Jerry wrote: "Consider the triad, "quali-sign - icon - rhema" (042914-1) in terms of CSP's assertions about chemical radicals and medads. How do relate this triad to either physics or mathematics? Or, from the perspective of rhetoric - grammar - logic? (Only recently, to my considerable delight, have I resolved this conundrum in relation to the logic of relatives for chemistry.)"
Can you elaborate on your recent resolution of the conundrum ? With all the best. Sung > > List, John: > > Interesting perspectives. > > I myself see the issue of "structure or process" to be a very old one, > going back to early Greek sentiments. > > Consider the following pairs of terms: > > changeable, unchangeable > dynamic, static > movable, unmovable > time, timeless > temporal, permanent > variable, constant > process, structure. > > Within the conceptualization of general systems theory these pairs of > symbols could be used as rhetorical signs of events within a given > semantic context. And, these terms do not infer either continuity or > discreteness. > > Not much difference among them, as I see it. > > BTW, I would see process as far more abstract than structure. Mathematical > structures (set, group, ring, vectors spaces...), biochemical structures, > anatomical structures, and so forth, are much simpler in concept than the > corresponding concept of change of processes and organization, such as > metabolism or life and death. > > One example of CSP's fuzzy-ness that I would invite you to weigh in on, > John. > > Consider the triad, "quali-sign - icon - rhema" in terms of CSP's > assertions about chemical radicals and medads. > > How do relate this triad to either physics or mathematics? > Or, from the perspective of rhetoric - grammar - logic? > > (Only recently, to my considerable delight, have I resolved this conundrum > in relation to the logic of relatives for chemistry.) > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > > On Apr 28, 2014, at 3:14 AM, John Collier wrote: > >> Jerry and others, >> >> I donât find Peirce especially obscure or fuzzy after studying his >> work for over 40 years, starting as an undergraduate. On the other hand, >> I think it is too limiting to see Peirce as either a structuralist or a >> process philosopher. Structuralism does not imply static constructs or >> no change: Jean Piaget, a developmental psychologist, was a big fan of >> structuralism, but clearly invoked processes in the production of >> structures. One problem is level of abstraction. Structuralism >> originated in mathematics with the Bourbaki. In this sense I think >> Peirce would be happy enough with it, within its limitations. Process is >> less abstract, and process philosophy holds that the world is made up >> entirely of particular processes that interact with each other (also >> processes). This is much more nominalistic than Peirceâs view. >> >> Iâd say more, but I am typing one fingered due to a separated shoulder >> last week, and a bacterial infection that has me in the main general >> hospital in Vienna. Wonderful view from my window â Ring, St >> Stephenâs, most of the south of the city, but it doesnât change >> much. I wouldnât call it a structure, though J >> >> John >> >> From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:[email protected]] >> Sent: April 28, 2014 3:33 AM >> To: Peirce List >> Cc: Stephen C. Rose >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 >> >> >> >> List: >> >> Frankly, I do not find CSP's words and works to be either as a structure >> or as a process. >> >> How about a "obscurist" or a "fuzzy-ist"? >> >> On the other hand, I find Michael's extraordinary clear view of >> philosophy: >> >> Peirce is the one great philosopher who escapes my definition >> of a philosopher as someone who only solves problems of his >> own devising. >> >> to be extraordinarily penetrating. >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> >> On Apr 27, 2014, at 7:54 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: >> >> >> Stephen, Michael, Gene, List, >> >> It seems to me that in sum the argumentation so far has been that >> Michael maintains that Peirce should be seen as a structuralist, Gene >> has countered that Peirce is best seen as a thorough-going process >> philosopher, and Michael responded to this by saying that to refer to >> his philosophy as processual is redundant since a properly understood >> structuralism includes the ideas of process and growth, and I have >> suggested that structuralism is generally not understood as such (that >> is, as involving change and growth), and that many Peircean philosophers >> see Peirce as a process thinker, but not as a structuralist. >> >> Now you may be suggesting--but I'm not exactly sure what your intended >> meaning was, Stephen--that Michael may well be proven correct and that >> there is good reason to see Peirce as a structuralist when that theory >> is "properly understood" to include the notions of history, change, and >> growth. >> >> But currently--and although I'm not a big fan of post-structuralism and >> deconstruction, etc.--structuralism tends to connote to many certain >> ideas which are not processual. Thus, at the conclusion of a the >> overview of structuralism in the Wikipedia article one is give these >> tenets "common to the various forms of structuralism" as formulated by >> the feminist theorist, Alison Assiter: >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structuralism >> >> First, that a structure determines the position of each element of a >> whole. Second, that every system has a structure. Third, structural laws >> deal with co-existence rather than change. Fourth, structures are the >> "real things" that lie beneath the surface or the appearance of meaning. >> >> Now I would imagine that Michael would say that Assiter does not >> properly understand structuralism. Still, and again, structuralism does >> indeed connote these ideas to many. And especially for this discussion >> note that the third tenet is that "structural laws deal with >> co-existence rather than change." >> >> So, until structuralism is "properly understood" (and I have no doubt >> that Michael has things of considerable importance to say about this, >> especially in the realms of linguistics and semiotics), it's a heavy >> load at present to suggest that Peirce is more structuralist than >> processual (or, rather, that that the idea of structure properly >> understood includes process, as Michael is saying). >> >> I'll be eager to learn more about this proper understanding of >> structuralism, and in that sense I agree with you, Stephen, that we >> should reserved judgment. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> >> >> On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 7:53 PM, Stephen C. Rose <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> I think it is much too early in the course of things to exclude >> Michael's conjectures which I assume are intended to widen in a radical >> and original manner the scope of Peirce's influence. It has after all >> taken 2000 years to arrive at the start of an appropriate revision of >> Aristotle, again based in part on Peirce's growing influence. It is >> somewhat a problem for the dead, who cannot respond, to have exclusive >> interpretations attached to aspects of their thought. Particularly if, >> like Peirce, they were inclined to favor the growth of communities of >> discourse and partial to abduction which means, I assume, guessing. >> >> @stephencrose >> >> >> On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 5:50 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> Gene, Michael, List, >> >> I would tend to agree with Gene here, especially given the situation >> that Structuralism is not generally "properly understood" in the sense >> in which you are suggesting, Michael. >> >> Meanwhile, a number of Peircean scholars use 'processual' in this >> context much as Gene does, and these include Andre de Tienne, Floyd >> Merrell, Kelly Parker, Cathy Legg, and, perhaps, and especially, >> Nicholas Rescher. >> >> Even in a group of papers you edited, Michael, as Peirce Seminar Papers: >> Essays in Semiotic Analysis, Nils B. Thelin in "Biopragmatism, >> Space/Time Cognition, and the Sense of Language," finds what he calls a >> "hierarchical-processual understanding" implicit in Peirce's treatment >> of abduction-deduction-induction in inquiryh. Thelin's extension of >> this--involving a model of "hierarchical-processual-feedback"--appears >> to me to be an attempt at developing further what is implicit in this >> regard in Peirce. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> >> >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> >> >> On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 5:15 PM, Eugene Halton >> <[email protected]> wrote: >> Dear Michael, >> Sorry, but it is not in the least redundant to characterize >> Peirceâs philosophy as processual. It clarifies what >> pervades his thinking. Calling Peirce a structuralist, on >> the other hand, does not, in my opinion. >> Gene >> >> From: Michael Shapiro [mailto:[email protected]] >> Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2014 12:11 PM >> To: Eugene Halton; [email protected] >> >> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 >> >> >> Gene, list, >> >> Structuralism properly understood does not exclude process or growth, >> just the opposite, so calling Peirce's doctrine "processualism" is both >> redundant and terminologically inadvisable, given the latter's >> unusualness. Cf. my 1991 book's title The Sense of Change: Language as >> History. >> >> Michael >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Eugene Halton >> Sent: Apr 27, 2014 12:02 PM >> To: "[email protected]" >> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 >> >> >> Response to Michael Shapiroâs post that Peirce should be seen as a >> structuralist. Shapiro: âThe use by Peirce of the form "rationalized" >> (rather than "rational") as a modifier of "variety" in the quotation >> above should be taken advisedly. This use of the participial form, with >> its adversion to process, should serve as a caveat that when Peirce >> talks about "objective idealism," what he ought to have said is >> "objectified idealism." >> >> Peirce: âThe one intelligible theory of the universe is that of >> objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits >> becoming physical lawsâ Peirce, CP 6.25. >> >> Note âbecoming.â And even those physical laws are still subject to >> evolution. A habit is a process, semiosis is an inferential process, >> ârationalized varietyâ is a kind of habituated variety yet still in >> process. I see no reason for calling Peirce a structuralist, since even >> a structure, in Peirce, is a habit-process, however slow or even >> seemingly invariant that inveterate habit may be: it remains potentially >> subject to growth. Why not simply acknowledge Peirceâs thoroughgoing >> processualism? >> >> Gene Halton >> >> >> From: Michael Shapiro [mailto:[email protected]] >> Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2014 7:51 AM >> To: [email protected] >> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 >> >> Dear Fellow-Listers, >> >> I'd like to offer up the following as a take on ch. 7 and an >> anticipation of ch. 8, from the perspective of a non-philosopher >> interested in developing a Peircean theory of language for the >> twenty-first century: >> >> >> Because he was a practicing scientist in the modern sense, >> Peirce is the one great philosopher who escapes my >> definition of a philosopher as someone who only solves >> problems of his own devising. This makes him also a >> proto-structuralist (a structuralist avant la lettre). >> >> The essential concept of structuralism, whether applied to >> physics or linguistics or anthropology, is that of >> invariance under transformation. This makes theory, >> following Peirce's whole philosophy and his pragmaticism in >> particular, therationalized explication of variety: >> "[U]nderlying all other laws is the only tendency which can >> grow by its own virtue, the tendency of all things to take >> habits .... In so far as evolution follows a law, the law or >> habit, instead of being a movement from homogeneity to >> heterogeneity, is growth from difformity to uniformity. But >> the chance divergences from laws are perpetually acting to >> increase the variety of the world, and are checked by a sort >> of natural selection and otherwise ... , so that the general >> result may be described as 'organized heterogeneity,' or, >> better, rationalized variety'' (CP 6.101). Or, translating >> law and habit into the appropriate phenomenological >> category: "Thirdness ... is an essential ingredient of >> reality" (EP 2:345). >> >> Once we properly understand structuralism not as the >> putatively debunked epistemology that originated in >> Geneva with Saussure, but rather as the revised, >> essentially correct version originating with Jakobson in >> Prague and Hjelmslev in Copenhagen, we can recognize the >> patterning of Thirdness and Secondness in >> languageââthe so-called "passkey semiotic"ââfor >> what it is. Consequently, the fundamental notion of >> alternation between basic form and contextual variant >> becomes understandable as immanent in theory, and not >> merely a construct or an artifact of description. The >> importance of this notion cannot be overestimated. >> >> A child learning its native language, for instance, is >> exactly in the same position as an analyst. It has to >> determine which linguistic form is basic, and which is a >> contextual variant. Take a simple example from English, >> that of the voiceless stops >> >> English voiceless (actually, tense) stops are aspirated >> when they are word-initial or begin a stressed syllable, >> as in pen,ten, Ken. They are unaspirated when immediately >> following word-initial s, as in spun, stun, skunk. After >> an s elsewhere in a word they are normally unaspirated as >> well, except when the cluster is heteromorphemic and the >> stop belongs to an unbound morpheme; compare dis[t]end >> vs. dis[tÊ°]aste. Word-final voiceless stops are >> optionally aspirate. >> >> This variation makes aspiration non-distinctive >> (non-phonemic) in English, unlike, say, in Ancient Greek >> or Hindi, where aspirated stops change the meaning of >> words by comparison with items that have their >> unaspirated counterparts ceteris paribus. >> >> I think it is only by taking such variation for what it >> is, i. e., the working out of Thirdness in the context of >> Secondness, that we can we understand what Peirce had in >> mind with his version of Pragmatism. >> >> Best regards, >> >> Michael >> >> P. S. The use by Peirce of the form "rationalized" (rather than >> "rational") as a modifier of "variety" in the quotation above should be >> taken advisedly. This use of the participial form, with its adversion to >> process, should serve as a caveat that when Peirce talks about >> "objective idealism," what he ought to have said is "objectified >> idealism." This slight grammatical change puts the meaning of the phrase >> (and the doctrine!) in a whole newââand completely >> acceptableââlight. >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. 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More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > >
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