Gary M, list, Gary M. quoted me then wrote:
GR: But, unlike Hegel's position, 3ns does not Aufheben (i.e., invalidate, annul, cancel out) the other two categories, but rather joins them in a genuine tricategorial relation. GCM: Where does Hegel say "Aufheben" absolutely "cancels out the other two categories? That would seem to go against the general tenor of his philosophy in general - but I have nothing specific to oppose it with. I don't know Hegel well enough to answer your question, while the word "Aufheben" is so variously translated into English that it's hard to tell exactly what Peirce had in mind in his comments regarding Hegel in this matter. Of course he read Hegel in German and may have had any number of connotations in mind regarding "Aufheben". I'm away from my desk until late Sunday or early next week, so I can't look up the relevant Peirce quotes, but he does seem to be saying in several places that Hegel is so completely enamored of thirdness that his philosophy can be seen as one which valorizes that category to the detriment of the others (e.g., see Peirce's lecture on the 7 systems of philosophy in his 1903 lectures on pragmatism), that Hegel seems to be saying, in moving from 1ns to 2ns to 3ns, "Next!" in his eagerness to get to 3ns. In Peirce's view no one category ought be valorized (except for certain analytical purposes), rather all should be seen as essential and equally potent in any semiosic event. But, when I'm back at my desk I'll offer specific quotes on the matter since both you and Helmut have shown interest in this matter. Again, first quoting me quoting Peirce, GM comments: CSP: "Reality consists in regularity. Real regularity is active law. Active law is efficient reasonableness, or in other words is truly reasonable reasonableness [and that] continuity is an indispensable element of reality, and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives." GCM: If "Reality consists in regularity" and "Real regularity is active law" and "Active law is EFFICIENT reasonableness" and "continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives" and "continuity... like generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the essence of thought" and "is an essential ingredient of reality", especially when combined, seem to say to me "reality is continuity". However, you do say, "yet does not by itself constitute reality" (even though it is the "essential ingredient") which, in first reflex, I agree with - except: what do you mean by "constitute" of something so culturally and conventionally defined with such terms as "regularity", "reasonableness", and "generality". What is the constituent? This is all provisional on my (GCM) part. Actually it was Peirce, not I, who said that continuity "does not by itself constitute reality" while yet being an "essential ingredient" of it. As to your several questions, I think they must be addressed to Peirce himself--these are his ideas. But, I will say say that whatever may be meant by the phrase to "constitute reality", that Peirce is merely denying that continuity can do this, and you and I seemingly agree that this is so. On vectors, GM again quotes me, then comments. GR: "I'm glad the idea of vectors has given you "much to think about." I think about them a lot, and wonder why they haven't been taken up much in the Peircean secondary literature." GCM: All I have been able to find in Peirce about "vectors" is item (158) in "Logic of Relatives, 1870" in CE, vol. 2, pg. 414-5 which to an utterly mathematical illiterate person such as I cannot possibly begin to comprehend. Is there something English in Peirce? As far as I know, Peirce did not use the term vector in this way, but he does introduce the idea of different paths through the categories with the term "order" in "The Mathematics of Logic" as I mentioned in my post addressed to Helmut. "Vector" in this sense and in this context is introduced by Richard Parmentier in a brief passage in Mats Bergman pointed me to many years ago in which Parmentier complains that Peirce gives much attention to the vector of determination (i.e. re: the object determines the sign for the interpretant sign), but too little attention to the vector of representation (the order of the work of a scientist or artist in creating a representation of "some universe of experience") which follows the reverse path (btw, for Peirce abduction follows the same vector). Finally, I hope my most recent remarks to Helmut helped clarify my earlier parenthetical remarks on vectors. Yet, as important as I believe it to be, this matter of categorial vector analysis is not an easy one to grasp. Certainly it might help if I placed more current material on vectors on Arisbe, but I have been too busy the past few years to do that. My most recent paper on the topic has not yet been published, but I'm hoping it will be at some point, and that, hopefully, will help a little. Best, Gary R. *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sat, Jun 14, 2014 at 9:24 AM, Gary Moore <[email protected]> wrote: > RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM > 1] . But, unlike Hegel's position, 3ns does not Aufheben (i.e., > invalidate, annul, cancel out) the other two categories, but rather joins > them in a genuine tricategorial relation. > GCM: Where does Hegel say "Aufheben" absolutely "cancels out the other two > categories? That would seem to go against the general tenor of his > philosophy in general - but I have nothing specific to oppose it with. > 2] 1º Thanks, but I don't think I'd exactly say that "reality is > continuity," but, as I wrote today, "pragmatism involves 'the recognition > that continuity is an indispensable element of reality' [and that > continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives."] > CSP" > GR said, sometimes quoting Peirce: > 2º Reality consists in regularity. Real regularity is active law. Active > law is efficient reasonableness, or in other words is truly reasonable > reasonableness > 3º that continuity is an indispensable element of reality, and that > continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives." > GCM: If "Reality consists in regularity" and "Real regularity is active > law" and "Active law is EFFICIENT reasonableness" and "continuity is simply > what generality becomes in the logic of relatives" and "continuity... like > generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the > essence of thought" and "is an essential ingredient of reality", especially > when combined, seem to say to me "reality is continuity". However, you do > say, "yet does not by itself constitute reality" (even though it is the > "essential ingredient") which, in first reflex, I agree with - except: > what do you mean by "constitute" of something so culturally and > conventionally defined with such terms as "regularity", "reasonableness", > and "generality". What is the constituent? This is all provisional on my > (GCM) part. > 3] GR: "I'm glad the idea of vectors has given you "much to think about." > I think about them a lot, and wonder why they haven't been taken up much in > the Peircean secondary literature." > GCM: All I have been able to find in Peirce about "vectors" is item (158) > in "Logic of Relatives, 1870" in CE, vol. 2, pg. 414-5 which to an utterly > mathematical illiterate person such as I cannot possibly begin to > comprehend. Is there something English in Peirce? > 4] GR: "Helmut wrote that assignment of elements of a triad to the > categories depends on the observer position, and that assignment of > categories to triads seem to underlie an inversion due to observer position > change. I would, rather, suggest that the putative "inversion" is the > result not of "observer position change" but of not considering vectorial > movement through the categories..." > GCM: The "brief comments below" generally elude my old mind, i.e., "the > most general mode of reality... involves (vector of involution) the others > (actuality, action, and possibility, feeling), this much in the way in > which lawfulness (habit, 3ns) involves force (law in action 2ns ["Peirce > argues repeated and persuasively that there are real generals"])." "There > are exactly six paths (vectors) through a genuine tricategorial relation, > and that in matters of categorial involution (such as the one just > considered) one commences at 3ns ["actuality (2ns) is clearly also real > enough that some, nominalists, have stopped there"], first, which involves > 2ns (and 1ns [real possibles]), next, and 2ns [there are real generals"] " > in turn involves 1ns ["real possibles"], finally. Thus, "first" in > categorial vector analysis is not necessarily category 1ns ["real > possibles"] (commencing at 1ns ["real possibles"] is the case for only 2 of > the six paths), but may commence at 3ns ["there are real generals"] or 2ns. > [""actuality (2ns) is clearly also real enough"] > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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