Re: [PEIRCE-L] RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi,

In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trikonic, I find the following two
statements:

"Firstness is the mode of being that of which is such         (061514-1)
as it is, positively and without reference to anything else.
Secondness is the mode of being that which is such as it is,
with respect to a second but regardless of any third.
Thirdness is the mode of being that which is such as it is,
in bringing a second and third into relation to each other."


"Vector of Determination – The object determines (2ns)                    
                                (061514-2)
a sign (1ns) for an interpretant (3ns)."

It seems to me that (061514-2) is consistent with (061514-1) except the
following question that arises in connection with the former:

"How can Firstness be 'determined' by Secondness ?"           (061514-3)

Any suggestion ?

I wonder if the seeming  ‘contradiction in (061514-2) can be avoided by
re-stating it as:

“The object (2ns) presupposes a sign (1ns) which determines   (061514-4)
an interpretant  (3ns).”

which then fits the definition of a mathematical category; i.e.,

“The Peircean categories of 2ns, 1ns, and 3ns form            (061514-5)
a mathematical category.”

If (061514-4) is true, we can conclude that

“The concept of ‘category’ is self-similar similar           (061514-6)
 to a Russian nesting doll.”


With all the best.

Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

> RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM
> 1] . But, unlike Hegel's position, 3ns does not Aufheben
> (i.e., invalidate, annul, cancel out) the other two categories, but rather
> joins them in a genuine tricategorial relation.
> GCM: Where does Hegel say “Aufheben” absolutely “cancels out
> the other two categories? That would seem to go against the general tenor
> of
> his philosophy in general - but I have nothing specific to oppose it with.
> 2] 1º Thanks, but I don't think I'd exactly say that
> "reality is continuity," but, as I wrote today, "pragmatism
> involves 'the recognition that continuity is an indispensable element of
> reality' [and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the
> logic of
> relatives."] CSP"
> GR said, sometimes quoting Peirce:
> 2º Reality consists in regularity. Real regularity is active
> law. Active law is efficient reasonableness, or in other words is truly
> reasonable reasonableness
> 3º that continuity is an indispensable element of reality,
> and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of
> relatives."
> GCM: If “Reality consists in regularity” and “Real
> regularity is active law” and “Active law is EFFICIENT
> reasonableness” and “continuity
> is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives” and
> “continuity… like
> generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the
> essence of thought” and “is an essential ingredient of reality”,
> especially
> when combined, seem to say to me “reality is continuity". However, you
> do
> say, “yet does not by itself constitute reality” (even though it is
> the “essential
> ingredient”) which, in first reflex, I agree with – except:  what do
> you mean by “constitute” of something
> so culturally and conventionally defined with such terms as
>  “regularity”, “reasonableness”, and “generality”.
> What is the constituent? This is all provisional on my (GCM) part.
> 3] GR: “I'm glad the idea of vectors has given you
> "much to think about." I think about them a lot, and wonder why they
> haven't been taken up much in the Peircean secondary literature.”
> GCM: All I have been able to find in Peirce about “vectors”
> is item (158) in “Logic of Relatives, 1870” in CE, vol. 2, pg. 414-5
> which to
> an utterly mathematical illiterate person such as I cannot possibly begin
> to
> comprehend. Is there something English in Peirce?
> 4] GR: “Helmut wrote that assignment of elements of a triad
> to the categories depends on the observer position, and that assignment of
> categories to triads seem to underlie an inversion due to observer
> position
> change. I would, rather, suggest that the putative "inversion" is the
> result not of "observer position change" but of not considering
> vectorial movement through the categories…”
> GCM: The “brief comments below” generally elude my old mind,
> i.e., “the most general mode of reality… involves (vector of
> involution) the
> others (actuality, action, and possibility, feeling), this much in the way
> in
> which lawfulness (habit, 3ns) involves force (law in action 2ns [“Peirce
> argues
> repeated and persuasively that there are real generals”]).”  “There
> are exactly six paths (vectors)
> through a genuine tricategorial relation, and that in matters of
> categorial
> involution (such as the one just considered) one commences at 3ns
> [“actuality
> (2ns) is clearly also real enough that some, nominalists, have stopped
> there”],
> first, which involves 2ns (and 1ns [real possibles]),  next, and 2ns
> [there are real generals”] “ in
> turn involves 1ns [“real possibles“], finally. Thus, "first" in
> categorial vector analysis is not necessarily category 1ns [“real
> possibles”]
> (commencing at 1ns [“real possibles”] is the case for only 2 of the
> six paths),
> but may commence at 3ns [“there are real generals”] or 2ns.
> [““actuality (2ns)
> is clearly also real enough”]
>


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