Eugene, Michael, List, Eugene wrote:
"I see no reason for calling Peirce a structuralist, (042714-1) since even a structure, in Peirce, is a habit-process, however slow or even seemingly invariant that inveterate habit may be: it remains potentially subject to growth. Why not simply acknowledge Peirces thoroughgoing processualism?" It seems to me that it may be useful (pragmatic ?) to recognize two aspects of "structures" -- (i) something that remains invariant upon transformation, and (ii) something that evolves (or varies) continuously with time. These two kinds of structures occur in biology widely -- (i) genes remain mostly invariant within an organism's 'ontogenic" lifetime, and (ii) genes of a species constantly change/mutate over the evolutionary (or phylogenic) time scale. The information carried by the former structure may be referred to as synchronic while that carried by the latter diachronic, to borrow the terms from linguists [1]. With all the best. Sung ____________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Reference: [1] Ji, S. (2012). Synchronic Versus Diachronic Information. In: Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. Section 4.5, pp. 92-95. PDF available at conformn.net under Publications < Book Chapters. > Response to Michael Shapiroâs post that Peirce should be seen as a > structuralist. Shapiro: âThe use by Peirce of the form "rationalized" > (rather than "rational") as a modifier of "variety" in the quotation above > should be taken advisedly. This use of the participial form, with its > adversion to process, should serve as a caveat that when Peirce talks > about "objective idealism," what he ought to have said is "objectified > idealism." > > Peirce: âThe one intelligible theory of the universe is that of > objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming > physical lawsâ Peirce, CP 6.25. > > Note âbecoming.â And even those physical laws are still subject to > evolution. A habit is a process, semiosis is an inferential process, > ârationalized varietyâ is a kind of habituated variety yet still in > process. I see no reason for calling Peirce a structuralist, since even a > structure, in Peirce, is a habit-process, however slow or even seemingly > invariant that inveterate habit may be: it remains potentially subject to > growth. Why not simply acknowledge Peirceâs thoroughgoing > processualism? > > Gene Halton > > > From: Michael Shapiro [mailto:poo...@earthlink.net] > Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2014 7:51 AM > To: PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 > > Dear Fellow-Listers, > > I'd like to offer up the following as a take on ch. 7 and an anticipation > of ch. 8, from the perspective of a non-philosopher interested in > developing a Peircean theory of language for the twenty-first century: > > Because he was a practicing scientist in the modern sense, > Peirce is the one great philosopher who escapes my definition > of a philosopher as someone who only solves problems of his > own devising. This makes him also a proto-structuralist (a > structuralist avant la lettre). > The essential concept of structuralism, whether applied to > physics or linguistics or anthropology, is that of invariance > under transformation. This makes theory, following Peirce's > whole philosophy and his pragmaticism in particular, the > rationalized explication of variety: "[U]nderlying all other > laws is the only tendency which can grow by its own virtue, > the tendency of all things to take habits .... In so far as > evolution follows a law, the law or habit, instead of being a > movement from homogeneity to heterogeneity, is growth from > difformity to uniformity. But the chance divergences from laws > are perpetually acting to increase the variety of the world, > and are checked by a sort of natural selection and otherwise > ... , so that the general result may be described as > 'organized heterogeneity,' or, better, rationalized variety'' > (CP 6.101). Or, translating law and habit into the appropriate > phenomenological category: "Thirdness ... is an essential > ingredient of reality" (EP 2:345). > Once we properly understand structuralism not as the > putatively debunked epistemology that originated in Geneva > with Saussure, but rather as the revised, essentially > correct version originating with Jakobson in Prague and > Hjelmslev in Copenhagen, we can recognize the patterning of > Thirdness and Secondness in languageââthe so-called > "passkey semiotic"ââfor what it is. Consequently, the > fundamental notion of alternation between basic form and > contextual variant becomes understandable as immanent in > theory, and not merely a construct or an artifact of > description. The importance of this notion cannot be > overestimated. > A child learning its native language, for instance, is > exactly in the same position as an analyst. It has to > determine which linguistic form is basic, and which is a > contextual variant. Take a simple example from English, > that of the voiceless stops > English voiceless (actually, tense) stops are aspirated > when they are word-initial or begin a stressed syllable, as > in pen, ten, Ken. They are unaspirated when immediately > following word-initial s, as in spun, stun, skunk. After an > s elsewhere in a word they are normally unaspirated as > well, except when the cluster is heteromorphemic and the > stop belongs to an unbound morpheme; compare dis[t]end vs. > dis[tÊ°]aste. Word-final voiceless stops are optionally > aspirate. > This variation makes aspiration non-distinctive > (non-phonemic) in English, unlike, say, in Ancient Greek or > Hindi, where aspirated stops change the meaning of words by > comparison with items that have their unaspirated > counterparts ceteris paribus. > I think it is only by taking such variation for what it is, > i. e., the working out of Thirdness in the context of > Secondness, that we can we understand what Peirce had in > mind with his version of Pragmatism. > Best regards, > Michael > P. S. The use by Peirce of the form "rationalized" (rather than > "rational") as a modifier of "variety" in the quotation above should be > taken advisedly. This use of the participial form, with its adversion to > process, should serve as a caveat that when Peirce talks about "objective > idealism," what he ought to have said is "objectified idealism." This > slight grammatical change puts the meaning of the phrase (and the > doctrine!) in a whole newââand completely acceptableââlight. >
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