Ben, John, Frederik, Vinicius, Lists, This was all helpful. Reading over the last few posts of John, Frederik, and Vinicius, I don't think that we're in much disagreement here. Perhaps Ben's concluding thought in this post helps clear up what can appear confusing. You wrote:
BU: But sheer quality of feeling and sheer haecceity resist intellectual conception; it can't be quite true to them. This does not mean that they are quite incognizable. So one follows the involutional order and finds that one can generalize about qualities and haecceity. Still *'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu,,* and our very languages show the depth of their connectedness to 1ns and 2ns. So, even in the intellectual sphere we speak of 'insight', 'clarity', 'vision,' 'brilliance,' etc.--all metaphorically rooted in our sense of sight (and of course one could find myriad examples in all the sense). Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 3:43 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > John C., Gary R., lists, > > A bit of followup. In 1878, Peirce's pragmatic maxim reduces the > conception of an object to the _*conception*_ of the object's effects. So > it doesn't involve just the object's effects per se, and we shouldn't > confuse a conception's meaning with some actual effects, though 'meaning' > and 'effect' make a kind of intellectual rhyme. Somewhere (I forget where), > in later years, Peirce wrote that he didn't understand the talk of > 'meaning' that had cropped up around the pragmatic maxim; then still later > he wrote that the conception of the object's effects is the intellectual > meaning, the _*intellectual **purport*_, of the conception of the object. > In other words, Peirce holds that qualities of feeling have no intellectual > purport. I think that this means that he thinks that, strictly speaking, an > individual reaction also has no intellectual purport. But we can and do > form conceptions of those things and, insofar as a reaction's effects > follow some norm or regularity, a reaction lends itself to conception. But > sheer quality of feeling and sheer haecceity resist intellectual > conception; it can't be quite true to them. This does not mean that they > are quite incognizable. > > Best, Ben > > On 4/27/2015 3:24 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > John C., Gary R., lists, > > I haven't been following this thread closely, but I can offer a few > comments at this point. Peirce does call qualities abstract for reflection. > > Peirce specifically states somewhere that the pragmatic maxim is not for > clarifying feeling-qualities per se but for clarifying conceptions, ideas. > Qualities of feeling lack meanings in the requisite sense. Peirce insists > on it. Yet this doesn't keep the conception of quality out of Peirce's > philosophy. > > It does not stop a quality's occurrence in a given case, or its general > categorial role, from being conceived of and having meanings. In "What Is a > Sign" Peirce discusses a contemplation, dreamy and half-awake, of quality > without reaction or reflection. > > [....] Except in a half-waking hour, nobody really is in a state of > feeling, pure and simple. But whenever we are awake, something is present > to the mind, and what is present, without reference to any compulsion or > reason, is feeling. > [End quote http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/ep2book/ch02/ep2ch2.htm ] > > In "The Logic of Mathematics: An Attempt to Develop My Categories from > Within," Peirce says that qualities _*are*_ generals - when _*reflected > on*_. By this logic, they are individuals when reacted with; at least > such an individual has a quality; and maybe Peirce thinks that a > feeling-quality taken as a general is really a general such as a symbol > incorporating or evoking a quality. Anyway, two pertinent passages > http://www.textlog.de/4282.html : > > [....] That quality is dependent upon sense is the great error of the > conceptualists. That it is dependent upon the subject in which it is > realized is the great error of all the nominalistic schools. A quality is a > mere abstract potentiality; and the error of those schools lies in holding > that the potential, or possible, is nothing but what the actual makes it to > be. It is the error of maintaining that the whole alone is something, and > its components, however essential to it, are nothing. > [End quote from CP 1.422] > > [....] When we say that qualities are general, are partial > determinations, are mere potentialities, etc., all that is true of > qualities reflected upon; but these things do not belong to the > quality-element of experience. > [End quote from CP 1.425] > > Best, Ben > > On 4/27/2015 2:33 PM, John Collier wrote: > > I am not denying 1ns. Never have. I claim it does not stand on its own, > and as a result cannot itself be foundational. It requires further mental > actions to pick out 1ns. It is not manifested in itself. It is not "given". > It cannot be the foundation for an epistemology. > > You seem to still be misunderstanding my use of "abstraction". I am using > it in the time honoured way initiated by Locke as partial consideration. > Berkeley missed this and thought of ideas as little pictures, so we can't > have an idea of man because every man has specific characteristics. Locke > had already answered this. Yesterday I saw a man in the bushes. I did not > see his colour, the number of limbs (though it was at least two) or a bunch > of other things. I have no problem saying this was a perceptual experience. > But it must have involved judgment. I know there must have been things that > I experienced that led to this, but I couldn't well say what they were, > since that would bring them under generalities, which aren't 1ns. > > But I further maintain that 1ns is useless for thought, because thought > requires generalities. Perhaps that is what you don't like. > > John > > > > > > *From: Gary Richmond Sent: April 27, 2015 2:12 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: > [email protected] <[email protected]> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: > [biosemiotics:8485] Re: Natural Propositions,* > > John, > > You first wrote: "the experience of firstness. I maintained there is no > such thing in itself (except as an abstraction)." > > But now you say that you agree with Frederik's analysis. But I do not > think that Frederik is saying that there is "so such thing in itself" as an > "experience of firstness," but that we must prescissively abstract it out > if we are to "focus" on in certain analyses. > > Frederik has just written that he does not deny 1ns. You however seem to > to saying that it is merely "an abstraction," has its being as an > abstraction, has no other reality than that. Again, this does not appear to > me to be how Frederik sees it (he'll correct me, I'm sure, if I'm wrong). > All he seems to be saying is that for some analytical purposes it is > helpful to prescissively abstract 1ns from the other two categories. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > > > > > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College > of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 9:13 AM, John Collier <[email protected] > > wrote: > > >
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