Frank, list,
I was elucidating Peirce's conception of symbol as I understand it.
When I said that a symbol is "a sign that refers to its object by a norm
or rule of interpretation," I did not mean by "object" the symbol's
appearance's constituents. The letters 'd', 'o', 'g', ordered or
unordered, are not the object of the symbol 'dog'. Dog, or the dog
species, is the object. So the charcar example doesn't apply.
I didn't say that an abstract symbol such as the meaning or conception
of 'dog' does not prescribe at all. I said that it does not prescribe
the quality of appearance of its symbol-replicas, such as the words
'dog' and 'perro', which, like the abstract symbol, are also symbols,
legisigns, general in their being, and which, unlike the abstract
symbol, prescribe qualities of appearance for their individual
instances. On the other hand the abstract symbol does prescribe a way of
being interpreted; it _/is/_ that prescription, that rule, that norm, as
in the quotes that Gary Richmond sent. It is a sign that refers to its
object by a norm or rule (by being a norm or rule) of interpretation
irrespective of the sign's any resemblance or factual connection to its
object. In that sense the appearing symbol's appearance is arbitrary IN
RESEMBLANCE/NON-RESEMBLANCE TO THE SYMBOL'S OBJECT. Such a symbol's
appearance is obviously not arbitrary in every way whatsoever. It is not
arbitrary that the numerical digits are all comparatively simple and
mutually distinct in appearance.
When Peirce discussed a legisign's individual instance, he called it an
'instance' or 'replica'; the individual instance of a symbol, according
to Peirce, is not itself a symbol but a kind of index, an index to one's
experience of the symbol's object.
But when a legisign, a.k.a. a type, a sign general in its being, is a
replica of another legisign, it sounds funny to call it a 'general
instance'; it makes more sense to call it a 'general replica'. Now, all
(though not only) symbols are legisigns. The relationship between the
abstract symbol, the meaning or conception 'dog', and (general) words
such as 'dog' and 'perro', is genus-species. The word 'dog' and the
abstract symbol 'dog' are different not like Peter and Paul but like
Fish and Animal.
Back in 2005 Joe Ransdell and Tom Short argued about 'dog' and 'perro'.
Joe said that in Peircean terms they should be considered the _/same/_
symbol. Tom said that, since they weren't sure what Peirce thought, they
should assume that 'dog' and 'perro' count as _/two/_ symbols.
Some time later I argued with Joe, saying that there should be a way at
the general sign-classificational level to account for divergent forms
of the same symbol, and that all of the elements of the question were
generically categorial - signs, symbols, qualities of signs, etc. Then
at some point I or somebody dug up what Peirce said about how some
symbols (symbolic legisigns), replicas of still more-general symbolic
legisigns, prescribe qualities of appearance for their individual
instances (corresponding sinsigns a.k.a. tokens). So 'perro' and 'dog'
are the same symbol in one sense, and are two symbols in another sense.
(Of course Quine would object 'gavagai' but Peirce's context in these
matters was inductive and abductive, not deductive.). In one sense,
Peirce coined new symbols (new words, that is), quite often. In another
sense he was supplying new clothing for more general symbols that he was
evolving.
By 'linguistic symbol' in a Peircean context I mean a word, phrase,
sentence, etc., in a given particular language, used symbolically (words
like "this" have an indexical function, they're not symbols, or not
entirely symbols). The equivalence of Peirce's linguistic symbol to
Saussure's 'sign' is only approximate, since Saussure would count as
signs proper names and demonstratives which Peirce usually counted as
indices, not symbols.
Best, Ben
On 7/5/2014 2:38 PM, Frank Ransom wrote:
Ben, list,
For the past couple days I was somewhat confused by what you, Ben,
meant when you said that "a symbol which consists in their shared
conception, is not a word in a particular language and does not
prescribe qualities of appearance for its instances". After reading
the excerpt from _/New Elements/_, I think I understand. But what you
said is a little misleading, I think, since the symbol nevertheless
refers to other signs--icons and indices--and the icons in particular
will be or have qualities of appearance; the symbol has information.
If a symbol refers to indexes and icons and the symbol is a final
cause that brings into being its members, then does it not seem right
to say that the symbol does in a sense prescribe the qualities of
appearance? Peirce says that a symbol cannot by definition refer to
any specific characters, but still a symbol will direct the
interpreter to icons which will be or have qualities of appearance. I
suppose the meaning of "prescribe" is here the concern, since, as I
understand it, Saussure claimed that symbols prescribe what they mean
by definition and are fixed in such prescriptions, and this is why you
are wary of allowing that a sign "prescribes" anything, because this
entails a kind of necessity of meaning that Peirce is clearly denying
in a symbol's meaning. But if we look at the example of _/coach/ _
that Peirce uses in the excerpt you gave, we find that there were
several different words used and the meaning changed or developed over
time. My concern is not so much about what you have to say about the
abstract symbol of which "dog" and "perro" are replicas, but that
"dog" and "perro", while admitted to be symbols, are somehow permitted
to prescribe qualities of appearance in a way in which the abstract
symbol of which they are replicas does not (and actually, I am a
little surprised at the use of the term "_/general/ _ replica" in
this case), even though their own meanings can indeed change and
develop over time just as does the abstract symbol of which they are
general replicas; while on the other hand the abstract symbol is what
is not arbitrary. So, if I understand you rightly, the (real?) symbol
is neither arbitrary nor prescriptive? Then, if you might, would you
be able to say what it is, in a positive sense, since you have stated
only what it is not, that it is neither arbitrary nor prescriptive in
its meaning, and why the linguistic _/symbol/ _ should indeed be
considered /arbitrary and prescriptive/ in its meaning?
If I suppose a symbol as a set that includes a box, a shoe, the left
side of a blue car, the moon, and a new tv show, then I suppose that
symbol might be called arbitrary, and linguistic. It is a linguistic
symbol in the sense that I came up with it, but it has no basis in
reality. I call this set "charcar" and teach others what it means:
just the set of a box, a shoe, the left side of a blue car, a moon,
and a new tv show. This would appear altogether arbitrary and
prescriptive. But is it true that this "charcar" is something I came
up with willy-nilly? No. It is really an example I came up with to
make sense of what is supposed in the idea of a linguistic symbol; as
such, it has a purpose, and the objects chosen (i.e., a box, a shoe,
the left side of a blue car, the moon, and a new tv show) were
arbitrary in the sense that I arbitrated, or exercised my judgment, in
deciding what random objects to use--objects specifically selected to
be colligated because they do not have any readily apparent connection
with one another that makes them a natural class; which absence of
apparent connection turns out to be the characteristic they have in
common. But suppose that such "charcar" was a real example. I could
easily say that it's an image of someone stepping out of the left side
of a blue car, with a shoe appearing as the person steps out, with the
moon in the background, and this image is seen on a new tv show that
is featured in a box, i.e. a television set. Perhaps then I was
inspired by the purpose of developing a scene in a new tv show I knew
would be viewed through a television set, and the image came to mind
to answer my purpose as to what to express. In this case also, I did
not just willy-nilly come up with the "linguistic" symbol. I doubt
that there is any such genuine "linguistic" symbol which does not,
after all, serve some genuine purpose and hence is simply a symbol; or
else it is not a symbol at all.
If it clears up what I'm concerned about, I should say that I agree
with you that Sung is equivocating on the meaning of "sign", in a
rather willful conflation of Saussure and Peirce with one another, but
I'm not so certain about your concession that Saussure's symbol is
Peirce's "linguistic" symbol, however one is to understand what is
meant by Peirce's "linguistic" symbol. It seems to me that a symbol
can be linguistic in so far as it indexes certain characters that are
understood to be linguistic, as certain markings on a surface or
certain patterns of sound are understood to be, because the symbol,
which indexes those characters, is also understood to index yet other
characters, so that there is an association, say, between the
characters "d", "o", and "g", arranged in a particular way, with ideas
about four leggedness and tails and such, and the symbol consists in
that association; if I see the word "dog" written, I think of four
legs and a tail and such, while if I see an animal with all the
requisite characters of four legs, tail, and such, then I think of the
word "dog". But the word-symbol "dog" is not at all referring to the
characters "d", "o", and "g" arranged in serial order, but to this
serial ordering of characters _ /as well as/ _ all the other
characters associated with the word-symbol, like four leggedness and
tails and all the existents with the associated characters. Your
distinction between symbol and "linguistic" symbol strikes me as not
only unhelpful but misleading and false; consider that Peirce early on
introduces the term "symbol" as a neutral way to refer to words and
concepts indifferently. I might suppose, on a charitable reading, that
we should consider cases where a person introduces a new word to name
something, as scientists often do. But I don't think a new
"linguistic" symbol has been introduced into being; I think that the
symbol has simply further developed to being interpretable through
characters it was not originally interpretable through, (which
characters have themselves come to be associated under the term-symbol
"linguistic"); and, of course, the same symbol may yet develop
further, not being restricted to some kind of "prescription" as to
what it must mean, other than what it prescribes for itself as a final
cause working itself out in the cosmos.
I have the feeling I must be missing something here, but I don't know
what, and would appreciate a clue here at least. Perhaps it has
something to do with the notion of _ /general/ _ replica?
-- Franklin
On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 6:03 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Sung, list,
You're mixing apples and oranges, using the word 'sign' equivocally.
Saussure's 'sign' is not Peirce's 'sign' or even Peirce's 'symbol';
Saussure's 'sign' is Peirce's 'linguistic symbol'.
Peirce defines a symbol as a sign that refers to its object by a norm
or rule of interpretation. He does not generally characterize such
rule or norm as arbitrary. In Peirce's system, individual instances
of the words 'dog' and (Spanish) 'perro' are replicas of the general
word-symbols 'dog' and 'perro' which specify qualities of appearance
of their word-instances and which, in turn, are, 'dog' and 'perro',
two general replicas of the _/same symbol/_, a symbol which consists
in their shared conception, is not a word in a particular language
and does not prescribe qualities of appearance for its instances. See
"New Elements of Mathematics" MS 517 (1904), EP 2:300-324, see p. 317
(EP page numbers are added to the MS 517 transcription at Arisbe
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/stoicheia/stoicheia.htm ).
The qualities of appearance prescribed for word-instances by
particular languages' words are usually arbitrary with respect to the
denoted objects. But when words in different languages are replicas
of the same essential symbol, that symbol does not partake of the
arbitrariness of linguistic words.
Hence, from the Peircean standpoint, the symbols in mathematics are
arbitrary in the sense of Saussurian signs insofar as they specify,
for their replica instances, qualities of appearance that are
arbitrary with regard to the denoted objects, e.g., the numeral '5'
doesn't look like five things, or like the set of all sets of 5
things, or however you conceive of 5.
Best, Ben
On 7/3/2014 5:27 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
Edwina wrote:
"The difference is as I explained in my original post: (6061-1)
that between a model and the process of reasoning
which are not the SAME empirical reality; . . ."
Before I comment on (6061-1), let me repeat what I said about the UAM
(Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics) thesis.
Major premise: All signs are arbitrary (Saussure)
Minor premise: Mathematics is an argument symbolic legisign (Peirce)
Coclusion: Mathemtica is arbitrary (consistent with the experimental
evidecen provided),
where "mathematics" means "mathemtical equations" such as the Planckian
distribution, the double exponetial function of Lu et al (1998), or the
ex-Gaussian function of R. D. Luce (1986, p. 100), and NOT "mathematcal
reasonig" as you wrongly assumed.
Based on this anlaysis, I conclude that
"Statement (6061-1) is a red herring desinged to (6061-2)
mis-lead readers, away from the true significance
of the UAM thesis, whihc is empiricallly substantiated"
as evident in the graphs that I pains-takingly provided to help readiers
to understand what I mean.
With all the best.
Sung
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