Danko,
Indeed, What is important is that we understand each other. But that takes time, and since you’ve been getting so many good responses to your posts and your paper, I probably should have held my peace, given that I currently don’t have the time it would take to give proper attention to your work. Even to distinguish between terminological and more substantive issues takes more dialogue than we often think, especially considering that there’s no definitive boundary between them — “since thought, like an onion, is composed of nothing but wrappings” (Peirce, EP2:460). Anyway I’ll have to bow out of the discussion now, saving the links you’ve given until I can get back to them. gary f. From: Danko Nikolic [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 29-Mar-15 9:40 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] abduction in the brain Dear Gary, I see. What I meant was "theories", of course. I presume that there is some reality out there, to which we have only indirect access and we are trying to describe it best we can. It is just a difference in the use of terminology that I have to get used to. We could discuss at length whether your or mine use of the term "law" is more correct and more in the spirit of modern physics (and probably you would win at the end), but it would not matter much. What is important is that we understand each other. So, this makes me "realistic", if that's the right term. Danko On 29/03/15 14:31, Gary Fuhrman wrote: Danko, you “consider physical laws to be a product of our minds.” A more Peircean view would be that physical theories are products of our minds, or rather of our inquiries. Theories of course are signs; and the objects of those signs, insofar as the theories are testable and fallible, are the real physical laws which actually govern what happens in the physical universe whether anyone knows it or not. If you are saying that there are no physical laws operating independently of our minds, i.e. no real and general physical laws, then your metaphysics is nominalistic. Peirce’s on the other hand was realistic. gary f. -----Original Message----- From: Danko Nikolic [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 29-Mar-15 6:54 AM To: Evgenii Rudnyi; [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] abduction in the brain Dear Evgenii, My replies bellow: On 29/03/15 11:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > Thank you. I have one more question about physical. We talk after all > about processes in time and the question would be on how it happens > according to your view. To this end, let me quote from Tim Maudlin's > "The Metaphysics Within Physics" > > “I believe there is a fundamental physical state of the world.” > No. > “In addition to the physical state of the universe, I believe in > fundamental physical laws.” > No. > “Once the total physical state of the universe and the laws of physics > are fixed, every other fact, such as may be, supervenes.” > Not in reality. However, this may be a damn good approximation, maybe the best that we can come up with. So, for all practical purposes, perhaps yes. But in reality, not really. > Would you agree with such a description of physical processes? Or do > you consider a physical process differently? > I consider it differently. I consider physical laws to be a product of our minds. They are not really fundamental. Our physics is just a practical way of organizing knowledge. These laws are fundamental only for our way of thinking about it. If we had different minds i.e., if the evolution took some other direction to make us intelligent enough to develop technology, we would have different "physics" too. We would consider some other descriptive rules as fundamental. It would be more fair to say that minds came first and that these minds then invented physical laws (and mathematics and so on). However, having said that, I also have to make a qualifier. I disagree that science (i.e., physics-based science) will never explained qualia or mind. I believe that with our physics-based model of the universe we will be able to explain qualia -- despite physics not being fundamental. (This is what practopoiesis is about, anyway.) It may not be the simplest or most practical explanation but, importantly, we can do it. Once we have done it, we can look back more accurately to reconsider what we want to adopt as fundamental. What should be the most elegant model of "everything"? In which way can we make most accurate descriptions and predictions of as many phenomena with as parsimonious model possible? Maybe at that time it will become apparent to the mainstream science that physics needs to be replaced with something else. Perhaps we should establish the rules of the mind, use them as fundamental and consider physics "supervening" on these rules. In fact, I would argue that this is exactly what we can do already today, using results from mainstream science of the mind and add to it even the mainstream physiology and anatomy of the brain. We can find the rules that "govern our universe" already in the functional anatomy of the cerebrum and in the ways how we think in general and make decisions, categorizations, inferences. Maybe Peirce has already hinted on that mind-based approach. Or has he already elaborated it to a substantial degree? I wouldn't know. Please tell me. Danko -- Prof. Dr. Danko Nikolić Web: http://www.danko-nikolic.com Mail address 1: Department of Neurophysiology Max Planck Institut for Brain Research Deutschordenstr. 46 60528 Frankfurt am Main GERMANY Mail address 2: Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies Wolfgang Goethe University Ruth-Moufang-Str. 1 60433 Frankfurt am Main GERMANY ---------------------------- Office: (..49-69) 96769-736 Lab: (..49-69) 96769-209 Fax: (..49-69) 96769-327 [email protected] ----------------------------
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