Gary F, Danko, lists,

I wonder if a diagram, in addition to words, might be helpful in clarifying
the complex relations among "theories". "laws", "sings" , "objects",
"mind", etc.

As all Peirceans would agree, the sign is irreducibly triadic, which I
often represent diagrammatically thus [1, see Table V]:


                                   f
                          g
                   Object ------------> Sign (also called 'Representamen')
------------>  Interpretant
                       |
                                             ^
                       |
                                             |

 |_______________________________________________________|
                                                                    h


Figure 1.  The Peircean sign as an irreducible triad characterized by the
commutative relation, f x g = h, meaning that operation f followed by
operation g leads to the same results as operation h, where f = natural
process, g = mental process, and h = information flow [1].



Gary F's remark above seems to map "laws" and "theories"  on to the triadic
tempalte of teh sign difgferently from mine, as shown in the following
table:


   ______________________________________________________________

   Table 1.  Possible mappings of "theories", "laws", and "phenomena" on to
                 the triadic template of the Peircean sign.
   ______________________________________________________________

      author                   Object                 Sign
     Interpretant
    ______________________________________________________________

      Gary F                   Laws                  Theories
       ?

      Sung                      Laws                  Phenomena
Theories

        .
        .
        .
   _______________________________________________________________


In the definition of signs by Peirce, the 'mind' is not explicitly
implicated as an element of the triad but, without it, the sign cannot
exist, since the interpretant is the effect that a sign has on the mind of
the interpreter of the sign. The following two quotes from [2] clarifies
the relation between a sign and a mind:


*4 - 1873 - MS 380 - Of logic as a study of signs .*

"A sign is something which stands for another thing to a mind."


*9 - v. 1897_- C.P. 2-228 - Division of signs .*

A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign or perhaps a more
developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the
first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that
object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I
have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. [...]
Finally, I would like to point out that the triadic definition of a sign
and that of a mathematical category is almost identical, and that many
mathematicians and theoretical physicists seem to believe that physics and
mathematics can be unified under the framework of the category theory [3,
4], in agreement with Table V in [1].


With all the best.

Sung


Reference:
    [1] Ji, S. (2015).  Planckian distributions in molecular machines,
living cells, brains:  The wave-particle duality in biomedical sciences.
Proceedings of the International Conference on Biology and Biomedical
Engineering, Vienna, March 15-17, 2015,  pp. 115-137.  PDF previously
circulated on these lists and will be provided upon request.

   [2] 76 Definitions of The Sign by C. S. Peirce collected and
analyzed by Robert
Marty at http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM.

   [3]  Grand Unification of Physics and Mathematics.
https://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=7114

   [4] Burgin, M. (2004).  Unified Foundations for Mathematics.
arXiv:math/0403186v1 <http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0403186v1> [math.LO].

On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 8:31 AM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote:

> Danko, you “consider physical laws to be a product of our minds.” A more
> Peircean view would be that physical *theories* are products of our
> minds, or rather of our inquiries. Theories of course are *signs*; and
> the *objects* of those signs, insofar as the theories are testable and
> fallible, are the real physical laws which actually govern what happens in
> the physical universe whether anyone knows it or not. If you are saying
> that there are no physical laws operating independently of our minds, i.e.
> no *real* and general physical laws, then your metaphysics is
> nominalistic. Peirce’s on the other hand was realistic.
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Danko Nikolic [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: 29-Mar-15 6:54 AM
> To: Evgenii Rudnyi; [email protected]
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] abduction in the brain
>
>
>
> Dear Evgenii,
>
>
>
>    My replies bellow:
>
>
>
> On 29/03/15 11:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
> > Thank you. I have one more question about physical. We talk after all
>
> > about processes in time and the question would be on how it happens
>
> > according to your view. To this end, let me quote from Tim Maudlin's
>
> > "The Metaphysics Within Physics"
>
> >
>
> > “I believe there is a fundamental physical state of the world.”
>
> >
>
> No.
>
>
>
> > “In addition to the physical state of the universe, I believe in
>
> > fundamental physical laws.”
>
> >
>
> No.
>
>
>
> > “Once the total physical state of the universe and the laws of physics
>
> > are fixed, every other fact, such as may be, supervenes.”
>
> >
>
> Not in reality. However, this may be a damn good approximation, maybe the
> best that we can come up with. So, for all practical purposes, perhaps yes.
> But in reality, not really.
>
>
>
>
>
> > Would you agree with such a description of physical processes? Or do
>
> > you consider a physical process differently?
>
> >
>
> I consider it differently.
>
>
>
> I consider physical laws to be a product of our minds. They are not really
> fundamental. Our physics is just a practical way of organizing knowledge.
> These laws are fundamental only for our way of thinking about it. If we had
> different minds i.e., if the evolution took some other direction to make us
> intelligent enough to develop technology, we would have different "physics"
> too. We would consider some other descriptive rules as fundamental.
>
>
>
> It would be more fair to say that minds came first and that these minds
> then invented physical laws (and mathematics and so on).
>
>
>
> However, having said that, I also have to make a qualifier. I disagree
> that science (i.e., physics-based science) will never explained qualia or
> mind.
>
>
>
> I believe that with our physics-based model of the universe we will be
> able to explain qualia -- despite physics not being fundamental. (This is
> what practopoiesis is about, anyway.)
>
>
>
> It may not be the simplest or most practical explanation but, importantly,
> we can do it.
>
>
>
> Once we have done it, we can look back more accurately to reconsider what
> we want to adopt as fundamental. What should be the most elegant model of
> "everything"? In which way can we make most accurate descriptions and
> predictions of as many phenomena with as parsimonious model possible?
>
>
>
> Maybe at that time it will become apparent to the mainstream science that
> physics needs to be replaced with something else.
>
>
>
> Perhaps we should establish the rules of the mind, use them as fundamental
> and consider physics "supervening" on these rules. In fact, I would argue
> that this is exactly what we can do already today, using results from
> mainstream science of the mind and add to it even the mainstream physiology
> and anatomy of the brain. We can find the rules that "govern our universe"
> already in the functional anatomy of the cerebrum and in the ways how we
> think in general and make decisions, categorizations, inferences.
>
>
>
> Maybe Peirce has already hinted on that mind-based approach. Or has he
> already elaborated it to a substantial degree?
>
>
>
> I wouldn't know. Please tell me.
>
>
>
>
>
> Danko
>
>
>
>
> -----------------------------
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>


-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net
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