Frank, list,
I've been discussing Peirce's views on sign classification and my ideas
on what those views require, not my own views per se on sign
classifications. The charcar example involves a gathering of individual
objects, and such cannot constitute a symbol in Peirce's classification,
but only an individual index that instantiates a symbol, and furthermore
an instance of a symbol that prescribes the qualities of appearance of
its instances, that is, the look &/or sound etc. of those objects,
whereby one will recognize it as an instance of said symbol. Peirce
distinguishes between (A) a word as a symbol and legisign, and (B) an
individual instance of a word (such as an individual utterance of the
word "dog").
I don't understand why you think you can arbitrarily make a symbol (or
an instance of a symbol) out of a collection of objects, but can't
arbitrarily make up a purposeful word. Your charcar example is
purposeful AS an example, but the same is true of such invented words as
"grue" and "bleen" which have been discussed a good deal in philosophy.
Whether such symbols, words, etc., are purposeful beyond the purpose OF
being an example for theoretical discussion, whether such symbols are
cogent, fertile, growth-capable, useful etc., in thought more generally,
is another question; it is much harder to make up such thriving symbols,
and such are the symbols in which Peirce is principally interested.
As regards tradition versus purpose, Peircean symbols may be natural,
social, etc.; they all depend on purpose or function in a broad sense.
They depend on their sheer functionality, depend on that they will be
interpreted in certain ways, irrespectively of their resembling or being
factually connected to their represented objects. Often the purpose or
function is traditional, a community's habitual purpose from back in
time. A English word such as "dog" has a traditional purpose of evoking
the idea of a dog, and it also has a traditional purpose to look and
sound distinct from other words such as "dock" and "hog." For whatever
reasons - its polyglot vocabulary resources, its sound-shift history,
etc., - English has many homonyms, but often they're still spelt
differently, although for example there seem to be six or so separate
words that look and sound like "mole," and often enough we're reduced to
depending on context to distinguish words. The Spanish word "perro" has
a traditional purpose of evoking the idea of a dog, and a traditional
purpose to look and sound distinct from such words as "pero" and "pajaro."
Generally I've meant that Saussure is a linguist concerned with words,
sentences, etc., while for Peirce words etc. are just one kind of
symbol. I haven't meant that their theoretical frameworks regarding
words are alike enough that one can plug conceptions from one framework
freely into the other.
Now, if "dog" and "perro" are two in some sense, and if one is speaking
of the words in their habitual or general being and not speaking of two
individual instances or utterances of words, and if, as you say, they're
the same symbol, then of what are they two? What are they two OF? Well,
they're two signs, but two of what kind of sign? This question is in
terms of generic semiotics and categorics, pertaining to signs,
qualities, norms, etc. There's no good excuse in a Peircean system for
ignoring the question, and the question is pressed upon one when one
seeks examples of Peircean semiotic phenomena in actual language.
Peirce's solution to the question of whether "dog" and "perro" are one
symbol or two is not to see it as an exclusive alternative. For some
purposes they are the same, i.e., the same _/term/_, expressible
variously in various languages, and for some purposes they are
different, i.e., different _/words/_, insofar as a word belongs to a
language. Term, proposition, argument, as opposed to word,
(declarative-mood) sentence, linguistically expressed argument. He
regards all signs as icons, indices, or symbols. It's a three-way global
division. He regards the individual instances of symbols such as
utterances of "dog" as indices to one's experience of the symbolized
objects. He does not regard words such as "dog" and "perro" as icons,
since they do not resemble their represented objects. He regards the
words (not their individual instances) as symbols because, like terms,
they fit his definition of symbol. They are habits or dispositions of
representation of objects, such that said representation does not depend
on resemblance or factual connection to those represented objects.
it's true that animals share some sort of quality of appearance, so that
one can't say that animal is to fish _/entirely/_ as abstract symbol is
to linguistic symbol. But Peirce's classifications are global divisions
according to such basics as phenomenological category and logical
quantity, so one will find these deeper differences between kinds.
Here are the quotes, I previously linked to one and the other was sent
to peirce-l by Gary Richmond.
[From MS 517, EP 2:317, "Kaina Stoicheia [New Elements]"]
A symbol is defined as a sign which becomes such by virtue of the
fact that it is interpreted as such. The signification of a complex
symbol is determined by certain rules of syntax which are part of
its meaning. A simple symbol is interpreted to signify what it does
from some accidental circumstance or series of circumstances, which
the history of any word illustrates. For example, in the latter half
of the fifteenth century, a certain model of vehicle came into use
in the town of Kots (pronounced, /kotch/) in Hungary. It was copied
in other towns, doubtless with some modifications, and was called a
/kotsi szeker/, or Kots cart. Copied in still other towns, and
always more or less modified, it came to be called, for short, a
/cotch/. It thus came about that the /[word]/ /coach/ was used,
first, for a magnificent vehicle to be drawn by horses for carrying
persons in state and in such comfort as that state required; then,
for a large and pretentious vehicle to be drawn by four or more
horses for conveying passengers from one town to another; and
finally, to any large vehicle for conveying passengers at a fare by
the seat from one town to another. In all ordinary cases, it is, and
must be, an accidental circumstance which causes a symbol to signify
just the characters it does; for were there any necessary, or nearly
necessary, reason for it, it would be this which would render the
sign a sign, and not the mere fact that so it would be interpreted,
as the definition of a symbol requires. It will be well here to
interpose a remark as to the identity of a symbol. A sign has its
being in its adaptation to fulfill a function. A symbol is adapted
to fulfill the function of a sign simply by the fact that it does
fulfill it; that is, that it is so understood. It is, therefore,
what it is understood to be. Hence, if two symbols are used, without
regard to any differences between them, they are replicas of the
same symbol. [.... More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/stoicheia/stoicheia.htm ]
[From CP 2.292, EP 2:274 (Syllabus, 1903).]
A Symbol is a Representamen whose Representative character consists
precisely in its being a rule that will determine its Interpretant.
All words, sentences, books, and other conventional signs are
Symbols. We speak of writing or pronouncing the word "man"; but it
is only a replica, or embodiment of the word, that is pronounced or
written. The word itself has no existence although it has a real
being, consisting in the fact that existents will conform to it. It
is a general mode of succession of three sounds or representamens of
sounds, which becomes a sign only in the fact that a habit, or
acquired law, will cause replicas of it to be interpreted as meaning
a man or men. The word and its meaning are both general rules; but
the word alone of the two prescribes the qualities of its replicas
in themselves. Otherwise the "word" and its "meaning" do not differ,
unless some special sense be attached to "meaning."
[From CP 2.249, EP 2:292 (Syllabus, 1903).]
A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by
virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which
operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that
Object. It is thus itself a general type or law, that is, is a
Legisign. As such it acts through a Replica. Not only is it general
itself, but the Object to which it refers is of a general nature.
Now that which is general has its being in the instances which it
will determine. There must, therefore, be existent instances of what
the Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by "existent,"
existent in the possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers.
More at this link: http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/symbol
Best, Ben
On 7/8/2014 11:49 PM, Frank Ransom wrote:
Ben, list,
Ben, thank you kindly for this response. I would like to follow-up. So
here goes:
With respect to the linguistic symbol: The letters "d", "o", and "g",
ordered in a particular way on a surface or in sound, are not the
object of the symbol, as you said. But I was discussing the word
"dog", not as an object, but as a linguistic symbol. So I don't
understand what you mean by the charcar example being irrelevant. I
don't think that a symbol can form without some purpose at work, and I
worked to demonstrate that, with the charcar example, there is a
purpose in coming up with the example in the first place; and secondly
suggested that a purpose would make itself known otherwise. A
'linguistic' symbol, on the other hand, struck me as something which a
person can come up with, and do away with, irrespective of any real
purpose, and I don't think there can be any such symbol that is
prescribed or prescribable in this way. I also don't think that you
mean that "dog" or "perro" are linguistic symbols in this sense that I
am discussing, but I do think that admitting that some symbols
prescribe qualities while denying that other symbols do is confusing,
especially when you apply it to a distinction between linguistic vs.
non-linguistic symbols, and here's why: As I understand it, Saussure
believed signs are fixed by tradition, not purpose. Since you admitted
that Saussure's signs are Peirce's linguistic symbols, I think you
made it seem that Peirce's linguistic symbols, which prescribe
qualities of appearance, are fixed by tradition, not by purpose. Maybe
I jumped the gun on that and assumed too much from what you said, but
I do think some could interpret it so. I add that, because you say
that an abstract symbol does not prescribe its qualities of
appearance, but that I would expect qualities of appearance to be
determined according to the final cause at work, I am somewhat
confused by how you view the relationship between the final causes of
the abstract symbol and the words "dog" and "perro", unless you agree
with Saussure that linguistic symbols prescribe qualities of
appearance according to tradition, not purpose. To my mind, the
purposes at work are one and the same for the abstract symbol and the
words, so there is only one symbol. Though I suppose that different
languages might be considered their own purposes, so an instance of
"dog" is really a meeting between two purposes, the dog species and
the English language, and could serve as an index for either symbol.
With respect to the relationship of the abstract symbol to the words
"dog" and "perro" as the relationship of genus to species, I am
uncertain on this point. I accept the distinction between
genus-species, as the distinction between animal and fish is one of
genus to species. But whether this is the case with how the abstract
symbol relates to "dog" and "perro" is what I hold in question, since
after all I have been denying that "dog" and "perro" are properly
symbols at all, and that there is but one symbol, manifested in two
instances with different qualities of appearance (the one with the
characters "d", "o", "g", and the other appearing with the characters
"p", "e", etc.). Clearly, then, whether or not you thought I meant the
abstract symbol and the word "dog" are like Peter and Paul, I should
say that I never thought them related in such a way, because I deny
their distinctness from each other as being more than one symbol.
Since you brought up the debate between Joe and Tom, I suppose you
probably recognized this to be my position. Then again, there is some
plausibility to your suggestion, if after all I am willing to accept
the genus-species distinction as applicable in some cases. But there
is an important difference in this case, because you are saying that
the abstract symbol does not prescribe qualities of appearance, while
animal certainly prescribes qualities for individuals of fish; there
are certain characteristics which must appear in the phenomena of fish
that animal says must appear; e.g., the power of locomotion.
You said: "Some time later I argued with Joe, saying that there should
be a way at the general sign-classificational level to account for
divergent forms of the same symbol, and that all of the elements of
the question were generically categorial - signs, symbols, qualities
of signs, etc." I think this is a very interesting question, which
leads into questions of metaphysics, or so it seems to me. As a way
towards working to an answer: since semiotics and logic are really the
same science, and the genus-species distinction is a logical one, I
think there must be some semiotically describable way of articulating
the diverging of forms from the same symbol, if they do indeed
diverge; at least, if the genus-species distinction has application,
it would seem that there should be a way to articulate it. However, I
am not aware of how that should work. Would you like to take a stab at
that one? By semiotically describable, I don't mean just saying one or
more than one symbol diverges from another symbol and appears; that
would of course be unhelpful. I mean looking at the structure of
semiosis and showing how symbols can develop from other symbols in the
way you are suggesting. If it's possible to just reference me to your
previous discussions on articulating your idea, that should certainly
be sufficient. There is no need to say it all over again, unless it's
too much trouble to find that previous discussion, or if you never
detailed it from a semiotic standpoint before.
You said: "Then at some point I or somebody dug up what Peirce said
about how some symbols (symbolic legisigns), replicas of still
more-general symbolic legisigns, prescribe qualities of appearance for
their individual instances (corresponding sinsigns a.k.a. tokens)." I
would very much like to see the quote(s), in order to put his
statement(s) into context. Well, if you can supply them off-hand. No
worries if you can't. I note that you didn't say that Peirce claimed
the more-general symbolic legisigns don't prescribe qualities of
appearance as well for the individual instances. In connection with
this, consider what I just said above about animal and instances of fish.
-- Franklin
On Sat, Jul 5, 2014 at 4:35 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:
Frank, list,
I was elucidating Peirce's conception of symbol as I understand it.
When I said that a symbol is "a sign that refers to its object by a
norm or rule of interpretation," I did not mean by "object" the
symbol's appearance's constituents. The letters 'd', 'o', 'g',
ordered or unordered, are not the object of the symbol 'dog'. Dog, or
the dog species, is the object. So the charcar example doesn't apply.
I didn't say that an abstract symbol such as the meaning or
conception of 'dog' does not prescribe at all. I said that it does
not prescribe the quality of appearance of its symbol-replicas, such
as the words 'dog' and 'perro', which, like the abstract symbol, are
also symbols, legisigns, general in their being, and which, unlike
the abstract symbol, prescribe qualities of appearance for their
individual instances. On the other hand the abstract symbol does
prescribe a way of being interpreted; it _/is/ _ that prescription,
that rule, that norm, as in the quotes that Gary Richmond sent. It is
a sign that refers to its object by a norm or rule (by being a norm
or rule) of interpretation irrespective of the sign's any resemblance
or factual connection to its object. In that sense the appearing
symbol's appearance is arbitrary IN RESEMBLANCE/NON-RESEMBLANCE TO
THE SYMBOL'S OBJECT. Such a symbol's appearance is obviously not
arbitrary in every way whatsoever. It is not arbitrary that the
numerical digits are all comparatively simple and mutually distinct
in appearance.
When Peirce discussed a legisign's individual instance, he called it
an 'instance' or 'replica'; the individual instance of a symbol,
according to Peirce, is not itself a symbol but a kind of index, an
index to one's experience of the symbol's object.
But when a legisign, a.k.a. a type, a sign general in its being, is a
replica of another legisign, it sounds funny to call it a 'general
instance'; it makes more sense to call it a 'general replica'. Now,
all (though not only) symbols are legisigns. The relationship between
the abstract symbol, the meaning or conception 'dog', and (general)
words such as 'dog' and 'perro', is genus-species. The word 'dog' and
the abstract symbol 'dog' are different not like Peter and Paul but
like Fish and Animal.
Back in 2005 Joe Ransdell and Tom Short argued about 'dog' and
'perro'. Joe said that in Peircean terms they should be considered
the _/same/ _ symbol. Tom said that, since they weren't sure what
Peirce thought, they should assume that 'dog' and 'perro' count as
_/two/ _ symbols.
Some time later I argued with Joe, saying that there should be a way
at the general sign-classificational level to account for divergent
forms of the same symbol, and that all of the elements of the
question were generically categorial - signs, symbols, qualities of
signs, etc. Then at some point I or somebody dug up what Peirce said
about how some symbols (symbolic legisigns), replicas of still
more-general symbolic legisigns, prescribe qualities of appearance
for their individual instances (corresponding sinsigns a.k.a.
tokens). So 'perro' and 'dog' are the same symbol in one sense, and
are two symbols in another sense. (Of course Quine would object
'gavagai' but Peirce's context in these matters was inductive and
abductive, not deductive.). In one sense, Peirce coined new symbols
(new words, that is), quite often. In another sense he was supplying
new clothing for more general symbols that he was evolving.
By 'linguistic symbol' in a Peircean context I mean a word, phrase,
sentence, etc., in a given particular language, used symbolically
(words like "this" have an indexical function, they're not symbols,
or not entirely symbols). The equivalence of Peirce's linguistic
symbol to Saussure's 'sign' is only approximate, since Saussure would
count as signs proper names and demonstratives which Peirce usually
counted as indices, not symbols.
Best, Ben
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