Edwina wrote: "As for ALL the universal categories in every phenomenon (082614-1) - I don't see that - - "
Then you do not see what Peirce is saying, or you see what he is saying but disagree with him for your own personal reason. Even I, a novice in semiotics, picked this up very early in may reading of Peirce (mainly secondary sources), about 10 years ago. ". . . - and my example are the ten classes of signs, (082614-2) where the only SIGN with all three categories is a Rhematic Indexical Legisign. The other 9 classes of signs have only one or two of the categories within their triad. " But you seem to be forgeting the fact that in all of the 10 classes of signs, representamen is associated with 1ns, object with 2ns, and interpretant with 3ns. I agree with you that the triad of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (forming the horizontal margin of the table of 10 signs) is not the same as the triad of First, Second, and Third (forming the vertical margin of the table). For convenience, we may refer to the former triad as the "material categories" and the latter and the "formal categories", or something similar. Let us not forget that both sets are "categories", mathematiclaly speaking. In fact they can be viewed as members of the ur-category that I discussed in many of my recent posts both here and in the biosemiotics list. With all the best. Sung __________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > Thanks for your comments, Ben - And, see my responses interleaved: > ----- > ----- > > > >>1) BEN: Edwina, you said that Gary's calling the sign priman or > first confines it. > > "After all, if the representamen relation can be in a mode of > Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness...then how can you confine it to > 1ns, as you do below?" > > >EDWINA: Ah, now I see what you meant by my use of 'confine'. Again, > the Representamen is a Relation, not a thing - and so, I don't see > how it can be JUST, always, defined as you do, as 1ns. The > Representamen Relation can be in any of the three modes - check out > the ten classes of signs. > > BEN-2Um, neither Gary nor I have said that the sign can be JUST, always, > defined as 1ns. This is the same as you're talking about Gary's > "confining" the sign to firstness. You keep saying it, but not > explaining it. Peirce says that all the universal categories are in > every phenomenon. Do you disagree with him, or no? > > EDWINA-2: What I read of Gary R, is that he does define it as 'First', > which he seems to understand as 'Firstness'. I see the two terms as > different. As for ALL the universal categories in every phenomenon - I > don't see that - and my example are the ten classes of signs, where the > only SIGN with all three categories is a Rhematic Indexical Legisign. > The other 9 classes of signs have only one or two of the categories > within their triad. > > > >>2) BEN: Or if you're distinguishing between representamen and > representamen relation, Gary is quoting Peirce as saying that the > sign is a first that stands in a _triadic_ relation. > > >EDWINA: No, I am distinguishing between 'representation' and > 'representamen'. See 1.339. These are two different completely > different terms and with completely different meanings. The > Representation is the full triadic SIGN. The Representamen is the > mediation Relation. > > BEN-2: In 1.339 Peirce uses "representation" as an alternate term for > "sign," as people sometimes do. He makes it very clear in 1.339: "The > easiest of those which are of philosophical interest is the idea of a > sign, or representation" The "or" is an _a.k.a._ There's that > "or"+comma, often used by Peirce to emphasize the sense of _a.k.a._ > > EDWINA-2. Yes, that's exactly what I was saying....Representation is an > alternate term for Sign - the full triadic 'set'. Note that you wrote > above.." representamen and representamen relation"...and I was rejecting > this. > > BEN-3: Usually he distinguishes representation from representamen / > sign. The representamen or sign is that which represents. The > representation is the act or relation of representing. > EDWINA-3. I consider the Representamen as the Relation of mediation, > mediating the transformation of data/information from the input Object > Relation to the output Interpretant Relation. I consider that the > representation - in this particular paragraph and section of Peirce - is > the SIGN (the full triad). But I do note that in other parts of his work > elsewhere - Peirce calls the Representamen..as the sign. > > 4) BEN: > > > a.. "When it is desired to distinguish between that which represents > and the act or relation of representing, the former may be termed the > ârepresentamen,â the latter the ârepresentation.ââ¯" C. S. > Peirce, The Baldwin Dictionary, volume 2, 1902, page 464, "Represent," > http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Represent reprinted in the > Collected Papers volume 2, paragraph 273. > b.. "I confine the word _representation_ to the operation of a sign > or its _relation_ to the object _for_ the interpreter of the > representation. The concrete subject that represents I call a sign or > a representamen ." â C. S. Peirce, Lowell Lectures, 1903, Collected > Papers. volume 1, paragraph 540. See at Commens. > http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/representamen > > Those usages contradict Peirce's usages in 1.339. > > EDWINA: Agreed - thanks for the quotes. And I've seen him, as you note, > use the term 'representamen' to refer to the Relation but as a mediating > Relation, it relates to both the Object AND the Interpretant. Not just > to the Object. > > 5) BEN "Representamen" is a good word for distinguishing that which > represents from the representational act or relation. It also has > pedigree. It was used in Late Latin by Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff. See > http://www.cspeirce.com/rsources/representamen.htm . I once argued with > Tom Short here at peirce-l about whether it was worth it to have a word > "interpretant." He thought that "interpretation" would suffice. There > are similar reasons for both distinctions. > EDWINA: I think Peirce was quite specific about 'interpretant' and that > it wasn't really an 'interpretation' - for the mediate Relation, (which > I still call Representamen) carries out, in large part, but not fully, > that role. > > Peirce could have used another word than "interpretant" - he could have > used "interpretament" from Late Latin _interpretamentum_, which meant a > gloss, a construal, an interpretation (as opposed to the act or relation > of interpreting). I like "interpretant" better than "interpretament", > it's shorter. > > In Peirce's more usual sense of "representation," representation is the > representamen relation. > > > > >> 3) BEN:As for the sign's being a 'triad', I don't understand that > kind of description since I'm used mainly to Peirce's way of > talking about it. A triad of sign-object-interpretant may, as a > whole, be an object or sign or even an interpretant, as far as I > can tell. I don't see the reason to characterize it particularly > as a sign. I'm not feigning incomprehension Socrates-style or in > any other sense. I just don't get it. > > > EDWINA: But Peirce himself refers to the sign as a triad. See his > diagram at 1.347. > > BEN: I looked at the diagram at 1.347 and found _relatives_ in triadic > relations. He does not refer to a sign as a triad anywhere in CP > 300-353. If I'm wrong, please quote the passage. > > Meanwhile he does something else which he sometimes avoids: he refers to > trichotomies as triads. > > > So, when you say that a sign is a 'triad', do you mean merely that the > sign is a trichotomy? The more usual way to say that is that there is a > trichotomy (more than one trichotomy actually) of signs. > > And he says the folowing in 1.347, right below the diagram: "And > analysis will show that every relation which is _tetradic_, _pentadic_, > or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of > triadic relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond > the three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is > nothing else to be found in the phenomenon. " That's in 1894. > Twenty-five years after "On a New List," evidently he had not given up > on the association between categories and monad/dyad/triad. Your later > reference to 2.340 from 1902 about "dissatisfaction" with "On a New > List" turned out to make pretty much the opposite point as to his > supposed dissatisfaction, and the dissatisfactions that he mentioned had > nothing to do with the association between categories and > monad/dyad/triad. > > > >EDWINA: In 2.234-6, he discusses the triadic relations, and > outlines clearly, the ten classes of Signs, each made up of three > Relations or correlates. I think we have to be careful talking > about terms, for Peirce uses them, often, interchangeably. He > sometimes refers to the Representamen as a 'sign' and as a > 'ground'. And sometimes refers to the Relations as signs! > > > Peirce says that he uses representamen and sign in pretty much the same > sense, and the reason is that he means pretty much the same thing. > > >> 4) BEN: When Peirce discusses monadic, dyadic, and triadic, in > cases where all three are irreducible, as he does in one of the > quotes below, then he IS discussing the categories, and he's > doing so in connection with object, sign, interpretant. He lays > it out in "On a New List of Categories." > > > EDWINA: Peirce himself (2.340) was not pleased with his analysis > in his 1867 New List of Categories, (1.559) > > No, he says in 2.340 that "New List" of 1867 is, from a logical point of > view, the LEAST unsatisfactory work that he ever produced. He does not > complain at all about the connection between categories and > monad/dyad/triad, so I don't see why you mention the passage. Here is > the passage, 2.340: > > [2.340 "Syllabus," 1902. Quote] > In 1867 I defined a symbol as any general representamen; and so far I > was right. But I immediately proceeded after the traditional manner, to > divide symbols into _terms_, _propositions_ and _argumentations_, with > the meaning that "terms" have no assertoric element, and there I was > wrong, although the division itself is not so much wrong as it is > unimportant. Subsequently, noticing that I had classed natural symptoms > both among indices and among symbols, I restricted symbols to > conventional signs, which was another error. The truth is that my paper > of 1867 was perhaps the least unsatisfactory, from a logical point of > view, that I ever succeeded in producing; and for a long time most of > the modifications I attempted of it only led me further wrong. > [End quote] > > > >. The monadic references, in my reading, are not references to the > three categories, but to the nature of the Semiosic Structural > Relations. There is only ONE Representamen Relation. There are two > Object Relations: Dynamic Object or/and Immediate Object); and > three Interpretant Relations: immediate, dynamic and final. These > are well discussed by Peirce elsewhere..See, for example. 5.475 > (emotional, energetic and logical). > > >Edwina > Edwina, I don't know what you mean by "the monadic references" unless > you mean monad/dyad/triad. Peirce is pretty consistent about it. I've > provided quotes. Each of your quotes contradicts your claims or is > irrelevant to your claims. You have not explained what is so confining > about seeing the sign as a first, object as second, interpretant as > third, in a general way. You have not explained how that creates a > problem for the sign classes. You have not said whether you agree or > disagree with Peirce about whether all three universal categories are in > every phenomenon. I'm less sure than ever of what you mean by calling a > sign a "triad." Maybe you mean a trichotomy, a three-way classification. > > Best, Ben > > Best, Ben > > > Best, Ben > > > On 8/25/2014 6:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Ben, now I'm confused. Where did I say that a sign (which I > consider a triadic set of Relations) is 'priman' or first, i.e., > confined to Firstness in all respects? I certainly don't agree > with that - there is only one Sign (triad) whose three Relations > are all in a mode of Firstness. The other 9 signs certainly are > not. So - I'm not sure where you get that impression from me. > > The various manuscript quotes you provide are about the > interaction of the Three Relations and are not about the Three > Categories of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. I keep saying > that one must be careful not to mix up these two analytic > frameworks. > > Edwina > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Benjamin Udell > To: [email protected] > Sent: Monday, August 25, 2014 6:07 PM > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction, > > > Edwina, list, > > I don't understand why you speak of _confinement_. To say that a > sign is priman, or is a first, in some sense, is not to say that > it is confined to firstness in all respects. > > ["Lectures on Pragmatism," CP 5.43, Quote] > The particular categories form a series, or set of series, > only one of each series being present, or at least > predominant, in any one phenomenon. The universal categories, > on the other hand, belong to every phenomenon, one being > perhaps more prominent in one aspect of that phenomenon than > another but all of them belonging to every phenomenon. > [End quote] > > It seems a great deal like Peirce does not generally regard > categorial characterizations as particularly confining. If you > disagree with Peirce, then fine, I disagree with him on some > important things myself. But what is your argument that saying > that a sign is a priman in respect of object and interpretant > involves a confinement of the sign to 'a mode of firstness'? > > [1905 - MS 939 - Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise of1 > Human Nature". Quote] > [...] It is difficult to define a sign in general. It is > something which is in such a relation to an object that it > determines, or might determine, another sign of the same > object. This is true but considered as a definition it would > involve a vicious circle, since it does not say what is meant > by the interpretant being a "sign" of the same object. > However, this much is clear ; that a sign has essentially two > correlates, its object and its possible Interpretant sign. Of > these three, Sign, Object, Interpretant, the sign as being the > very thing under consideration is Monadic, the object is > Dyadic, and the Interpretant is Triadic. We therefore look to > see, whether there be not two Objects, the object as it is in > itself (the Monadic Object), and the object as the sign > represents it to be (the Dyadic Object). There are also three > Interpretants; namely, 1°, the Interpretant considered as an > independent sign of the Object, 2°, the Interpretant as it is > as a fact determined by the Sign to be, and 3° the > Interpretant as it is intended by, or is represented in, the > Sign to be. [...] > [End quote] > > So, first off, he's saying that there is a sense in which, at > the same time, the Sign is Monadic, the Object is Dyadic, and > the Interpretant is Triadic. He doesn't seem worried that this > will somehow prevent the Sign from being a sinsign, legisign, > index, symbol, dicisign, or argument. > > > Then he relates this to the subdivisions of the correlates: the > Sign unsubdivided, remains ONE, the Object is divided into TWO, > the Dynamical and Immediate Objects, and the Interpretant into > THREE, though it is not either of his familiar trichotomies of > interpretants. This is a familiar pattern. > > > This question of what is the very thing under consideration goes > back to "On A New List," where the bearer of firstness is the > quale (which is what is under consideration); the bearers of > secondness are the relate (under consideration) and its > correlate; and the bearers of thirdness are Sign (under > consideration), a correlate of it the Object and its other > correlate the Interpretant. This is reflected again in the > phaneroscopy - normatives - metaphysics distinction. The > phenomenon is the _appearance_ under consideration. It's not > that far conceptually from appearance to manifestation. As a > manifestation of an object, something is a sign. > > > [1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) > presumably July 1905] > So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a > priman (not a priman element generally) and we might define a > sign as follows: > > A "sign" is anything, A, which, > > (1) in addition to other characters of its own, > > (2) stands in a dyadic relation Ã, to a purely active > correlate, B, > > (3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely > passive correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to > determine C to be in a dyadic relation, µ, to B, the relation > µ corresponding in a recognized way to the relation Ã. > > > Then look at how Peirce is trying to work out relationships with > sign and category in successive drafts. He is not worried about > "confining" the sign to firstness or secondness or thirdness, > even though he sees it as having those categories in various > ways *irrespectively* of whether the sign is qualisign, sinsign, > legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme, dicisign, or argument. The > priman-ness of the sign consists in its being the thing under > consideration, and in its material characters of its own, > considered apart from relations to other things. > > > [MS 793 -On Signs, four versions of a certain page 11. Quote] > a - A Sign would be a Priman Secundan to something termed its > Object and if anything were to be in a certain relation to the > sign called being Interpretant to it, the Sign actively > determines the Interpretant to be itself in a relation to the > same Object, corresponding to its own. > > b - b - A "Sign" is a genuinely genuine Tertian. It would > generally be Priman in some characters, called its "Material > Characters". But in addition, it is essentially (if only > formally) Second to something termed its "Real Object", which > is purely active in the Secundanity, being immediately > unmodified by this secundanity; and these characters of the > Real Object which are essential to the identity of the Sign > constitute an ens rationis called the "Immediate Object". > Moreover, the Sign is conceivably adapted to being Third to > its Immediate Object for an ens rationis constituted thereby > in the same (generic) relation to that Object in which the > Sign itself stands to the same ; and this Third is termed the > "Intended Interpretant", but the ... [unfinished] > > c - A Sign would be in some respects Priman, and its > determination as Priman are called its Material characters. > But in addition it is Second to what is termed its Real > Object, which is altogether active, and immediately unmodified > by this Secundanity, and in so far as the Sign is second to > it, it is termed the immediate Object. The Sign is conceivably > adapted to being third to its Immediate Object for something > in so far termed its Intended Interpretant; and the Sign only > functions as such so far as the Intended Interpretant is > Second to it for an Actual Interpretant which thus becomes > adapted become a sign of the Immediate [there is a question > mark above this word] Object for a further intended > Interpretant, and in so far as the Interpretant is such Third > it is termed Reflex Interpretant. > > d - A "Sign" would be in some respects Priman, and its > determinations as such are called its "Material characters". > But in addition, it is Second to something termed its "Real > Object", which is purely active being immediately unmodified > by this Secundanity; and in so for as the sign is Second to > it, it is termed the "Immediate Object" thereof. The Sign is > conceivably adapted bo being Third to its Immediate Object for > something which should thereby be brought into the generically > same dyadic relation to that Object in which the Sign itself > stands to that Object, and this Third is called the "Intended > Interpretant"; but the Sign functions as such only in so far > as the Intended Interpretant is Second to it and is Third to > it for an existent termed the "Actual Interpretant", the modes > of... [unfinished] > [End quote] > > > Best, Ben > > > On 8/25/2014 4:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > As I keep pointing out, I consider it a serious error to > confuse Peirce's linear order of the processing semiosis of > the triad (moving from Object via Representamen to > Interpretant and also, within the mediative Representamen > reasoning, to Object to Interpretant)..as having anything at > all to do with the modal categories of Firstness, Secondness > and Thirdness! > > Therefore, your (Gary R's) outline of the Sign - even though > you declare that 'many' agree with you - I certainly don't - > and I'm not going to bring in any 'ad populum' appeal. Again, > I consider it a profound error to merge the three categorical > modes with the linear processing order of the act of semiosis. > Your outline below contradicts the other small tables, a, b, > c, which show the nine Relations - with which I DO agree. > After all, if the representamen relation can be in a mode of > Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness...then how can you confine > it to 1ns, as you do below? > > Sign: > representamen (1ns) > |> interpretant (3ns) > object (2ns) > > Edwina > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Gary Richmond > To: [email protected] ; Peirce-L > Sent: Monday, August 25, 2014 4:02 PM > Subject: [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction, > > > Helmut, > > > I think what you are pointing to as the "overall role" of > the interpretant as 3ns is reflected in this passage: > > > CP 2.274. A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands > in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its > Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its > Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its > Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The > triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are > bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any > complexus of dyadic relations. That is the reason the > Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic > relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to > it as the Representamen itself does. Nor can the triadic > relation in which the Third stands be merely similar to that > in which the First stands, for this would make the relation > of the Third to the First a degenerate Secondness merely. > The Third must indeed stand in such a relation, and thus > must be capable of determining a Third of its own; but > besides that, it must have a second triadic relation in > which the Representamen, or rather the relation thereof to > its Object, shall be its own (the Third's) Object, and must > be capable of determining a Third to this relation. All this > must equally be true of the Third's Thirds and so on > endlessly; and this, and more, is involved in the familiar > idea of a Sign. . . > > > > Many Peirce scholars, although not Edwina, I believe, see > the following categorial relation in semiotics. > > > Sign: > representamen (1ns) > |> interpretant (3ns) > object (2ns) > > > Then I think we all agree that each of these has it > tricategorial relations: > > > (a) Representamen: > qualisign (1ns) > |> legisign (3ns) > sinsign (sin==single, 2ns) > > > (b) Object: > icon (1ns) > |>symbol (3ns) > index (2ns) > > > (c) Intepretant: > Rheme ('term' generalized for semiotic, 1ns) > |> Argument (3ns) > Dicisign ('proposition' generalized for semiotic, 2ns) > > > In introducing the three trichotomies and, then, the 10-adic > sign classification, Peirce writes: > > > > CP 2.243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first > [(a) above], according as the sign in itself is a mere > quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; > secondly [(b) above], according as the relation of the sign > to its object consists in the sign's having some character > in itself, or in some existential relation to that object, > or in its relation to an interpretant; third [(c) above], > according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of > possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason. > > > Explicating the trichotomies (by which word, trichotomy, > Peirce virtually always means some categorial trichotomy > involving1ns, 2ns, and 3ns) based on CP 2.243 we get: > > > (a) Representamen: > qualisign (the sign is a mere quality) > |> legisign (the sign is a general law) > sinsign (the sign is an actual existent) > > > (b) Object: > icon (the relation of the sign to its object is some > character in itself) > |>symbol (the relation of the sign to its object is a > relation to the interpretant) > index (the relation of the sign to its object is an > existential one) > > > (c) Intepretant: > Rheme (the interpretant represents the sign as one of > possibility) > |> Argument (the interpretant represents the sign as one of > reason) > Dicisign (the interpretant represents the sign as one of > fact) > > > Immediately before introducing the 10-adic sign > classification and descriptions of the 10 sign classes > Peirce writes: > > > CP 2.254. The three trichotomies of Signs result together in > dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS, of which numerous > subdivisions have to be considered. The ten classes are as > follows: [he then gives descriptions of the 10] > > > So, in this sense (and whether or not one sees the > Interpretant as in itself expression of 3ns), Edwina is > correct that only the Argument is an Interpretant > representing its sign as a sign of reason, or, 3ns. Yet each > and all of the 10 signs has within it a relation to its > interpretant which is either rhematic, dicentic, or > argumentative. > > > Best, > > > Gary > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690 > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY > ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe > PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > >
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