Ben, list, Ben, thank you kindly for this response. I would like to follow-up. So here goes:
With respect to the linguistic symbol: The letters "d", "o", and "g", ordered in a particular way on a surface or in sound, are not the object of the symbol, as you said. But I was discussing the word "dog", not as an object, but as a linguistic symbol. So I don't understand what you mean by the charcar example being irrelevant. I don't think that a symbol can form without some purpose at work, and I worked to demonstrate that, with the charcar example, there is a purpose in coming up with the example in the first place; and secondly suggested that a purpose would make itself known otherwise. A 'linguistic' symbol, on the other hand, struck me as something which a person can come up with, and do away with, irrespective of any real purpose, and I don't think there can be any such symbol that is prescribed or prescribable in this way. I also don't think that you mean that "dog" or "perro" are linguistic symbols in this sense that I am discussing, but I do think that admitting that some symbols prescribe qualities while denying that other symbols do is confusing, especially when you apply it to a distinction between linguistic vs. non-linguistic symbols, and here's why: As I understand it, Saussure believed signs are fixed by tradition, not purpose. Since you admitted that Saussure's signs are Peirce's linguistic symbols, I think you made it seem that Peirce's linguistic symbols, which prescribe qualities of appearance, are fixed by tradition, not by purpose. Maybe I jumped the gun on that and assumed too much from what you said, but I do think some could interpret it so. I add that, because you say that an abstract symbol does not prescribe its qualities of appearance, but that I would expect qualities of appearance to be determined according to the final cause at work, I am somewhat confused by how you view the relationship between the final causes of the abstract symbol and the words "dog" and "perro", unless you agree with Saussure that linguistic symbols prescribe qualities of appearance according to tradition, not purpose. To my mind, the purposes at work are one and the same for the abstract symbol and the words, so there is only one symbol. Though I suppose that different languages might be considered their own purposes, so an instance of "dog" is really a meeting between two purposes, the dog species and the English language, and could serve as an index for either symbol. With respect to the relationship of the abstract symbol to the words "dog" and "perro" as the relationship of genus to species, I am uncertain on this point. I accept the distinction between genus-species, as the distinction between animal and fish is one of genus to species. But whether this is the case with how the abstract symbol relates to "dog" and "perro" is what I hold in question, since after all I have been denying that "dog" and "perro" are properly symbols at all, and that there is but one symbol, manifested in two instances with different qualities of appearance (the one with the characters "d", "o", "g", and the other appearing with the characters "p", "e", etc.). Clearly, then, whether or not you thought I meant the abstract symbol and the word "dog" are like Peter and Paul, I should say that I never thought them related in such a way, because I deny their distinctness from each other as being more than one symbol. Since you brought up the debate between Joe and Tom, I suppose you probably recognized this to be my position. Then again, there is some plausibility to your suggestion, if after all I am willing to accept the genus-species distinction as applicable in some cases. But there is an important difference in this case, because you are saying that the abstract symbol does not prescribe qualities of appearance, while animal certainly prescribes qualities for individuals of fish; there are certain characteristics which must appear in the phenomena of fish that animal says must appear; e.g., the power of locomotion. You said: "Some time later I argued with Joe, saying that there should be a way at the general sign-classificational level to account for divergent forms of the same symbol, and that all of the elements of the question were generically categorial - signs, symbols, qualities of signs, etc." I think this is a very interesting question, which leads into questions of metaphysics, or so it seems to me. As a way towards working to an answer: since semiotics and logic are really the same science, and the genus-species distinction is a logical one, I think there must be some semiotically describable way of articulating the diverging of forms from the same symbol, if they do indeed diverge; at least, if the genus-species distinction has application, it would seem that there should be a way to articulate it. However, I am not aware of how that should work. Would you like to take a stab at that one? By semiotically describable, I don't mean just saying one or more than one symbol diverges from another symbol and appears; that would of course be unhelpful. I mean looking at the structure of semiosis and showing how symbols can develop from other symbols in the way you are suggesting. If it's possible to just reference me to your previous discussions on articulating your idea, that should certainly be sufficient. There is no need to say it all over again, unless it's too much trouble to find that previous discussion, or if you never detailed it from a semiotic standpoint before. You said: "Then at some point I or somebody dug up what Peirce said about how some symbols (symbolic legisigns), replicas of still more-general symbolic legisigns, prescribe qualities of appearance for their individual instances (corresponding sinsigns a.k.a. tokens)." I would very much like to see the quote(s), in order to put his statement(s) into context. Well, if you can supply them off-hand. No worries if you can't. I note that you didn't say that Peirce claimed the more-general symbolic legisigns don't prescribe qualities of appearance as well for the individual instances. In connection with this, consider what I just said above about animal and instances of fish. -- Franklin On Sat, Jul 5, 2014 at 4:35 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Frank, list, > > I was elucidating Peirce's conception of symbol as I understand it. > > When I said that a symbol is "a sign that refers to its object by a norm > or rule of interpretation," I did not mean by "object" the symbol's > appearance's constituents. The letters 'd', 'o', 'g', ordered or unordered, > are not the object of the symbol 'dog'. Dog, or the dog species, is the > object. So the charcar example doesn't apply. > > I didn't say that an abstract symbol such as the meaning or conception of > 'dog' does not prescribe at all. I said that it does not prescribe the > quality of appearance of its symbol-replicas, such as the words 'dog' and > 'perro', which, like the abstract symbol, are also symbols, legisigns, > general in their being, and which, unlike the abstract symbol, prescribe > qualities of appearance for their individual instances. On the other hand > the abstract symbol does prescribe a way of being interpreted; it _*is*_ > that prescription, that rule, that norm, as in the quotes that Gary > Richmond sent. It is a sign that refers to its object by a norm or rule (by > being a norm or rule) of interpretation irrespective of the sign's any > resemblance or factual connection to its object. In that sense the > appearing symbol's appearance is arbitrary IN RESEMBLANCE/NON-RESEMBLANCE > TO THE SYMBOL'S OBJECT. Such a symbol's appearance is obviously not > arbitrary in every way whatsoever. It is not arbitrary that the numerical > digits are all comparatively simple and mutually distinct in appearance. > > When Peirce discussed a legisign's individual instance, he called it an > 'instance' or 'replica'; the individual instance of a symbol, according to > Peirce, is not itself a symbol but a kind of index, an index to one's > experience of the symbol's object. > > But when a legisign, a.k.a. a type, a sign general in its being, is a > replica of another legisign, it sounds funny to call it a 'general > instance'; it makes more sense to call it a 'general replica'. Now, all > (though not only) symbols are legisigns. The relationship between the > abstract symbol, the meaning or conception 'dog', and (general) words such > as 'dog' and 'perro', is genus-species. The word 'dog' and the abstract > symbol 'dog' are different not like Peter and Paul but like Fish and Animal. > > Back in 2005 Joe Ransdell and Tom Short argued about 'dog' and 'perro'. > Joe said that in Peircean terms they should be considered the _*same*_ > symbol. Tom said that, since they weren't sure what Peirce thought, they > should assume that 'dog' and 'perro' count as _*two*_ symbols. > > Some time later I argued with Joe, saying that there should be a way at > the general sign-classificational level to account for divergent forms of > the same symbol, and that all of the elements of the question were > generically categorial - signs, symbols, qualities of signs, etc. Then at > some point I or somebody dug up what Peirce said about how some symbols > (symbolic legisigns), replicas of still more-general symbolic legisigns, > prescribe qualities of appearance for their individual instances > (corresponding sinsigns a.k.a. tokens). So 'perro' and 'dog' are the same > symbol in one sense, and are two symbols in another sense. (Of course Quine > would object 'gavagai' but Peirce's context in these matters was inductive > and abductive, not deductive.). In one sense, Peirce coined new symbols > (new words, that is), quite often. In another sense he was supplying new > clothing for more general symbols that he was evolving. > > By 'linguistic symbol' in a Peircean context I mean a word, phrase, > sentence, etc., in a given particular language, used symbolically (words > like "this" have an indexical function, they're not symbols, or not > entirely symbols). The equivalence of Peirce's linguistic symbol to > Saussure's 'sign' is only approximate, since Saussure would count as signs > proper names and demonstratives which Peirce usually counted as indices, > not symbols. > > Best, Ben >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
