The term "physical," during the twentieth century, has transformed to be
equated with materialism. That is a naive and technical mistake. In this
view matter or material is epistemically first, ideas and feelings are a
mystery that "evolves" or "emerges." But this is a stagnant view.
Carnap did not share it, nor did any Peirce, nor do I. Carnap said,
basically, that physical is whatever structure *does,* concurring with your
nature argument. Empiricism, the observation and record of actions in
structure, is epistemically first.
Now before scholars jump in and accuse me of materialism or nominalism,
let's be clear. First, not all has been discovered and this is the
principle mistake and arrogance of twentieth century science. So how and
where may we make new discovery? Simple, in Biophysics.
It never was reasonable to assume that we could proceed in biophysics or
medicine without making new physical discoveries. Not least because we have
this nebulous thing that people do not understand with a variety of names,
spirituality, consciousness, the mind, logic. In all cases, ideas and
feelings.
Explanation is required for the cause of structural forms and behaviors
(motions, however complex). Gravitation and electromagnetic force, are
examples of twentieth century explanations - but clearly these are not
adequate for biophysics and medicine. In addition, they must be unified.
This leaves us with the pragmatist view of epistemology and the reason
Peirce and Carnap are so close. In it explanation is directed toward
structure and its behaviors. The quest of science is the minimal set of
equations required to explain it all. Einstein had both direct and indirect
things to add to this argument but he was less an epistemologist than he
was a physicist.
Gravitation is a manifest universal non-local force and its strength is as
much for the epistemology it brings (general covariance) as its simple
physical idea. The endless failure of Quantum-Gravity efforts only goes to
underscore this.
So this is where the Peirce family view comes into play and this view is
that of Benjamin Peirce, not Charles. There is another universal akin to
gravitation that is the basis of all biophysical behavior. It is not
account for today. It cannot be repeated computationally (although we may
just be able to compute it at work in simple form and a lot of
computational power). Turing's computation is excluded from biophysics due
to its power profile.
Benjamin called this new feature of the world "Universal Will" and Charles
referred to it as "matter as effete mind" - I refer to it as the "basis of
experience," covariant to light, gravitation and "shaped" into its various
forms by structure. It plays a role akin to the role in structure played by
its sibling gravitation.
How do we incorporate this view into physical theory? By looking to
Einstein's "general covariance." The power of general covariance was
essnetially missed by both Carnap and Geodel, Einstein's logician friends.
I believe that Benjamin would have seen it clearly and was simply lacking
the advanced conceptual and technical tools to take him the full way at the
time.
So let's be clear. How does this differ from physical theory before? It
says: 1. there is more to be discovered. 2. new empirical evidence is
coming from biophysics (often generated for "mundane" causes). 3. a new
universal non-local effect in structure. 4. it is mathematizable. 5.
rethink everything.
How do we mathematically reason about the mind and sense/feeling? Do we
follow Charles? No. We follow Benjamin Peirce's intuition on quaternions.
Complex Analysis provides a pointer to the necessary tools. A holomorphic
functor can describe the character of a particular and developing sense,
feeling, memory or response - a particular shape upon the cells or membrane
structure. This non-local behavior across structure IS a sense. A
hyper-functor (two holomorphic functors combined) is sense and response,
with a critical decision points between sense and response potentials. The
supporting mechanisms are evident in biophysics. And this scales up to the
operation of all biophysics and the familiar mind. This is the result of a
decade of full-time research on my part. I am writing it up.
My advantage is simply to live in a time when biophysical data has become
accessible through technology ... and I have now begun to make my case. See
my Stanford University lecture for more details:
https://youtu.be/zF5Bp_YsZ3M
Apparently I am not immortal (my view before the past year). And,
unfortunately, I was suffering from a superficial stroke and cancer at the
time of this presentation that went into stage four a month or two later
(it's a shock just how quickly cancer can extrapolate). I have been slowed
down. But I have been treated and the prognosis is good, the cancer "fog"
is clearing. I expect a full recovery. I now trust that I can get back on
track in this coming year. My book is only delayed (and better for the new
and humbling experience). :-)
Regards,
Steven
On Sat, Mar 28, 2015 at 3:06 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
> Hi! Does "physical" mean "natural" or "material"? I think, that it means
> "natural", although in medicine it is often used for affairs of the body in
> contrast to affairs of the mind (psychical). In Greek "physica" means
> science of the nature. Maybe this is only a term problem?
> Helmut
>
> *Gesendet:* Samstag, 28. März 2015 um 21:00 Uhr
> *Von:* "Danko Nikolic" <[email protected]>
> *An:* "Evgenii Rudnyi" <[email protected]>, [email protected]
> *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] abduction in the brain
>
> I subscribe to this.
>
> (I am also aware that this is not an absolute truth, but a convenient way
> of describing the world in scientific terms.)
>
> Danko
> On 28 Mar 2015 14:46, "Evgenii Rudnyi" <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> Dear Danko,
>>
>> Before discussing Peirce, I would like to know your understanding of
>> physical.
>>
>> Let me quote the definition of physicalism from Stanford Encyclopedia of
>> Philosophy
>>
>> "The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the
>> universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the
>> condition of being physical. Of course, physicalists don't deny that the
>> world might contain many items that at first glance don't seem physical —
>> items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or social nature. But
>> they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are either
>> physical or supervene on the physical."
>>
>> Do you subscribe to this, or your vision of physical is different?
>>
>> Evgenii
>>
>> Am 27.03.2015 um 20:50 schrieb Danko Nikolic:
>>>
>>> Dear Evgenii,
>>>
>>> This is the first time I hear of that definition of matter. It is
>>> interesting. I don't know the implications as I am new to Peirce.
>>>
>>> Yes, of course, I would agree that being biological implies that the
>>> mind is a physical phenomenon.
>>>
>>> Danko
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27/03/15 19:34, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>>>
>>>> This implies that "The mind is a physical phenomenon." Along this
>>>> line I would appreciate if you make your statement on what is for
>>>> you physical and how it is related to inevitable physical laws.
>>>>
>>>> Peirce's quote in this respect:
>>>>
>>>> “Matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit to the
>>>> point where the breaking up of this habits is very difficult.”
>>>>
>>>> Evgenii
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
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