Jon, You've got me there. When the discussion moves toward "sets of ordered triples" I tend to move on.
But my point here is that if we're going to discussion anything — be it propositions, logics, or complex sign relations — diagrammatically, then we need to see that thing as an "icon or diagram the relations of whose parts shall present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of reasoning …" [CP3.363] It would not be the proposition, logic, or sign relation, as a diagram, which is the "object of reasoning." It would be what it's "parts" are analogous to; what it is we hope to understand by correctly applying the diagram to some thing or another. Tom On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 10:48 AM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: > Thread (cont.) > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13937 > SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13938 > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13939 > TG:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13940 > > Tom, > > I'm guessing you hadn't read my reply to Sung before replying to his, so > let me explain that my use of the phrase "symbolic matrix" was simply a > rhetorical variant for "sign relation that happens to be rife with signs of > the symbolic type". > > You may know me well enough by now to recognize that I always use "sign > relation" to mean a set (or a collection) of ordered triples of the form > (o, s, i) — or any other of the 6 possible orders that happens to be > convenient in a given context. > > Sometimes we think of the collection of triples in a sign relation as > being very numerous and very indefinite. Here we imagine the set of > triples to encompass the entire "setting" of our discussion and thought and > we may well regard this "matrix" more in the sense of Dewey's "existential > matrix". > > When we want to analyze an example of a sign relation with any degree of > thoroughness — as we might analyze the genome of a flatworm or roundworm > down to the last drop of DNA — we reign in the triples of the target sign > relation to a definite, definable collection, often but not always rather > small. > > Hope that clears a few things up ... > > Jon > > > > Tom Gollier wrote: > >> If propositions are diagrams, dependent on analogy, logic and "symbolic >> matrices" are surely diagrams as well. Formal logic suffers from a >> certain >> sterility, I think, precisely because it focuses exclusively on the >> logical >> diagram itself, forgetting the analogies at it's base and not worrying all >> that much about it's experiential consequences. >> >> Tom >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 3:30 AM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Jon wrote: >>> >>> "But analogies and icons all break in time, at one (090614-1) >>> point or another, and it is only their embedding in a >>> more fluid and robust symbolic matrix that makes it >>> possible for us to use them where they fit and to set >>> them aside when they fail." >>> >>> By "symbolic matrix" do you mean algebraic and formal expressions in >>> contrast to diagrams ? >>> Sung >>> >>> >>> >> > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >
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