Peircers,
A passage from “3.3. Dicisigns: Signs Separately Indicating Their Object”.
<quote>
True to Peirce's general way of investigating sign types, he describes Dicisigns
compositionally, functionally, and systematically. As Hilpinen (1992) says,
Peirce's recurrent and “standard” definition of Dicisigns is given in the
following italicized passage from “Kaina stoicheia”:
“It is remarkable that while neither a pure icon or a pure index can assert
anything, an index which forces something to be an icon, as a weathercock does,
or which forces us to regard it as an icon, as the legend under the portrait
does, does make an assertion, and forms a proposition. This suggests a true
definition of a proposition, which is a question in much dispute at the moment.
''A proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its
object.''” (EP2, 307, emphasis Hilpinen's)
</quote>(Frederik Stjernfelt, ''Natural Propositions'', 53–54)
Points and questions that come to mind on reading this selection:
Assertion. Brings to mind my first university course in logic (Stoll, perhaps).
Based on what I later learned was a tradition extending from Frege to Quine,
the text made a distinction between considering or contemplating a proposition
and actually asserting it. This was invoked, for example, to explain the
difference between a conditional (→) and an implication (⇒). I would eventually
find more sensible ways of understanding this.
Force. Seriously, experience has forced me to realize that nothing can truly
force anything to be an icon or force anyone to regard anything as an icon.
Independently and Separately. These concepts require definition. As a rule,
logicians and mathematicians do not define them the same way normal people do.
Regards,
Jon
--
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