GR : The Peirce quotation [Howard] offered concerns only an "absolute" first and *that*, no doubt, is an abstraction and, as such, cannot be experienced.
HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction is more than an artifact of language? H oward, the thrust of my post was exactly that firstness *can be* and *is* experienced. Peirce offers an abstract definition of firstness in the passage you earlier quoted in the interest of clarifying the kind of phenomenon it is " Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it " and, it is clear to me, that any abstract definition of it "must be false to it" as well. Were there such a phenomenon as absolute firstness which could stand apart from its participation in a reality which involves all three categories, it might look like Peirce's abstract definition. There is no such abstract firstness in reality--there are only the embodied firstnesses such as those I described. Peirce concluded the passage you quoted by saying that what is first is " present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. " My personal example was meant to suggest just that presentness, immediacy, freshness, newness, spontaneity, vividness, consciousness, and evanescence. B est, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 1:44 PM, Howard Pattee <[email protected]> wrote: > At 09:54 PM 11/29/2014, Gary Richmond wrote: > > The Peirce quotation you offered concerns only an "absolute" first and > that, no doubt, is an abstraction and, as such, cannot be experienced. > > > HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction is more > than an artifact of language? > I would say that Firstness now belongs to the ongoing *qualia* > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia> problem > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia>. > > The question arises for any abstract verbal distinctions. For example, > Edwina's "three 'pure' or 'genuine' modes, 1-1, 2-2, 3-3, or Firstness as > Firstness, Secondness as Secondness; Thirdness as Thirdness." > > Just as confusing are the converse failures to make distinctions that have > empirical content. For example, Peirce's lumping abduction with logic. > > Qualia problems will require more than philosophical and linguistic > distinctions to clarify. We will need to know more about what is going on > in brains. > > Howard > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
