Jeff wrote: "It isn't clear how this logical conception of the self is related to the chemical or biological conception of a system that is auto (or self) organizing."
One concrete example of "self" is what Stan recently described so clearly -- as the activities of the neural networks of our brain, in other words, certain neural firing patterns, called dissipative structures. Just as there are almost infinite number of equilibrium structures that make up the Universe (including our fossilized brain skeletons), so there are almost infinite number of "dissipative structures" such as the calcium waves inside living cells (formed whenever we move our muscles) to the cosmic microwave background radiations originating some 13.8 billion years ago. Of course, Stan's "self" is not the only kind of self. There may be almost infinite number of "selves" in the Universe, depending on how one defines them. I am comfortable to define "self" as any "self-organizing systems", including abiotic ones such as the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction, which may serve as the irreducible units of all dissipative structures including the most complex ones such as our consciousness, just the set of about 100 elements in the periodic table serve as the basic units of all equilibrium structures in the Universe. "They seem to be very different conceptions that are associated with very different kinds of phenomena we're trying to explain." Whatever phenomena you are trying to explain (using your brain, of course) may be intimately connected to dissipative structures, i.e., neural firing patterns in your brain. It is important to keep in mind that dissipative structures result from combining energy and equilibrium structures, e.g., lighting (i.e., energy) the candle (i.e., equilibrium structure) to generate the flame (i.e., a dissipative structure). If this view is right, we may say that philosophy and natural science are not that different and are the two different aspects of the same reality or phenomena. For the convenience (or the necessity) of thought, philosophers may (have to) prescind certain aspect of the reality/phenomena and scientists prescind certain other aspect/phenomena. Because of the human intellectual limitations, philosophers and scientists may do better by learning from each other's experiences in order to accomplish not only their personal goals of inquiry but also for the advancement of human knowledge in general. I suggest that such a beneficial cooperative strategy for advancing human knowledge also applies to the relation between science and religion, thus the triad of Science (including logic), Philosophy (including aesthetics), and Religion (including ethics) forming Borromean rings. All the best. Sung On Thu, May 21, 2015 at 11:58 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Helmut, Ben, Lists, > > I agree with what you say here, Helmut: "Pitifully, this sort of > distinction is not a scientific one." What I mean in saying this is that I > don't believe that the distinctions you are making are problematic for the > practice of doing science. That is, scientists don't start by reflecting > on the kinds of worries you are expressing about the nature of the real > relations between observer, observation, and phenomena observed. For the > most part, they get the enterprise of scientific inquiry off the ground by > just making observations and then trying to explain the phenomena that have > been observed. For my part, I think there is much to be gained by starting > in philosophy in a similarly naive way. Where the phenomena are well > explained by the theories that have been developed, then there is no need > to have doubts about those theories. It is the surprising phenomena that > lead us to doubt some part of the accepted theories--and then we have > reason to search for better explanations. > > Based on what I have seen so far about the recent discussions of the > "self" that has been taking place on the list--I don't yet see a clearly > delineated set of phenomena that call out for explanation. As such, those > who are taking up these questions would do well to focus their attention at > this observational stage of the process before jumping to big conclusions > about which kinds of explanations are or not sufficient to account for the > phenomena they are trying to explain. > > Let me offer an example: one kind of phenomena that Peirce devotes > considerable attention to is the phenomena of how an individual person is > able to exert self-control over their thoughts. For his part, Peirce does > not think that the kinds of explanations offered by the likes of Descartes, > Leibniz, Hume or Mill are sufficient to account for the phenomena > associated with the exercise of logical self control. As such, there are > aspects of the phenomena of what a person--such as a young child--realizes > when he discovers that his beliefs about something like the suitability of > a stove for being touched are in error. Peirce claims that the stages the > child goes through in learning about the logical conceptions of error and > falsity as well as the conceptions of self and other are entirely analogous > to the stages that the human species must have gone through as these powers > of rationality of thought and action evolved. > > It isn't clear how this logical conception of the self is related to the > chemical or biological conception of a system that is auto (or self) > organizing. They seem to be very different conceptions that are associated > with very different kinds of phenomena we're trying to explain. > > --Jeff > > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Helmut Raulien [h.raul...@gmx.de] > Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2015 1:37 PM > To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > Subject: [biosemiotics:8672] Re: self-R > > The difficult thing about a phenomenon is, that it is a phenomenon in the > observers mind. An observer who wants to distinguish a phenomenon of > his/her own mind from a phenomenon, that is a phenomenon of another self, > might ask: Have I asked to have this phenomenon? Or am I observing > something that can only be explained by some entity other than me, having a > phenomenon, because this special phenomenon is so weird, that I never would > have made it up. Pitifully, this sort of distinction is not a scientific > one. But it indicates, that a self can only be detected by another self. Id > say, a self is something with a need. But assigning a need to something is > always a supposition, and a supposition is an action only a nother self can > do. So, at least, what remains is to say you have hit the nail on its head > by saying "preferably some that are surprising". A self is something > surprising, but surprise can only be felt by somebody who is surprised. So > maybe there is no way of getting a better grip, or is there? > Helmut > > > Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> > > Ben, Lists, > > I, too, find the thread puzzling. In order to get a better grip on what > the discussion is about, I wanted to ask a simple question: what are the > phenomena that need to be explained? We use the word 'self' to talk about a > wide range of things. As such, I was hoping that someone might point to > sample phenomena--preferably some that are surprising in one respect or > another--so that we could compare different explanations in terms of their > adequacy in accounting for the phenomena. > > --Jeff > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com] > Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2015 5:52 AM > To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > Subject: [biosemiotics:8665] Re: self-R > > Kalevi, Howard, list, > > I've been trying to understand this discussion thread's idea that the > individual self is founded in (self-)replication. Replication seems for > continuation of kind, species, lineage; it doesn't seem obvious how, > furthermore, the individual self is _founded_ there too, even if the > individual self is underpinned by that level. When I try to think of it in > my simplistic ways, it seems to me that the individual self is founded at a > 'higher' level. Let me resort for what it's worth to an analogy. > > In the analogous scientific practice, replication of results (even one's > own across various occasions), is not the same thing as the checking, > balancing, structurally supporting of results by various lines of evidence, > observation, etc., by various inquirers (or by oneself qua various), > converging from various directions, which seems a process of buttressing > and evolutionary (renovating, re-designing) buildup of results. > > While biological replication is needed for evolvable species and lineages, > the evolutionary process itself seems more analogous to that 'buttressing' > process in scientific practice. Insofar as an individual's learning > process, even though it depends on a general inherited capacity to learn, > does not follow inherited pre-programmed developmental paths, it is > 'evolutionary' (in the sense that various people including Stan Salthe use > the word), and this makes each individual an individualized self who is > checked and balanced both within the self's own experience and by other > individuals and experiences. > > (Such seems even more so the case when the individual learns not just by > trial & error (struggle) in various directions, practice & repetition, and > emulation/replication of valued exemplars and results, but by investigating > and testing claims made by various people or virtually made by various > appearances, the testing our notions to destruction rather than ourselves, > as Popper would put it.) > > Best, Ben > > On 5/20/2015 2:07 AM, Kalevi Kull wrote: > > Dear Howard, > > let us try whether we can find more agreement here. > > KK: yes, both construction and description, here von Neumann is right, I > agree - but the way how he defines self-reproduction is not what we could > apply in biology or biosemiotics. > > HP: How does it not apply? > > What I mean is this: von Neumann assumed that "self-reproducing > configuration must be capable of universal construction. This criterion, > indeed, eliminates the trivial cases, but it also has the unfortunate > consequence that it eliminates all naturally occurring self-reproducing > systems as well, since none of these have been shown to be capable of > universal construction." (Langton C. G. 1984. Self-reproduction in Cellular > Automata. Physica D 10: 135-144 - p. 137) > > KK: Therefore, if You state that "An individual self is first defined by > self-replication", it would require a relevant definition of > self-replication. Do You have one? > > HP: Yes. Von Neumann's logical conditions plus my physical conditions > > Von Neumann's logical conditions (which include the existence of universal > constructor) are not necessary - these are not used in the real living > systems. That is the point. > > Best > > Kalevi > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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