Tom,

 

Wariness is a good thing. Jumping to conclusions (as Jon did) is, well, not 
logical.

 

I would recommend that we work our way carefully through Frederik’s exposition 
of Peirce’s dicisign concept before assessing its value. We can’t do that based 
on one introductory post (or two). We’ll be doing it later this month (after we 
grapple with anti-psychologism). In the meantime … “the first thing that the 
Will to Learn supposes is a dissatisfaction with one's present state of 
opinion” (EP2:47).

 

gary f.

 

From: Tom Gollier [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: 2-Sep-14 12:53 PM
To: Peirce List
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re:Natural Propositions

 

I have to admit I'm with Jon in this discussion, at least insofar as the 
statement:

    "Peirce simply said that a Dicisign is a sign which is involved twice with 
one and the same
    object: 1) it refers to the object (P's generalization of the Subject part 
of a
    proposition; 2) it describes that object (P's generalization of the 
Predicate)."

makes me wary. While it is consistent, as far as it goes, with a 
triadic/diagrammatic interpretation of propositions, it seems susceptible to 
those dyadic interpretations of propositions that have so bedeviled modern 
interpretations of Peirce.

 

On Tue, Sep 2, 2014 at 8:37 AM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote:

Ben, thanks, you saved me the trouble of asking Jon to explain his cryptic post.

John, the bit you quoted is my wording of that part of Peirce's analysis 
(around EP2:282) which is basic to Frederik's thesis, which is considerably 
more complex than that (which is why we need a months-long seminar to deal with 
it). Whether Frederik would approve of my exact wording I don't know, but I 
also don't know what your objection to it is. Perhaps you can clarify. By the 
way, have you read any of NP yet?

gary f.


-----Original Message-----
From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 2-Sep-14 10:56 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re:Natural Propositions

Jon,

Why not be a bit more specific? You know that Peirce starting in 1903 Syllabus 
"Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations" says that some dicisigns 
(a.k.a. dicent signs) are symbols and some dicisigns instead are indices. Is 
your argument that every dicisign incorporates a symbol (I can't remember 
Peirce's view on this)? - and that, therefore, every dicisign is symbolic, even 
if not every dicisign is a symbol? In that case your objection seems a bit 
strong since it would be focused on Gary F.'s using the adjective "symbolic" 
rather than the noun "symbol."

But maybe your objection consists in something else. Why leave people guessing?

Best, Ben

On 9/2/2014 10:30 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

> Re: Gary Fuhrman
> At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13838
>
> "I think your book will change all that, showing as it does a dicisign
> — that is, a sign complete enough to be true — must involve both
> iconic and indexical components, but does not have to be symbolic."
>
> Gary,
>
> That statement is the very epitome of the retrograde motion that has
> occurred in the understanding of Peirce's logic and semiotics in
> recent years.  If that really is Frederik's thesis then you have just
> saved me the trouble of an utterly futile discussion.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> Gary Fuhrman wrote:



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