Gary, Jeff, Søren, Charles, list,
Actually my view seems to diverge from Jeff's, at least as he has
expressed it in the past.
In my peirce-l response sent March 26, 2014,
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12301/focus=12327
Jeff had asked:
[JBD QUOTE] [...] I'd like to raise the following question. To what
extent should we bracket metaphysical questions about the reality of
the purposes that seem to govern biological, chemical, physical
processes? T.L. Short seemed to think it worth the while to get
those questions on the table at the very start of his discussion of
Peirce's semiotics. I will admit that it makes sense to canvass all
of the possibilities as we start to classify different kinds of
representamens and relations and then build explanations of the
growth of semiotic systems. After all, we wouldn't want to leave
important classes out of our explanations. Having said that,
shouldn't we bracket the metaphysical questions out of a concern
that in our eagerness to give answers to these questions we might
bias the normative inquiry? [END QUOTE]
My reply included the following:
[BU QUOTE] Tom seems to minimize the importance of a Comtean
classification. I don't do that, but rather than bracketing I'd just
try to keep track of what is a general principle (say, in
normatives) and what is a special example (say, in metaphysics). For
my part I don't trust generalizations at any level enough to
completely bracket particulars; one's general ideas may be biased
just as one's special cases may be. I remember working at inputting
contract info (including financial terms, payment amounts, etc.) at
a publishing house decades ago. They brought the electronic system
online in order to test *it against the trusted old* hand-written
system; what they found was that the old hand-written system itself
was messed up; so they kept running the two systems for comparison
against each other for some period, trying to get the true picture
sooner or later. [END QUOTE]
I'd just add that, yes, one should have studied metaphysics before
getting too metaphysical about idioscopic (physical, chemical,
biological, psychological) processes. But we can't be awaiting some date
when metaphysical inquiry is sufficiently advanced in order to apply it
in idioscopy, or to seek idioscopic instantiations of metaphysical
principles in order to shed light on those principles. As Peirce pointed
out, no matter the sorry state of metaphysics as a discipline, still
people inevitably apply metaphysics, well or badly. It is as with
mathematics. Hamilton worked out the nontrivial math of conical
refraction and predicted conical refraction as an optical phenomenon.
It had never previously been observed, but he was right. Peirce's point
would be that the phenomenon of conical refraction does not prove the
math, it just proves the applicability of the math to the
special-scientific case.
Best, Ben
On 6/1/2014 1:06 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jeff, Søren, Charles list,
I agree with your succinct analysis of this matter of the evolution of
the self through self-control, Jeff, and especially your very
well-stated conclusion that "there is much to be said for trying to
avoid importing assumptions into the normative sciences that will tend
to bias our inquiry." This point has been made any number of times on
the list over the years--for recent example, by Ben Udell in certain
posts related to Peirce's Classification of the Sciences--but it bears
repeating. However, I'm currently on vacation so I won't say more just
now.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
E202-O
718 482-5700
*** *** *** ***
Jeffrey Brian Downard 06/01/14 10:51 AM
Søren, Charles and list,
The argument Peirce gives about the logical conception of the self in
"Question Concerning Certain Faculties" is about the development of
the self. In his later works, Peirce makes it clear that the example
of a child developing a logical conception of self is meant to help
us explore what is requisite for the evolution of the self and the
related capacities for self control more generally. (CP, 7.381-4)
The story we might tell in the special sciences of physics,
chemistry, biology and psychology about the development of
self-organizing and autopoietic systems shouldn't be used in a
normative theory of logic as a basis for developing our logical
hypotheses. In time, we'll want to reconcile the account of the self
developed in our logical theory with the accounts given in the
special sciences, but we should be wary of getting the cart before
the horse. (CP, 7.581)
We could, of course, disagree with Peirce on this point, and there
are many who do. For my part, however, I think there is much to be
said for trying to avoid importing assumptions into the normative
sciences that will tend to bias our inquiry.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________
From: Søren Brier [sb....@cbs.dk]
Sent: Sunday, June 01, 2014 5:52 AM
To: charles murray; Peirce List
Subject: SV: SV: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on
Mind, self, and person
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