List:
Frankly, I do not find CSP's words and works to be either as a structure or as a process. How about a "obscurist" or a "fuzzy-ist"? On the other hand, I find Michael's extraordinary clear view of philosophy: > Peirce is the one great philosopher who escapes my definition > of a philosopher as someone who only solves problems of his > own devising. to be extraordinarily penetrating. Cheers Jerry On Apr 27, 2014, at 7:54 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Stephen, Michael, Gene, List, > > It seems to me that in sum the argumentation so far has been that Michael > maintains that Peirce should be seen as a structuralist, Gene has countered > that Peirce is best seen as a thorough-going process philosopher, and Michael > responded to this by saying that to refer to his philosophy as processual is > redundant since a properly understood structuralism includes the ideas of > process and growth, and I have suggested that structuralism is generally not > understood as such (that is, as involving change and growth), and that many > Peircean philosophers see Peirce as a process thinker, but not as a > structuralist. > > Now you may be suggesting--but I'm not exactly sure what your intended > meaning was, Stephen--that Michael may well be proven correct and that there > is good reason to see Peirce as a structuralist when that theory is "properly > understood" to include the notions of history, change, and growth. > > But currently--and although I'm not a big fan of post-structuralism and > deconstruction, etc.--structuralism tends to connote to many certain ideas > which are not processual. Thus, at the conclusion of a the overview of > structuralism in the Wikipedia article one is give these tenets "common to > the various forms of structuralism" as formulated by the feminist theorist, > Alison Assiter: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structuralism > > First, that a structure determines the position of each element of a whole. > Second, that every system has a structure. Third, structural laws deal with > co-existence rather than change. Fourth, structures are the "real things" > that lie beneath the surface or the appearance of meaning. > > Now I would imagine that Michael would say that Assiter does not properly > understand structuralism. Still, and again, structuralism does indeed connote > these ideas to many. And especially for this discussion note that the third > tenet is that "structural laws deal with co-existence rather than change." > > So, until structuralism is "properly understood" (and I have no doubt that > Michael has things of considerable importance to say about this, especially > in the realms of linguistics and semiotics), it's a heavy load at present to > suggest that Peirce is more structuralist than processual (or, rather, that > that the idea of structure properly understood includes process, as Michael > is saying). > > I'll be eager to learn more about this proper understanding of structuralism, > and in that sense I agree with you, Stephen, that we should reserved judgment. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 7:53 PM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote: > I think it is much too early in the course of things to exclude Michael's > conjectures which I assume are intended to widen in a radical and original > manner the scope of Peirce's influence. It has after all taken 2000 years to > arrive at the start of an appropriate revision of Aristotle, again based in > part on Peirce's growing influence. It is somewhat a problem for the dead, > who cannot respond, to have exclusive interpretations attached to aspects of > their thought. Particularly if, like Peirce, they were inclined to favor the > growth of communities of discourse and partial to abduction which means, I > assume, guessing. > > @stephencrose > > > On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 5:50 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > Gene, Michael, List, > > I would tend to agree with Gene here, especially given the situation that > Structuralism is not generally "properly understood" in the sense in which > you are suggesting, Michael. > > Meanwhile, a number of Peircean scholars use 'processual' in this context > much as Gene does, and these include Andre de Tienne, Floyd Merrell, Kelly > Parker, Cathy Legg, and, perhaps, and especially, Nicholas Rescher. > > Even in a group of papers you edited, Michael, as Peirce Seminar Papers: > Essays in Semiotic Analysis, Nils B. Thelin in "Biopragmatism, Space/Time > Cognition, and the Sense of Language," finds what he calls a > "hierarchical-processual understanding" implicit in Peirce's treatment of > abduction-deduction-induction in inquiryh. Thelin's extension of > this--involving a model of "hierarchical-processual-feedback"--appears to me > to be an attempt at developing further what is implicit in this regard in > Peirce. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 5:15 PM, Eugene Halton <eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu> > wrote: > Dear Michael, > > Sorry, but it is not in the least redundant to characterize > Peirce’s philosophy as processual. It clarifies what pervades his thinking. > Calling Peirce a structuralist, on the other hand, does not, in my opinion. > > Gene > > > > From: Michael Shapiro [mailto:poo...@earthlink.net] > Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2014 12:11 PM > To: Eugene Halton; PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu > > > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 > > > > Gene, list, > > Structuralism properly understood does not exclude process or growth, just > the opposite, so calling Peirce's doctrine "processualism" is both redundant > and terminologically inadvisable, given the latter's unusualness. Cf. my 1991 > book's title The Sense of Change: Language as History. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: Eugene Halton > Sent: Apr 27, 2014 12:02 PM > To: "PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu" > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 > > > > Response to Michael Shapiro’s post that Peirce should be seen as a > structuralist. Shapiro: “The use by Peirce of the form "rationalized" (rather > than "rational") as a modifier of "variety" in the quotation above should be > taken advisedly. This use of the participial form, with its adversion to > process, should serve as a caveat that when Peirce talks about "objective > idealism," what he ought to have said is "objectified idealism." > > > > Peirce: “The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective > idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical > laws” Peirce, CP 6.25. > > > > Note “becoming.” And even those physical laws are still subject to evolution. > A habit is a process, semiosis is an inferential process, “rationalized > variety” is a kind of habituated variety yet still in process. I see no > reason for calling Peirce a structuralist, since even a structure, in Peirce, > is a habit-process, however slow or even seemingly invariant that inveterate > habit may be: it remains potentially subject to growth. Why not simply > acknowledge Peirce’s thoroughgoing processualism? > > > > Gene Halton > > > > > > From: Michael Shapiro [mailto:poo...@earthlink.net] > Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2014 7:51 AM > To: PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 > > > > Dear Fellow-Listers, > > I'd like to offer up the following as a take on ch. 7 and an anticipation of > ch. 8, from the perspective of a non-philosopher interested in developing a > Peircean theory of language for the twenty-first century: > > > > Because he was a practicing scientist in the modern sense, Peirce > is the one great philosopher who escapes my definition of a philosopher as > someone who only solves problems of his own devising. This makes him also a > proto-structuralist (a structuralist avant la lettre). > > The essential concept of structuralism, whether applied to > physics or linguistics or anthropology, is that of invariance under > transformation. This makes theory, following Peirce's whole philosophy and > his pragmaticism in particular, the rationalized explication of variety: > "[U]nderlying all other laws is the only tendency which can grow by its own > virtue, the tendency of all things to take habits .... In so far as evolution > follows a law, the law or habit, instead of being a movement from homogeneity > to heterogeneity, is growth from difformity to uniformity. But the chance > divergences from laws are perpetually acting to increase the variety of the > world, and are checked by a sort of natural selection and otherwise ... , so > that the general result may be described as 'organized heterogeneity,' or, > better, rationalized variety'' (CP 6.101). Or, translating law and habit into > the appropriate phenomenological category: "Thirdness ... is an essential > ingredient of reality" (EP 2:345). > > Once we properly understand structuralism not as the > putatively debunked epistemology that originated in Geneva with Saussure, but > rather as the revised, essentially correct version originating with Jakobson > in Prague and Hjelmslev in Copenhagen, we can recognize the patterning of > Thirdness and Secondness in language––the so-called "passkey semiotic"––for > what it is. Consequently, the fundamental notion of alternation between basic > form and contextual variant becomes understandable as immanent in theory, and > not merely a construct or an artifact of description. The importance of this > notion cannot be overestimated. > > A child learning its native language, for instance, is exactly > in the same position as an analyst. It has to determine which linguistic form > is basic, and which is a contextual variant. Take a simple example from > English, that of the voiceless stops > > English voiceless (actually, tense) stops are aspirated when > they are word-initial or begin a stressed syllable, as in pen, ten, Ken. They > are unaspirated when immediately following word-initial s, as in spun, stun, > skunk. After an s elsewhere in a word they are normally unaspirated as well, > except when the cluster is heteromorphemic and the stop belongs to an unbound > morpheme; compare dis[t]end vs. dis[tʰ]aste. Word-final voiceless stops are > optionally aspirate. > > This variation makes aspiration non-distinctive (non-phonemic) > in English, unlike, say, in Ancient Greek or Hindi, where aspirated stops > change the meaning of words by comparison with items that have their > unaspirated counterparts ceteris paribus. > > I think it is only by taking such variation for what it is, i. > e., the working out of Thirdness in the context of Secondness, that we can > we understand what Peirce had in mind with his version of Pragmatism. > > Best regards, > > Michael > > P. S. The use by Peirce of the form "rationalized" (rather than "rational") > as a modifier of "variety" in the quotation above should be taken advisedly. > This use of the participial form, with its adversion to process, should serve > as a caveat that when Peirce talks about "objective idealism," what he ought > to have said is "objectified idealism." This slight grammatical change puts > the meaning of the phrase (and the doctrine!) in a whole new––and completely > acceptable––light. > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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