Ben, list,
I am sorry for the much delayed response! I have had a lot going on
recently, and have been able to catch up only just now.
Ben, you said "The charcar example involves a gathering of individual
objects, and such cannot constitute a symbol in Peirce's
classification, but only an individual index that instantiates a
symbol, and furthermore an instance of a symbol that prescribes the
qualities of appearance of its instances, that is, the look &/or sound
etc. of those objects, whereby one will recognize it as an instance of
said symbol." When I was coming up with a response, I realized I had
been thinking of the nature of the dynamical object, in which the
Third in that trichotomy is a collective, and that's what made me
think the charcar example appropriate. But after considering it
further, I recall that the symbol would not only be a sign that is a
collective but also a type, so I suppose you must be right. I had been
thinking that a common purpose was enough, but now I see a common type
is required too for a symbol.
On a different point: Ben, you said  "I don't understand why you
think you can arbitrarily make a symbol (or an instance of a symbol)
out of a collection of objects, but can't arbitrarily make up a
purposeful word." I did not mean that a symbol can be made up
arbitrarily, but exactly that it must always have some purpose; which,
I believe, I have already said. So you're not-understanding is
backwards: I believe a symbol can be produced that has purpose, but
that a symbol without purpose, one that is purely arbitrary, is
impossible to make up. There is always a purpose at work.
I think you are right to point out that tradition can involve purpose.
Even more, it might be said that since a symbol is a symbol in virtue
of being interpreted as a sign, then tradition could be considered
nothing other than established symbols, fixed as such by being
traditionally interpreted to be signs of what they are interpreted to
signify in the tradition. Perhaps there is more similarity between
Peirce's views and those of Saussure than I have hitherto been
prepared to countenance.
Also I suppose I was too quick to think that you were conflating
Peirce with Saussure when you said Saussure's symbols are Peirce's
linguistic symbols. But I wanted to clarify just how far that
connection goes, and I suppose you have clarified somewhat what you
meant by that, although I think it is still in part not yet clear.
Ben, you said "Peirce's solution to the question of whether "dog" and
"perro" are one symbol or two is not to see it as an exclusive
alternative. For some purposes they are the same, i.e., the same
_term_, expressible variously in various languages, and for some
purposes they are different, i.e., different _words_, insofar as a
word belongs to a language. Term, proposition, argument, as opposed to
word, (declarative-mood) sentence, linguistically expressed argument."
Previously, I had said "Â To my mind, the purposes at work are one and
the same for the abstract symbol and the words, so there is only one
symbol. Though I suppose that different languages might be considered
their own purposes, so an instance of "dog" is really a meeting
between two purposes, the dog species and the English language, and
could serve as an index for either symbol." Now setting aside the fact
that we agree there can be multiple purposes at work, and hence
multiple symbols involved, the point for me is about what here a word
is, whether it is in fact the abstract symbol itself, or something
else than that abstract symbol. I say that the word and the abstract
symbol are one and the same. Hence the quote from Peirce does not
conflict with my position. Both "dog" and "perro" are instances of the
same word-symbol, a symbol which expresses itself differently
depending upon the context in which it appears; one important element
of that context being the community of human symbols, or language, at
use in the present environment. Consider Peirce's statement from one
of your quotes: "The word and its meaning are both general rules; but
the word alone of the two prescribes the qualities of its replicas in
themselves. Otherwise the "word" and its "meaning" do not differ,
unless some special sense be attached to "meaning."" I emphasize the
last sentence of his statement.
Ben, you said "it's true that animals share some sort of quality of
appearance, so that one can't say that animal is to fish _entirely_ as
abstract symbol is to linguistic symbol. But Peirce's classifications
are global divisions according to such basics as phenomenological
category and logical quantity, so one will find these deeper
differences between kinds." I'm not sure what you mean by "so one will
find these deeper differences between kinds." Would you please clarify
what you meant by that? What differences and what kinds in this
context? I get a little dizzy trying to figure out which ones you mean
to compare and contrast, what relevant differences and what relevant
kinds.
--Franklin
On Sat, Jul 12, 2014 at 1:41 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:
Frank, list,
I've been discussing Peirce's views on sign classification and my
ideas on what those views require, not my own views per se on sign
classifications. The charcar example involves a gathering of
individual objects, and such cannot constitute a symbol in
Peirce's classification, but only an individual index that
instantiates a symbol, and furthermore an instance of a symbol
that prescribes the qualities of appearance of its instances, that
is, the look &/or sound etc. of those objects, whereby one will
recognize it as an instance of said symbol. Peirce distinguishes
between (A) a word as a symbol and legisign, and (B) an individual
instance of a word (such as an individual utterance of the word
"dog").
I don't understand why you think you can arbitrarily make a symbol
(or an instance of a symbol) out of a collection of objects, but
can't arbitrarily make up a purposeful word. Your charcar example
is purposeful AS an example, but the same is true of such invented
words as "grue" and "bleen" which have been discussed a good deal
in philosophy. Whether such symbols, words, etc., are purposeful
beyond the purpose OF being an example for theoretical discussion,
whether such symbols are cogent, fertile, growth-capable, useful
etc., in thought more generally, is another question; it is much
harder to make up such thriving symbols, and such are the symbols
in which Peirce is principally interested.
As regards tradition versus purpose, Peircean symbols may be
natural, social, etc.; they all depend on purpose or function in a
broad sense. They depend on their sheer functionality, depend on
that they will be interpreted in certain ways, irrespectively of
their resembling or being factually connected to their represented
objects. Often the purpose or function is traditional, a
community's habitual purpose from back in time. A English word
such as "dog" has a traditional purpose of evoking the idea of a
dog, and it also has a traditional purpose to look and sound
distinct from other words such as "dock" and "hog." For whatever
reasons - its polyglot vocabulary resources, its sound-shift
history, etc., - English has many homonyms, but often they're
still spelt differently, although for example there seem to be six
or so separate words that look and sound like "mole," and often
enough we're reduced to depending on context to distinguish words.
The Spanish word "perro" has a traditional purpose of evoking the
idea of a dog, and a traditional purpose to look and sound
distinct from such words as "pero" and "pajaro."
Generally I've meant that Saussure is a linguist concerned with
words, sentences, etc., while for Peirce words etc. are just one
kind of symbol. I haven't meant that their theoretical frameworks
regarding words are alike enough that one can plug conceptions
from one framework freely into the other.
Now, if "dog" and "perro" are two in some sense, and if one is
speaking of the words in their habitual or general being and not
speaking of two individual instances or utterances of words, and
if, as you say, they're the same symbol, then of what are they
two? What are they two OF? Well, they're two signs, but two of
what kind of sign? This question is in terms of generic semiotics
and categorics, pertaining to signs, qualities, norms, etc.
There's no good excuse in a Peircean system for ignoring the
question, and the question is pressed upon one when one seeks
examples of Peircean semiotic phenomena in actual language.
Peirce's solution to the question of whether "dog" and "perro" are
one symbol or two is not to see it as an exclusive alternative.
For some purposes they are the same, i.e., the same _/term/ _,
expressible variously in various languages, and for some purposes
they are different, i.e., different _/words/ _, insofar as a word
belongs to a language. Term, proposition, argument, as opposed to
word, (declarative-mood) sentence, linguistically expressed
argument. He regards all signs as icons, indices, or symbols.
It's a three-way global division. He regards the individual
instances of symbols such as utterances of "dog" as indices to
one's experience of the symbolized objects. He does not regard
words such as "dog" and "perro" as icons, since they do not
resemble their represented objects. He regards the words (not
their individual instances) as symbols because, like terms, they
fit his definition of symbol. They are habits or dispositions of
representation of objects, such that said representation does not
depend on resemblance or factual connection to those represented
objects.
it's true that animals share some sort of quality of appearance,
so that one can't say that animal is to fish _/entirely/ _ as
abstract symbol is to linguistic symbol. But Peirce's
classifications are global divisions according to such basics as
phenomenological category and logical quantity, so one will find
these deeper differences between kinds.
Here are the quotes, I previously linked to one and the other was
sent to peirce-l by Gary Richmond.
[From MS 517, EP 2:317, "Kaina Stoicheia [New Elements]"]
A symbol is defined as a sign which becomes such by virtue of
the fact that it is interpreted as such. The signification of
a complex symbol is determined by certain rules of syntax
which are part of its meaning. A simple symbol is interpreted
to signify what it does from some accidental circumstance or
series of circumstances, which the history of any word
illustrates. For example, in the latter half of the fifteenth
century, a certain model of vehicle came into use in the town
of Kots (pronounced, /kotch/ ) in Hungary. It was copied in
other towns, doubtless with some modifications, and was called
a /kotsi szeker/ , or Kots cart. Copied in still other towns,
and always more or less modified, it came to be called, for
short, a /cotch/ . It thus came about that the /[word]/
/coach/ was used, first, for a magnificent vehicle to be drawn
by horses for carrying persons in state and in such comfort as
that state required; then, for a large and pretentious vehicle
to be drawn by four or more horses for conveying passengers
from one town to another; and finally, to any large vehicle
for conveying passengers at a fare by the seat from one town
to another. In all ordinary cases, it is, and must be, an
accidental circumstance which causes a symbol to signify just
the characters it does; for were there any necessary, or
nearly necessary, reason for it, it would be this which would
render the sign a sign, and not the mere fact that so it would
be interpreted, as the definition of a symbol requires. It
will be well here to interpose a remark as to the identity of
a symbol. A sign has its being in its adaptation to fulfill a
function. A symbol is adapted to fulfill the function of a
sign simply by the fact that it does fulfill it; that is, that
it is so understood. It is, therefore, what it is understood
to be. Hence, if two symbols are used, without regard to any
differences between them, they are replicas of the same
symbol. [.... More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/stoicheia/stoicheia.htm
]
[From CP 2.292, EP 2:274 (Syllabus, 1903).]
A Symbol is a Representamen whose Representative character
consists precisely in its being a rule that will determine its
Interpretant. All words, sentences, books, and other
conventional signs are Symbols. We speak of writing or
pronouncing the word "man"; but it is only a replica, or
embodiment of the word, that is pronounced or written. The
word itself has no existence although it has a real being,
consisting in the fact that existents will conform to it. It
is a general mode of succession of three sounds or
representamens of sounds, which becomes a sign only in the
fact that a habit, or acquired law, will cause replicas of it
to be interpreted as meaning a man or men. The word and its
meaning are both general rules; but the word alone of the two
prescribes the qualities of its replicas in themselves.
Otherwise the "word" and its "meaning" do not differ, unless
some special sense be attached to "meaning."
[From CP 2.249, EP 2:292 (Syllabus, 1903).]
A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes
by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas,
which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as
referring to that Object. It is thus itself a general type or
law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts through a
Replica. Not only is it general itself, but the Object to
which it refers is of a general nature. Now that which is
general has its being in the instances which it will
determine. There must, therefore, be existent instances of
what the Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by
"existent," existent in the possibly imaginary universe to
which the Symbol refers.
More at this link: http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/symbol
Best, Ben
On 7/8/2014 11:49 PM, Frank Ransom wrote:
Ben, list,
Ben, thank you kindly for this response. I would like to
follow-up. So here goes:
With respect to the linguistic symbol: The letters "d", "o", and
"g", ordered in a particular way on a surface or in sound, are
not the object of the symbol, as you said. But I was discussing
the word "dog", not as an object, but as a linguistic symbol. So
I don't understand what you mean by the charcar example being
irrelevant. I don't think that a symbol can form without some
purpose at work, and I worked to demonstrate that, with the
charcar example, there is a purpose in coming up with the example
in the first place; and secondly suggested that a purpose would
make itself known otherwise. A 'linguistic' symbol, on the other
hand, struck me as something which a person can come up with, and
do away with, irrespective of any real purpose, and I don't think
there can be any such symbol that is prescribed or prescribable
in this way. I also don't think that you mean that "dog" or
"perro" are linguistic symbols in this sense that I am
discussing, but I do think that admitting that some symbols
prescribe qualities while denying that other symbols do is
confusing, especially when you apply it to a distinction between
linguistic vs. non-linguistic symbols, and here's why: As I
understand it, Saussure believed signs are fixed by tradition,
not purpose. Since you admitted that Saussure's signs are
Peirce's linguistic symbols, I think you made it seem that
Peirce's linguistic symbols, which prescribe qualities of
appearance, are fixed by tradition, not by purpose. Maybe I
jumped the gun on that and assumed too much from what you said,
but I do think some could interpret it so. I add that, because
you say that an abstract symbol does not prescribe its qualities
of appearance, but that I would expect qualities of appearance to
be determined according to the final cause at work, I am somewhat
confused by how you view the relationship between the final
causes of the abstract symbol and the words "dog" and "perro",
unless you agree with Saussure that linguistic symbols prescribe
qualities of appearance according to tradition, not purpose. To
my mind, the purposes at work are one and the same for the
abstract symbol and the words, so there is only one symbol.
Though I suppose that different languages might be considered
their own purposes, so an instance of "dog" is really a meeting
between two purposes, the dog species and the English language,
and could serve as an index for either symbol.
With respect to the relationship of the abstract symbol to the
words "dog" and "perro" as the relationship of genus to species,
I am uncertain on this point. I accept the distinction between
genus-species, as the distinction between animal and fish is one
of genus to species. But whether this is the case with how the
abstract symbol relates to "dog" and "perro" is what I hold in
question, since after all I have been denying that "dog" and
"perro" are properly symbols at all, and that there is but one
symbol, manifested in two instances with different qualities of
appearance (the one with the characters "d", "o", "g", and the
other appearing with the characters "p", "e", etc.). Clearly,
then, whether or not you thought I meant the abstract symbol and
the word "dog" are like Peter and Paul, I should say that I never
thought them related in such a way, because I deny their
distinctness from each other as being more than one symbol. Since
you brought up the debate between Joe and Tom, I suppose you
probably recognized this to be my position. Then again, there is
some plausibility to your suggestion, if after all I am willing
to accept the genus-species distinction as applicable in some
cases. But there is an important difference in this case, because
you are saying that the abstract symbol does not prescribe
qualities of appearance, while animal certainly prescribes
qualities for individuals of fish; there are certain
characteristics which must appear in the phenomena of fish that
animal says must appear; e.g., the power of locomotion.
You said: "Some time later I argued with Joe, saying that there
should be a way at the general sign-classificational level to
account for divergent forms of the same symbol, and that all of
the elements of the question were generically categorial - signs,
symbols, qualities of signs, etc." I think this is a very
interesting question, which leads into questions of metaphysics,
or so it seems to me. As a way towards working to an answer:
since semiotics and logic are really the same science, and the
genus-species distinction is a logical one, I think there must be
some semiotically describable way of articulating the diverging
of forms from the same symbol, if they do indeed diverge; at
least, if the genus-species distinction has application, it would
seem that there should be a way to articulate it. However, I am
not aware of how that should work. Would you like to take a stab
at that one? By semiotically describable, I don't mean just
saying one or more than one symbol diverges from another symbol
and appears; that would of course be unhelpful. I mean looking at
the structure of semiosis and showing how symbols can develop
from other symbols in the way you are suggesting. If it's
possible to just reference me to your previous discussions on
articulating your idea, that should certainly be sufficient.
There is no need to say it all over again, unless it's too much
trouble to find that previous discussion, or if you never
detailed it from a semiotic standpoint before.
You said: "Then at some point I or somebody dug up what Peirce
said about how some symbols (symbolic legisigns), replicas of
still more-general symbolic legisigns, prescribe qualities of
appearance for their individual instances (corresponding sinsigns
a.k.a. tokens)." I would very much like to see the quote(s), in
order to put his statement(s) into context. Well, if you can
supply them off-hand. No worries if you can't. I note that you
didn't say that Peirce claimed the more-general symbolic
legisigns don't prescribe qualities of appearance as well for the
individual instances. In connection with this, consider what I
just said above about animal and instances of fish.
-- Franklin
