Joseph wrote: Firstness is a happy land . . . Not at all! The following are also all qualities of feeling (or complexes of them): suffering, pain (physical, say, toothache, or emotional, say, heartache), agony, distress, anxiety, fear, despair, fatigue, worry, etc.
Good or bad, painful or pleasurable, it is the "living" character of the feeling which matters. Yet the feeling must be present (even if it presents itself in, say, an intense memory of a feeling which comes to consciousness). Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 4:14 PM, Joseph Brenner <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., > > Thank you for this note which helps me understand what is embodied in > Firstness. > Firstness is a happy land in which there is no absence, delay, staleness, > wear, > slavery, vagueness, dullness, repetition, unconsiousness and permanence. > Happy, then, the biosemiotician or any scientist who can live and work in > that land. > > Joseph B. > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Cc:* [email protected] > *Sent:* Sunday, November 30, 2014 8:59 PM > *Subject:* [biosemiotics:7604] Re: Peirce categories > > GR > : > The Peirce quotation > [Howard] > offered concerns only an "absolute" first and *that*, no doubt, is an > abstraction and, as such, cannot be experienced. > > HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction is more > than an artifact of language? > > H > oward, the thrust of my post was exactly that firstness *can be* and *is* > experienced. > Peirce offers an abstract definition of firstness in the passage you > earlier quoted in the interest of clarifying the kind of phenomenon it is > " > Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it > " and, it is clear to me, that any abstract definition of it "must be > false to it" as well. > > > Were there such a phenomenon as absolute firstness which could stand > apart from its participation in a reality which involves all three > categories, it might look like Peirce's abstract definition. There is no > such abstract firstness in reality--there are only the embodied firstnesses > such as those I described. > > Peirce concluded the passage you quoted by saying that what is first is " > present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, > vivid, conscious, and evanescent. > " > > My personal example was meant to suggest just that presentness, > immediacy, freshness, newness, spontaneity, vividness, consciousness, and > evanescence. > > B > est, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 1:44 PM, Howard Pattee <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> At 09:54 PM 11/29/2014, Gary Richmond wrote: >> >> The Peirce quotation you offered concerns only an "absolute" first and >> that, no doubt, is an abstraction and, as such, cannot be experienced. >> >> >> HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction is more >> than an artifact of language? >> I would say that Firstness now belongs to the ongoing *qualia* >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia> problem >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia>. >> >> The question arises for any abstract verbal distinctions. For example, >> Edwina's "three 'pure' or 'genuine' modes, 1-1, 2-2, 3-3, or Firstness as >> Firstness, Secondness as Secondness; Thirdness as Thirdness." >> >> Just as confusing are the converse failures to make distinctions that >> have empirical content. For example, Peirce's lumping abduction with logic. >> >> Qualia problems will require more than philosophical and linguistic >> distinctions to clarify. We will need to know more about what is going on >> in brains. >> >> Howard >> >> >> >
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