Inherent perhaps. I do not think much can be explained regarding what exists before we name things. Vagueness. A penumbra. Or as I would say, all embracingly, reality. That would be the realm of firstness it seems. That said, it seems to me that we keep things in mind verbal form so that consideration from "firstness" can be inferred rather than always related to a sign. There is a sense in which "in the beginning is the word" to coin a phrase.
*@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 12:00 PM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> wrote: > I "Firstness is processed", Firstness must be second to the processor of > Firstness, whatever it may be." No ? > > Sung > > > > Firstness is not so much determined as processed, first by giving it a > > term > > (word, etc.) and then submitting it to the second. The amalgam of these > > yields up the third which as Gary R. has suggested is the area of life as > > it is lived. Thus whatever the first is or was survives only as a result > > of > > a process. Or so I surmise. > > > > *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* > > > > > > On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 7:53 AM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > >> Hi, > >> > >> In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trikonic, I find the following two > >> statements: > >> > >> "Firstness is the mode of being that of which is such (061514-1) > >> as it is, positively and without reference to anything else. > >> Secondness is the mode of being that which is such as it is, > >> with respect to a second but regardless of any third. > >> Thirdness is the mode of being that which is such as it is, > >> in bringing a second and third into relation to each other." > >> > >> > >> "Vector of Determination - The object determines (2ns) > >> (061514-2) > >> a sign (1ns) for an interpretant (3ns)." > >> > >> It seems to me that (061514-2) is consistent with (061514-1) except the > >> following question that arises in connection with the former: > >> > >> "How can Firstness be 'determined' by Secondness ?" (061514-3) > >> > >> Any suggestion ? > >> > >> I wonder if the seeming 'contradiction in (061514-2) can be avoided by > >> re-stating it as: > >> > >> "The object (2ns) presupposes a sign (1ns) which determines (061514-4) > >> an interpretant (3ns)." > >> > >> which then fits the definition of a mathematical category; i.e., > >> > >> "The Peircean categories of 2ns, 1ns, and 3ns form (061514-5) > >> a mathematical category." > >> > >> If (061514-4) is true, we can conclude that > >> > >> "The concept of 'category' is self-similar similar (061514-6) > >> to a Russian nesting doll." > >> > >> > >> With all the best. > >> > >> Sung > >> ___________________________________________________ > >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > >> Rutgers University > >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > >> 732-445-4701 > >> > >> www.conformon.net > >> > >> > RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM > >> > 1] . But, unlike Hegel's position, 3ns does not Aufheben > >> > (i.e., invalidate, annul, cancel out) the other two categories, but > >> rather > >> > joins them in a genuine tricategorial relation. > >> > GCM: Where does Hegel say "Aufheben" absolutely "cancels out > >> > the other two categories? That would seem to go against the general > >> tenor > >> > of > >> > his philosophy in general - but I have nothing specific to oppose it > >> with. > >> > 2] 1º Thanks, but I don't think I'd exactly say that > >> > "reality is continuity," but, as I wrote today, "pragmatism > >> > involves 'the recognition that continuity is an indispensable element > >> of > >> > reality' [and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the > >> > logic of > >> > relatives."] CSP" > >> > GR said, sometimes quoting Peirce: > >> > 2º Reality consists in regularity. Real regularity is active > >> > law. Active law is efficient reasonableness, or in other words is > >> truly > >> > reasonable reasonableness > >> > 3º that continuity is an indispensable element of reality, > >> > and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of > >> > relatives." > >> > GCM: If "Reality consists in regularity" and "Real > >> > regularity is active law" and "Active law is EFFICIENT > >> > reasonableness" and "continuity > >> > is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives" and > >> > "continuity... like > >> > generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is > >> the > >> > essence of thought" and "is an essential ingredient of reality", > >> > especially > >> > when combined, seem to say to me "reality is continuity". However, you > >> > do > >> > say, "yet does not by itself constitute reality" (even though it is > >> > the "essential > >> > ingredient") which, in first reflex, I agree with - except: what do > >> > you mean by "constitute" of something > >> > so culturally and conventionally defined with such terms as > >> > "regularity", "reasonableness", and "generality". > >> > What is the constituent? This is all provisional on my (GCM) part. > >> > 3] GR: "I'm glad the idea of vectors has given you > >> > "much to think about." I think about them a lot, and wonder why they > >> > haven't been taken up much in the Peircean secondary literature." > >> > GCM: All I have been able to find in Peirce about "vectors" > >> > is item (158) in "Logic of Relatives, 1870" in CE, vol. 2, pg. 414-5 > >> > which to > >> > an utterly mathematical illiterate person such as I cannot possibly > >> begin > >> > to > >> > comprehend. Is there something English in Peirce? > >> > 4] GR: "Helmut wrote that assignment of elements of a triad > >> > to the categories depends on the observer position, and that > >> assignment > >> of > >> > categories to triads seem to underlie an inversion due to observer > >> > position > >> > change. I would, rather, suggest that the putative "inversion" is the > >> > result not of "observer position change" but of not considering > >> > vectorial movement through the categories..." > >> > GCM: The "brief comments below" generally elude my old mind, > >> > i.e., "the most general mode of reality... involves (vector of > >> > involution) the > >> > others (actuality, action, and possibility, feeling), this much in the > >> way > >> > in > >> > which lawfulness (habit, 3ns) involves force (law in action 2ns > >> ["Peirce > >> > argues > >> > repeated and persuasively that there are real generals"])." "There > >> > are exactly six paths (vectors) > >> > through a genuine tricategorial relation, and that in matters of > >> > categorial > >> > involution (such as the one just considered) one commences at 3ns > >> > ["actuality > >> > (2ns) is clearly also real enough that some, nominalists, have stopped > >> > there"], > >> > first, which involves 2ns (and 1ns [real possibles]), next, and 2ns > >> > [there are real generals"] " in > >> > turn involves 1ns ["real possibles"], finally. Thus, "first" in > >> > categorial vector analysis is not necessarily category 1ns ["real > >> > possibles"] > >> > (commencing at 1ns ["real possibles"] is the case for only 2 of the > >> > six paths), > >> > but may commence at 3ns ["there are real generals"] or 2ns. > >> > [""actuality (2ns) > >> > is clearly also real enough"] > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> ----------------------------- > >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L > >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > >> BODY of the message. More at > >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > >> . > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > >
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