Gary R, List, According to I. Prigogine (1917-2003), there are two types of structures in the Universe -- (i) equilibrium STRUCTURES (e.g., table, bible, ec.) that do not change with time nor require energy dissiaption for them to exist, and (ii) dissipative STRUCTURES(e.g., the flame of a candle, TV images, EEG, Belousov-Zhabotinsky reactions, action potentials) that change in time and require dissipation of energy for their existence. As is well known, Prigogine was awarded a Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1977 for having contributed to establishing the concpet of dissiaptive structures.
Can philsophers and semioticians utilize the Prigoginean theory of STRUCTURES ? With all the best. Sung __________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > Stephen, Michael, Gene, List, > > It seems to me that in sum the argumentation so far has been that Michael > maintains that Peirce should be seen as a structuralist, Gene has > countered > that Peirce is best seen as a thorough-going process philosopher, and > Michael responded to this by saying that to refer to his philosophy as > processual is redundant since a properly understood structuralism includes > the ideas of process and growth, and I have suggested that structuralism > is > generally not understood as such (that is, as involving change and > growth), > and that many Peircean philosophers see Peirce as a process thinker, but > not as a structuralist. > > Now you may be suggesting--but I'm not exactly sure what your intended > meaning was, Stephen--that Michael may well be proven correct and that > there is good reason to see Peirce as a structuralist when that theory is > "properly understood" to include the notions of history, change, and > growth. > > But currently--and although I'm not a big fan of post-structuralism and > deconstruction, etc.--structuralism tends to connote to many certain ideas > which are not processual. Thus, at the conclusion of a the overview of > structuralism in the Wikipedia article one is give these tenets "common to > the various forms of structuralism" as formulated by the feminist > theorist, > Alison Assiter: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structuralism > > *First, that a structure determines the position of each element of a > whole. Second, that every system has a structure. Third, structural laws > deal with co-existence rather than change. Fourth, structures are the > "real > things" that lie beneath the surface or the appearance of meaning.* > > > Now I would imagine that Michael would say that Assiter does not properly > understand structuralism. Still, and again, structuralism does indeed > connote these ideas to many. And especially for this discussion note that > the third tenet is that "structural laws deal with co-existence rather > than > change." > > So, until structuralism is "properly understood" (and I have no doubt that > Michael has things of considerable importance to say about this, > especially > in the realms of linguistics and semiotics), it's a heavy load at present > to suggest that Peirce is more structuralist than processual (or, rather, > that that the idea of structure properly understood includes process, as > Michael is saying). > > I'll be eager to learn more about this proper understanding of > structuralism, and in that sense I agree with you, Stephen, that we should > reserved judgment. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 7:53 PM, Stephen C. Rose > <[email protected]>wrote: > >> I think it is much too early in the course of things to exclude >> Michael's >> conjectures which I assume are intended to widen in a radical and >> original >> manner the scope of Peirce's influence. It has after all taken 2000 >> years >> to arrive at the start of an appropriate revision of Aristotle, again >> based >> in part on Peirce's growing influence. It is somewhat a problem for the >> dead, who cannot respond, to have exclusive interpretations attached to >> aspects of their thought. Particularly if, like Peirce, they were >> inclined >> to favor the growth of communities of discourse and partial to abduction >> which means, I assume, guessing. >> >> *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* >> >> >> On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 5:50 PM, Gary Richmond >> <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> Gene, Michael, List, >>> >>> I would tend to agree with Gene here, especially given the situation >>> that >>> Structuralism is not generally "properly understood" in the sense in >>> which >>> you are suggesting, Michael. >>> >>> Meanwhile, a number of Peircean scholars use 'processual' in this >>> context >>> much as Gene does, and these include Andre de Tienne, Floyd Merrell, >>> Kelly >>> Parker, Cathy Legg, and, perhaps, and especially, Nicholas Rescher. >>> >>> Even in a group of papers you edited, Michael, as *Peirce Seminar >>> Papers: Essays in Semiotic Analysis*, Nils B. Thelin in "Biopragmatism, >>> Space/Time Cognition, and the Sense of Language," finds what he calls a >>> "hierarchical-processual understanding" implicit in Peirce's treatment >>> of >>> abduction-deduction-induction in inquiryh. Thelin's extension of >>> this--involving a model of "hierarchical-processual-feedback"--appears >>> to >>> me to be an attempt at developing further what is implicit in this >>> regard >>> in Peirce. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 5:15 PM, Eugene Halton >>> <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> Dear Michael, >>>> >>>> Sorry, but it is not in the least redundant to >>>> characterize >>>> Peirceâs philosophy as processual. It clarifies what pervades his >>>> thinking. >>>> Calling Peirce a structuralist, on the other hand, does not, in my >>>> opinion. >>>> >>>> Gene >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *From:* Michael Shapiro [mailto:[email protected]] >>>> *Sent:* Sunday, April 27, 2014 12:11 PM >>>> *To:* Eugene Halton; [email protected] >>>> >>>> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Gene, list, >>>> >>>> Structuralism properly understood does not exclude process or growth, >>>> just the opposite, so calling Peirce's doctrine "processualism" is >>>> both >>>> redundant and terminologically inadvisable, given the latter's >>>> unusualness. >>>> Cf. my 1991 book's title >>>> >>>> *The Sense of Change: Language as History. *Michael >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: Eugene Halton >>>> Sent: Apr 27, 2014 12:02 PM >>>> To: "[email protected]" >>>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 >>>> >>>> >>>> Response to Michael Shapiroâs post that Peirce should be seen as a >>>> structuralist. Shapiro: âThe use by Peirce of the form >>>> "rationalized" >>>> (rather than "rational") as a modifier of "variety" in the quotation >>>> above >>>> should be taken advisedly. This use of the participial form, with its >>>> adversion to process, should serve as a caveat that when Peirce talks >>>> about >>>> "*objective* idealism," what he ought to have said is >>>> "*objectified*idealism." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Peirce: âThe one intelligible theory of the universe is that of >>>> objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits >>>> becoming >>>> physical lawsâ Peirce, CP 6.25. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Note âbecoming.â And even those physical laws are still subject to >>>> evolution. A habit is a process, semiosis is an inferential process, >>>> ârationalized varietyâ is a kind of habituated variety yet still >>>> in >>>> process. I see no reason for calling Peirce a structuralist, since >>>> even a >>>> structure, in Peirce, is a habit-process, however slow or even >>>> seemingly >>>> invariant that inveterate habit may be: it remains potentially subject >>>> to >>>> growth. Why not simply acknowledge Peirceâs thoroughgoing >>>> processualism? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Gene Halton >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *From:* Michael Shapiro >>>> [mailto:[email protected]<[email protected]>] >>>> >>>> *Sent:* Sunday, April 27, 2014 7:51 AM >>>> *To:* [email protected] >>>> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Dear Fellow-Listers, >>>> >>>> I'd like to offer up the following as a take on ch. 7 and an >>>> anticipation of ch. 8, from the perspective of a non-philosopher >>>> interested >>>> in developing a Peircean theory of language for the twenty-first >>>> century: >>>> >>>> >>>> Because he was a practicing scientist in the modern sense, >>>> Peirce is *the* one great philosopher who escapes my definition of a >>>> philosopher as someone who only solves problems of his own devising. >>>> This >>>> makes him also a proto-structuralist (a structuralist *avant la >>>> lettre* >>>> ). >>>> >>>> The essential concept of structuralism, whether applied to >>>> physics or linguistics or anthropology, is that of invariance under >>>> transformation. This makes theory, following Peirce's whole philosophy >>>> and his pragmaticism in particular, the rationalized explication of >>>> variety: "[U]nderlying all other laws is the only tendency which can >>>> grow by its own virtue, the tendency of all things to take habits .... >>>> In >>>> so far as evolution follows a law, the law or habit, instead of being >>>> a >>>> movement from homogeneity to heterogeneity, is growth from difformity >>>> to >>>> uniformity. But the chance divergences from laws are perpetually >>>> acting to >>>> increase the variety of the world, and are checked by a sort of >>>> natural >>>> selection and otherwise ... , so that the general result may be >>>> described >>>> as 'organized heterogeneity,' or, better, rationalized variety'' (CP >>>> 6.101). Or, translating law and habit into the appropriate >>>> phenomenological category: "Thirdness ... is an essential ingredient >>>> of >>>> reality" (EP 2:345). >>>> >>>> Once we properly understand structuralism not as the >>>> putatively debunked epistemology that originated in Geneva with >>>> Saussure, >>>> but rather as the revised, essentially correct version originating >>>> with >>>> Jakobson in Prague and Hjelmslev in Copenhagen, we can recognize the >>>> patterning of Thirdness and Secondness in languageââthe so-called >>>> "passkey >>>> semiotic"ââfor what it is. Consequently, the fundamental notion of >>>> alternation between basic form and contextual variant becomes >>>> understandable as immanent in theory, and not merely a construct or an >>>> artifact of description. The importance of this notion cannot be >>>> overestimated. >>>> >>>> A child learning its native language, for instance, is >>>> exactly in the same position as an analyst. It has to determine which >>>> linguistic form is basic, and which is a contextual variant. Take a >>>> simple >>>> example from English, that of the voiceless stops >>>> >>>> English voiceless (actually, tense) stops are aspirated >>>> when they are word-initial or begin a stressed syllable, as in *pen*, >>>> *ten*, *Ken*. They are unaspirated when immediately following >>>> word-initial s, as in *spun*, *stun*, *skunk*. After an *s* elsewhere >>>> in a word they are normally unaspirated as well, except when the >>>> cluster is >>>> heteromorphemic and the stop belongs to an unbound morpheme; compare >>>> dis[t]end vs. dis[tÊ°]aste. Word-final voiceless stops are optionally >>>> aspirate. >>>> >>>> This variation makes aspiration non-distinctive >>>> (non-phonemic) in English, unlike, say, in Ancient Greek or Hindi, >>>> where >>>> aspirated stops change the meaning of words by comparison with items >>>> that >>>> have their unaspirated counterparts *ceteris paribus*. >>>> >>>> I think it is only by taking such variation for what it >>>> is, i. e., the working out of Thirdness in the context of Secondness, >>>> that >>>> we can we understand what Peirce had in mind with his version of >>>> Pragmatism. >>>> >>>> Best regards, >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> P. S. The use by Peirce of the form "rationalized" (rather than >>>> "rational") as a modifier of "variety" in the quotation above should >>>> be >>>> taken advisedly. This use of the participial form, with its adversion >>>> to >>>> process, should serve as a caveat that when Peirce talks about " >>>> *objective* idealism," what he ought to have said is >>>> "*objectified*idealism." This slight grammatical change puts the >>>> meaning of the phrase >>>> (and the doctrine!) in a whole newââand completely >>>> acceptableââlight. >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L >>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>> BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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