I think it is much too early in the course of things to exclude Michael's conjectures which I assume are intended to widen in a radical and original manner the scope of Peirce's influence. It has after all taken 2000 years to arrive at the start of an appropriate revision of Aristotle, again based in part on Peirce's growing influence. It is somewhat a problem for the dead, who cannot respond, to have exclusive interpretations attached to aspects of their thought. Particularly if, like Peirce, they were inclined to favor the growth of communities of discourse and partial to abduction which means, I assume, guessing.
*@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 5:50 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>wrote: > Gene, Michael, List, > > I would tend to agree with Gene here, especially given the situation that > Structuralism is not generally "properly understood" in the sense in which > you are suggesting, Michael. > > Meanwhile, a number of Peircean scholars use 'processual' in this context > much as Gene does, and these include Andre de Tienne, Floyd Merrell, Kelly > Parker, Cathy Legg, and, perhaps, and especially, Nicholas Rescher. > > Even in a group of papers you edited, Michael, as *Peirce Seminar Papers: > Essays in Semiotic Analysis*, Nils B. Thelin in "Biopragmatism, > Space/Time Cognition, and the Sense of Language," finds what he calls a > "hierarchical-processual understanding" implicit in Peirce's treatment of > abduction-deduction-induction in inquiryh. Thelin's extension of > this--involving a model of "hierarchical-processual-feedback"--appears to > me to be an attempt at developing further what is implicit in this regard > in Peirce. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 5:15 PM, Eugene Halton > <eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu>wrote: > >> Dear Michael, >> >> Sorry, but it is not in the least redundant to characterize >> Peirce’s philosophy as processual. It clarifies what pervades his thinking. >> Calling Peirce a structuralist, on the other hand, does not, in my opinion. >> >> Gene >> >> >> >> *From:* Michael Shapiro [mailto:poo...@earthlink.net] >> *Sent:* Sunday, April 27, 2014 12:11 PM >> *To:* Eugene Halton; PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu >> >> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 >> >> >> >> Gene, list, >> >> Structuralism properly understood does not exclude process or growth, >> just the opposite, so calling Peirce's doctrine "processualism" is both >> redundant and terminologically inadvisable, given the latter's unusualness. >> Cf. my 1991 book's title >> >> *The Sense of Change: Language as History. *Michael >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Eugene Halton >> Sent: Apr 27, 2014 12:02 PM >> To: "PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu" >> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 >> >> >> Response to Michael Shapiro’s post that Peirce should be seen as a >> structuralist. Shapiro: “The use by Peirce of the form "rationalized" >> (rather than "rational") as a modifier of "variety" in the quotation above >> should be taken advisedly. This use of the participial form, with its >> adversion to process, should serve as a caveat that when Peirce talks about >> "*objective* idealism," what he ought to have said is >> "*objectified*idealism." >> >> >> >> Peirce: “The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective >> idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical >> laws” Peirce, CP 6.25. >> >> >> >> Note “becoming.” And even those physical laws are still subject to >> evolution. A habit is a process, semiosis is an inferential process, >> “rationalized variety” is a kind of habituated variety yet still in >> process. I see no reason for calling Peirce a structuralist, since even a >> structure, in Peirce, is a habit-process, however slow or even seemingly >> invariant that inveterate habit may be: it remains potentially subject to >> growth. Why not simply acknowledge Peirce’s thoroughgoing processualism? >> >> >> >> Gene Halton >> >> >> >> >> >> *From:* Michael Shapiro [mailto:poo...@earthlink.net<poo...@earthlink.net>] >> >> *Sent:* Sunday, April 27, 2014 7:51 AM >> *To:* PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu >> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 >> >> >> >> Dear Fellow-Listers, >> >> I'd like to offer up the following as a take on ch. 7 and an anticipation >> of ch. 8, from the perspective of a non-philosopher interested in >> developing a Peircean theory of language for the twenty-first century: >> >> >> Because he was a practicing scientist in the modern sense, >> Peirce is *the* one great philosopher who escapes my definition of a >> philosopher as someone who only solves problems of his own devising. This >> makes him also a proto-structuralist (a structuralist *avant la lettre*). >> >> The essential concept of structuralism, whether applied to >> physics or linguistics or anthropology, is that of invariance under >> transformation. This makes theory, following Peirce's whole philosophy >> and his pragmaticism in particular, the rationalized explication of >> variety: "[U]nderlying all other laws is the only tendency which can >> grow by its own virtue, the tendency of all things to take habits .... In >> so far as evolution follows a law, the law or habit, instead of being a >> movement from homogeneity to heterogeneity, is growth from difformity to >> uniformity. But the chance divergences from laws are perpetually acting to >> increase the variety of the world, and are checked by a sort of natural >> selection and otherwise ... , so that the general result may be described >> as 'organized heterogeneity,' or, better, rationalized variety'' (CP >> 6.101). Or, translating law and habit into the appropriate >> phenomenological category: "Thirdness ... is an essential ingredient of >> reality" (EP 2:345). >> >> Once we properly understand structuralism not as the >> putatively debunked epistemology that originated in Geneva with Saussure, >> but rather as the revised, essentially correct version originating with >> Jakobson in Prague and Hjelmslev in Copenhagen, we can recognize the >> patterning of Thirdness and Secondness in language––the so-called "passkey >> semiotic"––for what it is. Consequently, the fundamental notion of >> alternation between basic form and contextual variant becomes >> understandable as immanent in theory, and not merely a construct or an >> artifact of description. The importance of this notion cannot be >> overestimated. >> >> A child learning its native language, for instance, is >> exactly in the same position as an analyst. It has to determine which >> linguistic form is basic, and which is a contextual variant. Take a simple >> example from English, that of the voiceless stops >> >> English voiceless (actually, tense) stops are aspirated >> when they are word-initial or begin a stressed syllable, as in *pen*, >> *ten*, *Ken*. They are unaspirated when immediately following >> word-initial s, as in *spun*, *stun*, *skunk*. After an *s* elsewhere in >> a word they are normally unaspirated as well, except when the cluster is >> heteromorphemic and the stop belongs to an unbound morpheme; compare >> dis[t]end vs. dis[tʰ]aste. Word-final voiceless stops are optionally >> aspirate. >> >> This variation makes aspiration non-distinctive >> (non-phonemic) in English, unlike, say, in Ancient Greek or Hindi, where >> aspirated stops change the meaning of words by comparison with items that >> have their unaspirated counterparts *ceteris paribus*. >> >> I think it is only by taking such variation for what it >> is, i. e., the working out of Thirdness in the context of Secondness, that >> we can we understand what Peirce had in mind with his version of Pragmatism. >> >> Best regards, >> >> Michael >> >> P. S. The use by Peirce of the form "rationalized" (rather than >> "rational") as a modifier of "variety" in the quotation above should be >> taken advisedly. This use of the participial form, with its adversion to >> process, should serve as a caveat that when Peirce talks about " >> *objective* idealism," what he ought to have said is >> "*objectified*idealism." This slight grammatical change puts the meaning of >> the phrase >> (and the doctrine!) in a whole new––and completely acceptable––light. >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
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