Hi Jon,
*In other words, we should not confuse a general term, one that applies to manyindividuals, with a term that denotes a general entity, property, or universal* Can you provide one or two concrete examples illustrating the point you are making ? Thanks. Sung On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: > Thread: > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16893 > ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16894 > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16895 > MS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16898 > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16898 > TW:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16900 > > Tom, List, > > Let me back up, refresh my memory, and try to remember what I had in mind. > > Nominalism takes its name from the idea that "generals are only names", > and it goes by the maxims: "Do not take a general name for the name of > a general" and "Do not multiply entities beyond necessity". In other > words, we should not confuse a general term, one that applies to many > individuals, with a term that denotes a general entity, property, or > universal, as those are dispensable in favor of individual entities. > > As far as the advice against confusing signs with objects and different > types or uses of signs with each other, and even the advice to economize > our budgets of entities to some degree, if not to the extreme of absolute > austerity, pragmatism can go a long ways with that. The fork in the road > comes with the degree to which general entities can be eliminated, wholly > or not so wholly. > > I will have to break for dinner here ... > > Jon > > On 8/1/2015 11:52 AM, Thomas wrote: > >> Jon, List ~ >> >> Here is how I interpreted Markku's comment: Because a semiotics process >> > > underlies the logical thinking of people, animals and plants, then the > >> logic/thoughts that are the subject of a philosopher's >> investigation/analysis >> > > are not themselves nominalistic. They are (intended to be) pragmatic. > >> >> The nominalism label in the poem must, perforce, apply to the thinking >> > > of a confused philosopher. His/her analytical approach is the Object > > of "nominal" (a Sign) in the poem. The poem is a critique of (some) > > philosophers. > >> >> Instead of a simple verse, I sense that Peirce's preferred poetic form >> > > would be a limerick comprised of palindromes. > >> >> Regards, Tom Wyrick >> >> >> On Jul 31, 2015, at 10:00 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Marccu, List, >> >> I sometimes use “nominal thinking” as another name for nominalism >> even as I use “pragmatic thinking” as another name for pragmatism. >> Now there is a punny bit of ribbing in that, as a nominal thinker >> is a “thinker in name only”, but how could a nominalist object to >> a general name without giving up the ghost of nominal philosophy? >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On 7/30/2015 5:50 PM, marccu s wrote: >> >>> I do not understand how ‘thinking’ could be nominal? >>> I suppose there are not such a phenomenon as ‘nominal thinking’. >>> Misunderstanding and understanding (results of thinking) etc are >>> both based on information formation within society in relation to >>> other subjects and objects etc. >>> >>> kindly, markku >>> >>> Lähetetty laitteesta Windowsin sähköposti >>> >>> Lähettäjä: Jon Awbrey >>> Lähetetty: torstai, 30. heinäkuuta 2015 18:10 >>> Vast.ott: [email protected] >>> >>> Post : Zeroth Law Of Semiotics >>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/07/30/zeroth-law-of-semiotics/ >>> Date : July 30, 2015 at 10:00 am >>> >>> Peircers, >>> >>> New (if not exactly novel) discussions of the so-called "Liar Paradox" >>> have broken out at several places on the web in recent weeks and these >>> always bring to my mind at least a number of critical ways in which the >>> Peircean paradigm of logic as semiotics differs from the fallback >>> paradigm >>> that bedevils the thinking of those who have yet to see by Peirce's >>> lights. >>> >>> And that brings to my mind at least the following oldie but still goodie >>> that articulates what I take to be the issue at the root of this and many >>> other pseudo-problems. (I have revised the title a bit for this >>> edition.) >>> >>> Zeroth Law Of Semiotics >>> ======================= >>> >>> Meaning is a privilege not a right. >>> Not all pictures depict. >>> Not all signs denote. >>> >>> Never confuse a property of a sign, >>> just for instance, existence, >>> with a sign of a property, >>> for instance, existence. >>> >>> Taking a property of a sign >>> for a sign of a property >>> is the zeroth sign of >>> nominal thinking >>> and the first >>> mistake. >>> >>> Also Sprach 0* >>> 2002 October 09 >>> http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=32824 >>> >>> >> > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
