Harvard Lectures, as "the logic of abduction."
While over the years I've read a number of her papers, articles, and
encyclopedia entries, I am only now reading her book, Peirce's
Pragmatism: The Design for Thinking. While I've just begun it, I can
already say that I regret not having read it earlier.
Our plan is for me to introduce in two posts the first half of the
chapter comprising a brief reflection on the history of pragmatism,
and then section 7.1, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." Several days
later Phyllis will do something similar with 7.2, Proving pragmatism,
and 7.3, Some applications of the pragmatic maxim. This is an
exceedingly rich chapter in which Kees brings together a number of
salient points from the chapters preceding it while explicitly
anticipating the next, the penultimate chapter, "Truth and reality."
One of the things which I most admire about Kees' book is that, in
this regard analogous to good criticism (and whether or not one fully
agrees with any particular interpretation or not), his explication and
analysis lead one /into/ the work, Speaking personally, such an
approach makes me want to reread and more deeply reflect on some of
the seminal works Kees considers, something which I've been doing. I
have found that, looking at the book as a whole, I tend to agree with
his interpretations more often than I disagree with them. Yet, and I
think that this was brought home to me by Joe Ransdell, discussion is
most fruitful in those, shall we say, /crevices / or even /crevasses
of analysis/ where we find ourselves not in complete agreement with or
even quite opposed to another's thinking. So, the following remarks
are meant to be taken in that spirit.
Kees begins with the familiar "legend" that modern pragmatism has its
origins in the discussions of The Metaphysical Club (TMC) in Cambridge
(which included Peirce, of course, but also William James, Chauncey
Wright, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., and others), most particularly in
their reflections on Bain's definition of /belief/ as "that upon which
a man is prepared to act." Indeed, Peirce will remark that his
pragmatism almost necessarily follows from Bain's definition, and not
only pragmatism, but his theory of inquiry as well.
As Kees notes, the notion that Peirce is the father of pragmatism very
likely comes from William James' pointing to the pragmatic maxim (PM)
as it was first articulated in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" in James'
widely discussed 1898 Berkeley Union address. Kees claims that the
singular importance of the PM is that it "leaves no intellectual
conception, philosophical or scientific, untouched, and as a result it
causes the entire fabric of thought to shift in significant ways."
Thus, it is in fact as uniquely important as James considered it to be.
My first question is, What can we think of this very broad claim as to
the foundational character of the PM for /all/ of science, philosophy,
and thought generally? Does Kees perhaps go too far here? If so, in
what direction(s)? If not, what are the implications of the PM being
/this/ foundational for present and future thought and inquiry?
My own sense is that even in the sciences of discovery that it is
difficult to see how the PM is foundational in relation to the
sciences which precede logic (I might also disagree with Kees as to
which branch of logic as semeiotic the PM belongs, something I'll
comment on when we get to 7.3) and especially his claim that it is
foundational to theoretical mathematics (despite Kees' discussion of π
in 7.3, which seems to me to apply more to applied than to pure
mathematics) and most especially to phaneroscopy. For example, Kees
quotes Peirce in 7.2 to the effect that pragmatism "is a study
/guided/ by mathematics" (118, emphasis added). In another place
Peirce says that the express purpose of the PM is to clarify words and
concepts in /metaphysics/. Now once /that/ is accomplished one can
readily see how it might effect sciences further down in his
classification of sciences, notably, the special sciences. But "/*all
* intellectual conception, philosophic or scientific/"?
The chapter continues with a brief history of late 19th century
pragmatism and how, for better or for worse, James' version dominated
the intellectual scene. His metaphor of truth as the "cash value" of
ideas appeared crass and materialistic to many thinkers (then and
now), perhaps contributing to the fact that pragmatism in all its
forms was poorly received by the philosophical community even though,
as Kees notes, both men argued that it was indeed a very old and even
noble idea, Peirce even finding it adumbrated in Jesus' saying: "by
their fruits you may know them."
Kees concludes this prefatory segment of the chapter by commenting on
James' biographer, Ralph Barton Perry's notion, that modern pragmatism
was formed "as a result of James' misunderstanding of Peirce." Contra
Perry, Kees argues that when one looks at James' early work one finds
his pragmatism already formed well before Peirce had published his
famous essay. He judges James' version of pragmatism to be just
"another strand" of it, probably conceived during the years of TMC.
That this version gained great popularity, almost completely
overshadowing Peirce's--and yet was so far from Peirce's own
understanding of the doctrine as to, shall we say, intellectually
/lead astray/ --famously caused Peirce to rename his doctrine
'pragmaticism', a word "ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers."
It seems to me. whether or not James developed his pragmatic ideas
early on, that Perry makes a good point, namely, that James, lacking
thorough training in the modern logic of his era, found it most
difficult to grasp Peirce's pragmatistic conceptions (consider, for
example, James' remarks about the incomprehensibility of Peirce's 1903
lectures on pragmatism in letters written at that time). And so, even
if both men were influenced by Bain's dictum during the days of TMC,
James, in promulgating his own (again, as Kees correctly notes,
nominalistic) brand of pragmatism, while yet conflating his
idiosyncratic conception with Peirce's radically different one, did
Peircean pragmatism a disservice. It is my sense that classical
pragmatism /was/ , as Perry argues, indeed formed under James', not
Peirce's, ideas. In never truly grasping Peirce's doctrine, while yet
ascribing the seminal pragmatic idea to him (and associating his own
work with /that/ ), James strongly impeded--and, I believe, even to
the present day--the fullest comprehension and furthest development of
Peircean pragmatism.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
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