Sung, list, Sung wrote:
*Doesn't Statement (061514-7) still imply that"Secondness (obejct) contrains the Firstness (sign), (061514-8)and hence Firstness is second to Secondness."* Again, from the categorially vectorial standpoint, Peirce does not always follow the Hegelian order of 1ns -> 2ns -> 3ns. Indeed the involutional order I recently discussed completely reverses the order: 3ns -> 2ns -> 1ns. There is nothing peculiar about this as I see it. Indeed, it seems to me that not only does Peirce offer examples of all six possible vectors (or, paths through a genuine tricategorial relation), but that there are fewer passages in his writing relating to the Hegelian order (Peirce seems to limit this to the ur-categorial abstraction: something/other/that which mediates between them) than to at least some of the others. For example Peirce analyzes inductive inference in the same 'order' as semiosis, 2ns -> 1ns -> 3ns. And, as earlier noted by way of example, for Peirce deductive inference follows the vector of involution while abduction follows the vector of representation--Peirce is quite explicit about these order (see his bean example of the 3 inference patterns). While only explicitly naming the "order of involution" which, again, he explicitly contrasts with its opposite, the "order of [Hegelian] evolution," Peirce offers his own categorial path for evolution in what I term the "process vector" 1ns -> 3ns -> 2ns, which may also be contrasted with Hegel's. Best, Gary R. *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 1:44 PM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R wrote: > > "It seems to me that there has come to be a consensus (061514-7) > here and in Peirce scholarship more generally that > "determines" should not be seen in this usage as analogous > to physically "causes" but more along the lines of > "constrains" or "limits". This is a logical, not a physical, > use of the term." > > Doesn't Statement (061514-7) still imply that > > "Secondness (obejct) contrains the Firstness (sign), (061514-8) > and hence Firstness is second to Secondness." > > > With all the best. > > Sung > > > > Sungchul , list, > > > > Sung asks, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > *"Vector of Determination - The object determines (2ns) > > (061514-2)a sign (1ns) for an interpretant (3ns)."It seems to > > me that (061514-2) is consistent with (061514-1) except thefollowing > > question that arises in connection with the former:"How can Firstness be > > 'determined' by Secondness ?" (061514-3)Any suggestion ?* > > > > There have been several discussions on peirce-l over the years, beginning > > in 1998 as I recall, and even recently concerning Peirce's use of the > term > > "determines" in the phrase "the object determines the representamen for > > the > > interpretant." > > > > It seems to me that there has come to be a consensus here and in Peirce > > scholarship more generally that "determines" should not be seen in this > > usage as analogous to physically "causes" but more along the lines of > > "constrains" or "limits". This is a logical, not a physical, use of the > > term. > > > > So, the basic idea seems to be that a sign cannot convey anything > > approaching the complete meaning of any given object, but only "a sort of > > idea" of it, the ground: > > > > A [sign] stands for [its] object, not in all respects, but in reference > to > > a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the *ground* of the [sign]. > > CP 2.228 > > Best, > > > > Gary R. > > > > > > circumscribe <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/circumscribe>, > > confine <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/confine>, hold down > > <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hold+down>, restrict > > <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/restrict> > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > > > > On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 7:53 AM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > >> Hi, > >> > >> In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trikonic, I find the following two > >> statements: > >> > >> "Firstness is the mode of being that of which is such (061514-1) > >> as it is, positively and without reference to anything else. > >> Secondness is the mode of being that which is such as it is, > >> with respect to a second but regardless of any third. > >> Thirdness is the mode of being that which is such as it is, > >> in bringing a second and third into relation to each other." > >> > >> > >> "Vector of Determination - The object determines (2ns) > >> (061514-2) > >> a sign (1ns) for an interpretant (3ns)." > >> > >> It seems to me that (061514-2) is consistent with (061514-1) except the > >> following question that arises in connection with the former: > >> > >> "How can Firstness be 'determined' by Secondness ?" (061514-3) > >> > >> Any suggestion ? > >> > >> I wonder if the seeming 'contradiction in (061514-2) can be avoided by > >> re-stating it as: > >> > >> "The object (2ns) presupposes a sign (1ns) which determines (061514-4) > >> an interpretant (3ns)." > >> > >> which then fits the definition of a mathematical category; i.e., > >> > >> "The Peircean categories of 2ns, 1ns, and 3ns form (061514-5) > >> a mathematical category." > >> > >> If (061514-4) is true, we can conclude that > >> > >> "The concept of 'category' is self-similar similar (061514-6) > >> to a Russian nesting doll." > >> > >> > >> With all the best. > >> > >> Sung > >> ___________________________________________________ > >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > >> Rutgers University > >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > >> 732-445-4701 > >> > >> www.conformon.net > >> > >> > RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM > >> > 1] . But, unlike Hegel's position, 3ns does not Aufheben > >> > (i.e., invalidate, annul, cancel out) the other two categories, but > >> rather > >> > joins them in a genuine tricategorial relation. > >> > GCM: Where does Hegel say "Aufheben" absolutely "cancels out > >> > the other two categories? That would seem to go against the general > >> tenor > >> > of > >> > his philosophy in general - but I have nothing specific to oppose it > >> with. > >> > 2] 1º Thanks, but I don't think I'd exactly say that > >> > "reality is continuity," but, as I wrote today, "pragmatism > >> > involves 'the recognition that continuity is an indispensable element > >> of > >> > reality' [and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the > >> > logic of > >> > relatives."] CSP" > >> > GR said, sometimes quoting Peirce: > >> > 2º Reality consists in regularity. Real regularity is active > >> > law. Active law is efficient reasonableness, or in other words is > >> truly > >> > reasonable reasonableness > >> > 3º that continuity is an indispensable element of reality, > >> > and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of > >> > relatives." > >> > GCM: If "Reality consists in regularity" and "Real > >> > regularity is active law" and "Active law is EFFICIENT > >> > reasonableness" and "continuity > >> > is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives" and > >> > "continuity... like > >> > generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is > >> the > >> > essence of thought" and "is an essential ingredient of reality", > >> > especially > >> > when combined, seem to say to me "reality is continuity". However, you > >> > do > >> > say, "yet does not by itself constitute reality" (even though it is > >> > the "essential > >> > ingredient") which, in first reflex, I agree with - except: what do > >> > you mean by "constitute" of something > >> > so culturally and conventionally defined with such terms as > >> > "regularity", "reasonableness", and "generality". > >> > What is the constituent? This is all provisional on my (GCM) part. > >> > 3] GR: "I'm glad the idea of vectors has given you > >> > "much to think about." I think about them a lot, and wonder why they > >> > haven't been taken up much in the Peircean secondary literature." > >> > GCM: All I have been able to find in Peirce about "vectors" > >> > is item (158) in "Logic of Relatives, 1870" in CE, vol. 2, pg. 414-5 > >> > which to > >> > an utterly mathematical illiterate person such as I cannot possibly > >> begin > >> > to > >> > comprehend. Is there something English in Peirce? > >> > 4] GR: "Helmut wrote that assignment of elements of a triad > >> > to the categories depends on the observer position, and that > >> assignment > >> of > >> > categories to triads seem to underlie an inversion due to observer > >> > position > >> > change. I would, rather, suggest that the putative "inversion" is the > >> > result not of "observer position change" but of not considering > >> > vectorial movement through the categories..." > >> > GCM: The "brief comments below" generally elude my old mind, > >> > i.e., "the most general mode of reality... involves (vector of > >> > involution) the > >> > others (actuality, action, and possibility, feeling), this much in the > >> way > >> > in > >> > which lawfulness (habit, 3ns) involves force (law in action 2ns > >> ["Peirce > >> > argues > >> > repeated and persuasively that there are real generals"])." "There > >> > are exactly six paths (vectors) > >> > through a genuine tricategorial relation, and that in matters of > >> > categorial > >> > involution (such as the one just considered) one commences at 3ns > >> > ["actuality > >> > (2ns) is clearly also real enough that some, nominalists, have stopped > >> > there"], > >> > first, which involves 2ns (and 1ns [real possibles]), next, and 2ns > >> > [there are real generals"] " in > >> > turn involves 1ns ["real possibles"], finally. Thus, "first" in > >> > categorial vector analysis is not necessarily category 1ns ["real > >> > possibles"] > >> > (commencing at 1ns ["real possibles"] is the case for only 2 of the > >> > six paths), > >> > but may commence at 3ns ["there are real generals"] or 2ns. > >> > [""actuality (2ns) > >> > is clearly also real enough"] > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> ----------------------------- > >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L > >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > >> BODY of the message. More at > >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > >> . > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > >
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