Danko, Gary F., list,
Peirce did not regard automatic regulation, such as that of a Jacquard
loom, as semiosis (sign action), because the Jacquard loom's action is
dyadic, not triadic.
[CP 5.473 "A Survey of Pragmaticism" c. 1906, also in _Philosophical
Writings of Peirce_ pages 275-6]
[....] In these cases, however, a mental representation of the index
is produced, which mental representation is called the _/immediate
object/_ of the sign; and this object does triadically produce the
intended, or proper, effect of the sign strictly by means of another
mental sign; and that this triadic character of the action is
regarded as essential is shown by the fact that if the thermometer
is dynamically connected with the heating and cooling apparatus, so
as to check either effect, we do not, in ordinary parlance speak of
there being any _/semeiosy/_, or action of a sign, but, on the
contrary, say that there is an "automatic regulation," an idea
opposed, in our minds, to that of _/semeiosy/_. For the proper
significate outcome of a sign, I propose the name, the
_/interpretant/_ of the sign. The example of the imperative command
shows that it need not be of a mental mode of being. Whether the
interpretant be necessarily a triadic result is a question of words,
that is, of how we limit the extension of the term "sign"; but it
seems to me convenient to make the triadic production of the
interpretant essential to a "sign," calling the wider concept like a
Jacquard loom, for example, a "quasi-sign." [....]
[End quote]
In 1907 Peirce discusses how a Jacquard loom's cards are signs to,
potentially, a mind, but not signs of which the pictures that the loom
actually weaves are themselves the interpretants.
From MS 318 (1907), EP 2:404 (in "Pragmatism"):
[....] Signs without interpreters less manifestly, but perhaps not
less certainly, exist. Let the cards for a Jacquard loom be prepared
and inserted, so that the loom shall weave a picture. Are not those
cards signs? They convey intelligence,— intelligence that,
considering its spirit and pictorial effect, cannot otherwise be
conveyed. Yet the woven pictures may take fire and be consumed
before anybody sees them. A set of those models that the designers
of vessels drag through the water may have been prepared; and with
the set a complete series of experiments may have been made; and
their conditions and results may have been automatically recorded.
There, then, is a perfect representation of the behavior of a
certain range of forms. Yet if nobody takes the trouble to study the
record, there will be no interpreter. So the books of a bank may
furnish a complete account of the state of the bank. It remains only
to draw up a balance sheet. But if this be not done, while the sign
is complete, the human interpreter is wanting.
[End quote]
As regards mechanical or electronic computers, Richard S. Robin gave
this summary of an unpublished Peirce manuscript:
831. [Reasoning and Instinct]
A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 2-29, incomplete.
The fine gradations between subconscious or instinctive mind and
conscious, controlled reason. Logical machines are not strictly
reasoning machines because they lack the ability of self-criticism
and the ability to correct defects which may crop up. Three kinds of
reasoning: inductive, deductive, hypothetical. Quasi-inferences.
[End quote, from the Robin Catalogue, logic section,
http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/robin/robin_fm/logic.htm
<http://www.iupui.edu/%7Epeirce/robin/robin_fm/logic.htm>]
Best, Ben
On 3/30/2015 2:17 AM, Danko Nikolic wrote:
Dear Gary and others,
Having read this it occurred to me that in practopoietic systems the
sign would correspond to "downward pressure for adjustment". That is,
the components of the system, individually or more of them
collectively, detect signs indicating that there is a need to act -- a
need to make changes either on the organism itself or on its environment.
But only a subset of those would be considered as a part of the mind
-- provided that mind is defined in mainstream terms.
One may however, generalize to other cybernetic systems too. So, in
a thermostat a "sign" would be any physical event indicating a
difference in the target and actual temperature of a room and hence,
indicating a need for action.
This brings an interesting question for me, but maybe trivial for
you: What does Peirce say about thermostats? Does his theory apply at all?
Danko
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