Ben, now I'm confused. Where did I say that a sign (which I
consider a triadic set of Relations) is 'priman' or first, i.e.,
confined to Firstness in all respects? I certainly don't agree
with that - there is only one Sign (triad) whose three Relations
are all in a mode of Firstness. The other 9 signs certainly are
not. So - I'm not sure where you get that impression from me.
The various manuscript quotes you provide are about the
interaction of the Three Relations and are not about the Three
Categories of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. I keep saying
that one must be careful not to mix up these two analytic frameworks.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Benjamin Udell <mailto:[email protected]>
*To:* [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
*Sent:* Monday, August 25, 2014 6:07 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction,
Edwina, list,
I don't understand why you speak of _/confinement/_. To say
that a sign is priman, or is a first, in some sense, is not
to say that it is confined to firstness in all respects.
["Lectures on Pragmatism," CP 5.43, Quote]
The particular categories form a series, or set of
series, only one of each series being present, or at
least predominant, in any one phenomenon. The universal
categories, on the other hand, belong to every
phenomenon, one being perhaps more prominent in one
aspect of that phenomenon than another but all of them
belonging to every phenomenon.
[End quote]
It seems a great deal like Peirce does not generally regard
categorial characterizations as particularly confining. If
you disagree with Peirce, then fine, I disagree with him on
some important things myself. But what is your argument that
saying that a sign is a priman in respect of object and
interpretant involves a confinement of the sign to 'a mode of
firstness'?
[1905 - MS 939 - Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise
of1 Human Nature". Quote]
[...] It is difficult to define a sign in general. It is
something which is in such a relation to an object that
it determines, or might determine, another sign of the
same object. This is true but considered as a definition
it would involve a vicious circle, since it does not say
what is meant by the interpretant being a "sign" of the
same object. However, this much is clear ; that a sign
has essentially two correlates, its object and its
possible Interpretant sign. Of these three, Sign, Object,
Interpretant, the sign as being the very thing under
consideration is Monadic, the object is Dyadic, and the
Interpretant is Triadic. We therefore look to see,
whether there be not two Objects, the object as it is in
itself (the Monadic Object), and the object as the sign
represents it to be (the Dyadic Object). There are also
three Interpretants; namely, 1°, the Interpretant
considered as an independent sign of the Object, 2°, the
Interpretant as it is as a fact determined by the Sign to
be, and 3° the Interpretant as it is intended by, or is
represented in, the Sign to be. [...]
[End quote]
So, first off, he's saying that there is a sense in which, at
the same time, the Sign is Monadic, the Object is Dyadic, and
the Interpretant is Triadic. He doesn't seem worried that
this will somehow prevent the Sign from being a sinsign,
legisign, index, symbol, dicisign, or argument.
Then he relates this to the subdivisions of the correlates:
the Sign unsubdivided, remains ONE, the Object is divided
into TWO, the Dynamical and Immediate Objects, and the
Interpretant into THREE, though it is not either of his
familiar trichotomies of interpretants. This is a familiar
pattern.
This question of what is the very thing under consideration
goes back to "On A New List," where the bearer of firstness
is the quale (which is what is under consideration); the
bearers of secondness are the relate (under consideration)
and its correlate; and the bearers of thirdness are Sign
(under consideration), a correlate of it the Object and its
other correlate the Interpretant. This is reflected again in
the phaneroscopy - normatives - metaphysics distinction. The
phenomenon is the _/appearance/_ under consideration. It's
not that far conceptually from appearance to manifestation.
As a manifestation of an object, something is a sign.
[1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft)
presumably July 1905]
So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a
priman (not a priman element generally) and we might
define a sign as follows:
A "sign" is anything, A, which,
(1) in addition to other characters of its own,
(2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active
correlate, B,
(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely
passive correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as
to determine C to be in a dyadic relation, µ, to B, the
relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the
relation Þ.
Then look at how Peirce is trying to work out relationships
with sign and category in successive drafts. He is not
worried about "confining" the sign to firstness or secondness
or thirdness, even though he sees it as having those
categories in various ways **irrespectively** of whether the
sign is qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol,
rheme, dicisign, or argument. The priman-ness of the sign
consists in its being the thing under consideration, and in
its material characters of its own, considered apart from
relations to other things.
[MS 793 -On Signs, four versions of a certain page 11.
Quote]
a - A Sign would be a Priman Secundan to something termed
its Object and if anything were to be in a certain
relation to the sign called being Interpretant to it, the
Sign actively determines the Interpretant to be itself in
a relation to the same Object, corresponding to its own.
b - b - A "Sign" is a genuinely genuine Tertian. It would
generally be Priman in some characters, called its
"Material Characters". But in addition, it is essentially
(if only formally) Second to something termed its "Real
Object", which is purely active in the Secundanity, being
immediately unmodified by this secundanity; and these
characters of the Real Object which are essential to the
identity of the Sign constitute an ens rationis called
the "Immediate Object". Moreover, the Sign is conceivably
adapted to being Third to its Immediate Object for an ens
rationis constituted thereby in the same (generic)
relation to that Object in which the Sign itself stands
to the same ; and this Third is termed the "Intended
Interpretant", but the ... [unfinished]
c - A Sign would be in some respects Priman, and its
determination as Priman are called its Material
characters. But in addition it is Second to what is
termed its Real Object, which is altogether active, and
immediately unmodified by this Secundanity, and in so far
as the Sign is second to it, it is termed the immediate
Object. The Sign is conceivably adapted to being third to
its Immediate Object for something in so far termed its
Intended Interpretant; and the Sign only functions as
such so far as the Intended Interpretant is Second to it
for an Actual Interpretant which thus becomes adapted
become a sign of the Immediate [there is a question mark
above this word] Object for a further intended
Interpretant, and in so far as the Interpretant is such
Third it is termed Reflex Interpretant.
d - A "Sign" would be in some respects Priman, and its
determinations as such are called its "Material
characters". But in addition, it is Second to something
termed its "Real Object", which is purely active being
immediately unmodified by this Secundanity; and in so for
as the sign is Second to it, it is termed the "Immediate
Object" thereof. The Sign is conceivably adapted bo being
Third to its Immediate Object for something which should
thereby be brought into the generically same dyadic
relation to that Object in which the Sign itself stands
to that Object, and this Third is called the "Intended
Interpretant"; but the Sign functions as such only in so
far as the Intended Interpretant is Second to it and is
Third to it for an existent termed the "Actual
Interpretant", the modes of... [unfinished]
[End quote]
Best, Ben
On 8/25/2014 4:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
As I keep pointing out, I consider it a serious error to
confuse Peirce's linear order of the processing semiosis of
the triad (moving from Object via Representamen to
Interpretant and also, within the mediative Representamen
reasoning, to Object to Interpretant)..as having anything at
all to do with the modal categories of Firstness, Secondness
and Thirdness!
Therefore, your (Gary R's) outline of the Sign - even though
you declare that 'many' agree with you - I certainly don't -
and I'm not going to bring in any 'ad populum' appeal.
Again, I consider it a profound error to merge the three
categorical modes with the linear processing order of the
act of semiosis. Your outline below contradicts the other
small tables, a, b, c, which show the nine Relations - with
which I DO agree. After all, if the representamen relation
can be in a mode of Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness...then how can you confine it to 1ns, as you do
below?
Sign:
representamen (1ns)
|> interpretant (3ns)
object (2ns)
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Gary Richmond <mailto:[email protected]>
*To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> ; Peirce-L
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Sent:* Monday, August 25, 2014 4:02 PM
*Subject:* [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction,
Helmut,
I think what you are pointing to as the "overall role"
of the interpretant as 3ns is reflected in this passage:
CP 2.274. A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which
stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second,
called its Object, as to be capable of determining a
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same
triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself
to the same Object. The triadic relation is genuine,
that is its three members are bound together by it in a
way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic
relations. That is the reason the Interpretant, or
Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the
Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as the
Representamen itself does. Nor can the triadic relation
in which the Third stands be merely similar to that in
which the First stands, for this would make the relation
of the Third to the First a degenerate Secondness
merely. The Third must indeed stand in such a relation,
and thus must be capable of determining a Third of its
own; but besides that, it must have a second triadic
relation in which the Representamen, or rather the
relation thereof to its Object, shall be its own (the
Third's) Object, and must be capable of determining a
Third to this relation. All this must equally be true of
the Third's Thirds and so on endlessly; and this, and
more, is involved in the familiar idea of a Sign. . .
Many Peirce scholars, although not Edwina, I believe,
see the following categorial relation in semiotics.
Sign:
representamen (1ns)
|> interpretant (3ns)
object (2ns)
Then I think we /all /agree that each of these has it
tricategorial relations:
_(a) Representamen_:
qualisign (1ns)
|> legisign (3ns)
sinsign (sin==single, 2ns)
_(b) Object_:
icon (1ns)
|>symbol (3ns)
index (2ns)
_(c) Intepretant_:
Rheme ('term' generalized for semiotic, 1ns)
|> Argument (3ns)
Dicisign ('proposition' generalized for semiotic, 2ns)
In introducing the three trichotomies and, then, the
10-adic sign classification, Peirce writes:
CP 2.243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies;
first [(a) above], according as the sign in itself is a
mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general
law; secondly [(b) above], according as the relation of
the sign to its object consists in the sign's having
some character in itself, or in some existential
relation to that object, or in its relation to an
interpretant; third [(c) above], according as its
Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or
as a sign of fact or a sign of reason.
Explicating the trichotomies (by which word, trichotomy,
Peirce virtually /always/ means some categorial
trichotomy involving1ns, 2ns, and 3ns) based on CP 2.243
we get:
_(a) Representamen_:
qualisign (the sign is a mere quality)
|> legisign (the sign is a general law)
sinsign (the sign is an actual existent)
_(b) Object_:
icon (the relation of the sign to its object is some
character in itself)
|>symbol (the relation of the sign to its object is a
relation to the interpretant)
index (the relation of the sign to its object is an
existential one)
_(c) Intepretant_:
Rheme (the interpretant represents the sign as one of
possibility)
|> Argument (the interpretant represents the sign as
one of reason)
Dicisign (the interpretant represents the sign as one of
fact)
Immediately before introducing the 10-adic sign
classification and descriptions of the 10 sign classes
Peirce writes:
CP 2.254. The three trichotomies of Signs result
together in dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS, of
which numerous subdivisions have to be considered. The
ten classes are as follows: [he then gives descriptions
of the 10]
So, in this sense (and whether or not one sees the
Interpretant as in itself expression of 3ns), Edwina is
correct that only the Argument is an Interpretant
representing its sign as a sign of reason, or, 3ns. Yet
each and all of the 10 signs has within it a relation to
its interpretant which is either rhematic, dicentic, or
argumentative.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <tel:718%20482-5690>*
