I "Firstness is processed", Firstness must be second to the processor of Firstness, whatever it may be." No ?
Sung > Firstness is not so much determined as processed, first by giving it a > term > (word, etc.) and then submitting it to the second. The amalgam of these > yields up the third which as Gary R. has suggested is the area of life as > it is lived. Thus whatever the first is or was survives only as a result > of > a process. Or so I surmise. > > *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* > > > On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 7:53 AM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Hi, >> >> In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trikonic, I find the following two >> statements: >> >> "Firstness is the mode of being that of which is such (061514-1) >> as it is, positively and without reference to anything else. >> Secondness is the mode of being that which is such as it is, >> with respect to a second but regardless of any third. >> Thirdness is the mode of being that which is such as it is, >> in bringing a second and third into relation to each other." >> >> >> "Vector of Determination - The object determines (2ns) >> (061514-2) >> a sign (1ns) for an interpretant (3ns)." >> >> It seems to me that (061514-2) is consistent with (061514-1) except the >> following question that arises in connection with the former: >> >> "How can Firstness be 'determined' by Secondness ?" (061514-3) >> >> Any suggestion ? >> >> I wonder if the seeming 'contradiction in (061514-2) can be avoided by >> re-stating it as: >> >> "The object (2ns) presupposes a sign (1ns) which determines (061514-4) >> an interpretant (3ns)." >> >> which then fits the definition of a mathematical category; i.e., >> >> "The Peircean categories of 2ns, 1ns, and 3ns form (061514-5) >> a mathematical category." >> >> If (061514-4) is true, we can conclude that >> >> "The concept of 'category' is self-similar similar (061514-6) >> to a Russian nesting doll." >> >> >> With all the best. >> >> Sung >> ___________________________________________________ >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >> Rutgers University >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >> 732-445-4701 >> >> www.conformon.net >> >> > RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM >> > 1] . But, unlike Hegel's position, 3ns does not Aufheben >> > (i.e., invalidate, annul, cancel out) the other two categories, but >> rather >> > joins them in a genuine tricategorial relation. >> > GCM: Where does Hegel say "Aufheben" absolutely "cancels out >> > the other two categories? That would seem to go against the general >> tenor >> > of >> > his philosophy in general - but I have nothing specific to oppose it >> with. >> > 2] 1º Thanks, but I don't think I'd exactly say that >> > "reality is continuity," but, as I wrote today, "pragmatism >> > involves 'the recognition that continuity is an indispensable element >> of >> > reality' [and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the >> > logic of >> > relatives."] CSP" >> > GR said, sometimes quoting Peirce: >> > 2º Reality consists in regularity. Real regularity is active >> > law. Active law is efficient reasonableness, or in other words is >> truly >> > reasonable reasonableness >> > 3º that continuity is an indispensable element of reality, >> > and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of >> > relatives." >> > GCM: If "Reality consists in regularity" and "Real >> > regularity is active law" and "Active law is EFFICIENT >> > reasonableness" and "continuity >> > is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives" and >> > "continuity... like >> > generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is >> the >> > essence of thought" and "is an essential ingredient of reality", >> > especially >> > when combined, seem to say to me "reality is continuity". However, you >> > do >> > say, "yet does not by itself constitute reality" (even though it is >> > the "essential >> > ingredient") which, in first reflex, I agree with - except: what do >> > you mean by "constitute" of something >> > so culturally and conventionally defined with such terms as >> > "regularity", "reasonableness", and "generality". >> > What is the constituent? This is all provisional on my (GCM) part. >> > 3] GR: "I'm glad the idea of vectors has given you >> > "much to think about." I think about them a lot, and wonder why they >> > haven't been taken up much in the Peircean secondary literature." >> > GCM: All I have been able to find in Peirce about "vectors" >> > is item (158) in "Logic of Relatives, 1870" in CE, vol. 2, pg. 414-5 >> > which to >> > an utterly mathematical illiterate person such as I cannot possibly >> begin >> > to >> > comprehend. Is there something English in Peirce? >> > 4] GR: "Helmut wrote that assignment of elements of a triad >> > to the categories depends on the observer position, and that >> assignment >> of >> > categories to triads seem to underlie an inversion due to observer >> > position >> > change. I would, rather, suggest that the putative "inversion" is the >> > result not of "observer position change" but of not considering >> > vectorial movement through the categories..." >> > GCM: The "brief comments below" generally elude my old mind, >> > i.e., "the most general mode of reality... involves (vector of >> > involution) the >> > others (actuality, action, and possibility, feeling), this much in the >> way >> > in >> > which lawfulness (habit, 3ns) involves force (law in action 2ns >> ["Peirce >> > argues >> > repeated and persuasively that there are real generals"])." "There >> > are exactly six paths (vectors) >> > through a genuine tricategorial relation, and that in matters of >> > categorial >> > involution (such as the one just considered) one commences at 3ns >> > ["actuality >> > (2ns) is clearly also real enough that some, nominalists, have stopped >> > there"], >> > first, which involves 2ns (and 1ns [real possibles]), next, and 2ns >> > [there are real generals"] " in >> > turn involves 1ns ["real possibles"], finally. Thus, "first" in >> > categorial vector analysis is not necessarily category 1ns ["real >> > possibles"] >> > (commencing at 1ns ["real possibles"] is the case for only 2 of the >> > six paths), >> > but may commence at 3ns ["there are real generals"] or 2ns. >> > [""actuality (2ns) >> > is clearly also real enough"] >> > >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >> . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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