Hi Jon,
Thanks for your reply.
I wonder if we can distinguish nominalism and realism based on the ITR
(irreducible triadic relation) diagram:
f
g
Child as a -----------------> Child as --------------->
Child as a neural firing
biological object a word
pattern in the brain
(Object) (Representamen)
(Interpretant)
|
^
|
|
|______________________________________________|
h
Figure 1. Defining 'nominalism' and 'realism' based on the ITR diagram.
f = sign production; g = sign interpretation; h =
correspondence/grounding/proof
*Nominalism:* The actual child generates (f) the word 'child' in the mind
of a nominalist (g) which need not be rooted in or supported by any real
object.
*Realism:* The actual child generates (f) the world 'child' which in turn
induces (g) an image of a child in the brain of a realist that is
consistent with or supported by a child in reality (h).
If this analysis is valid, I am tempted to conclude that nominalism may be
*dyadic* and realism *irreducibly triadic*.
All the best.
Sung
On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 4:45 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote:
> Thread:
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16893
> ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16894
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16895
> MS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16898
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16898
> TW:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16900
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16908
> SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16909
>
> Sung, List,
>
> General terms are terms like "man", "woman", "child", etc.,
> each of which applies to many individuals, in other words,
> has a general denotation or a plural extension. Generally
> speaking, a general term is treated as bearing an accessory
> reference, indirect denotation, or other form of association
> to a general property like man-ness, woman-ness, child-ness,
> etc. and to a set of individuals like men, women, children, etc.
> But a strict nominalist would hold that we have no need of these
> properties or sets, that all we need are the individual terms that
> denote individuals individually together with the general terms that
> denote individuals in a general way.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 8/4/2015 6:20 AM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
>> Hi Jon,
>>
>>
>> * In other words, we should not confuse a general term, one that applies
>> to many individuals, with a term that denotes a general entity,
>> property,
>> or universal *
>>
>> Can you provide one or two concrete examples illustrating the point you
>> are
>> making ?
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Tom, List,
>>>
>>> Let me back up, refresh my memory, and try to remember what I had in
>>> mind.
>>>
>>> Nominalism takes its name from the idea that "generals are only names",
>>> and it goes by the maxims: "Do not take a general name for the name of
>>> a general" and "Do not multiply entities beyond necessity". In other
>>> words, we should not confuse a general term, one that applies to many
>>> individuals, with a term that denotes a general entity, property, or
>>> universal, as those are dispensable in favor of individual entities.
>>>
>>> As far as the advice against confusing signs with objects and different
>>> types or uses of signs with each other, and even the advice to economize
>>> our budgets of entities to some degree, if not to the extreme of absolute
>>> austerity, pragmatism can go a long ways with that. The fork in the road
>>> comes with the degree to which general entities can be eliminated, wholly
>>> or not so wholly.
>>>
>>> I will have to break for dinner here ...
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On 8/1/2015 11:52 AM, Thomas wrote:
>>>
>>> Jon, List ~
>>>>
>>>> Here is how I interpreted Markku's comment: Because a semiotics
>>>> process underlies the logical thinking of people, animals and plants,
>>>> then the logic/thoughts that are the subject of a philosopher's
>>>> investigation/analysis are not themselves nominalistic.
>>>> They are (intended to be) pragmatic.
>>>>
>>>> The nominalism label in the poem must, perforce, apply to the thinking
>>>> of a confused philosopher. His/her analytical approach is the Object
>>>> of "nominal" (a Sign) in the poem. The poem is a critique of (some)
>>>> philosophers.
>>>>
>>>> Instead of a simple verse, I sense that Peirce's preferred poetic form
>>>> would be a limerick comprised of palindromes.
>>>>
>>>> Regards, Tom Wyrick
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Jul 31, 2015, at 10:00 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Marccu, List,
>>>>
>>>> I sometimes use “nominal thinking” as another name for nominalism
>>>> even as I use “pragmatic thinking” as another name for pragmatism.
>>>> Now there is a punny bit of ribbing in that, as a nominal thinker
>>>> is a “thinker in name only”, but how could a nominalist object to
>>>> a general name without giving up the ghost of nominal philosophy?
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon
>>>>
>>>> On 7/30/2015 5:50 PM, marccu s wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I do not understand how ‘thinking’ could be nominal?
>>>>> I suppose there are not such a phenomenon as ‘nominal thinking’.
>>>>> Misunderstanding and understanding (results of thinking) etc are
>>>>> both based on information formation within society in relation to
>>>>> other subjects and objects etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> kindly, markku
>>>>>
>>>>> Lähetetty laitteesta Windowsin sähköposti
>>>>>
>>>>> Lähettäjä: Jon Awbrey
>>>>> Lähetetty: torstai, 30. heinäkuuta 2015 18:10
>>>>> Vast.ott: [email protected]
>>>>>
>>>>> Post : Zeroth Law Of Semiotics
>>>>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/07/30/zeroth-law-of-semiotics/
>>>>> Date : July 30, 2015 at 10:00 am
>>>>>
>>>>> Peircers,
>>>>>
>>>>> New (if not exactly novel) discussions of the so-called "Liar Paradox"
>>>>> have broken out at several places on the web in recent weeks and these
>>>>> always bring to my mind at least a number of critical ways in which
>>>>> the Peircean paradigm of logic as semiotics differs from the fallback
>>>>> paradigm that bedevils the thinking of those who have yet to see by
>>>>> Peirce's lights.
>>>>>
>>>>> And that brings to my mind at least the following oldie
>>>>> but still goodie that articulates what I take to be the
>>>>> issue at the root of this and many other pseudo-problems.
>>>>> (I have revised the title a bit for this edition.)
>>>>>
>>>>> Zeroth Law Of Semiotics
>>>>> =======================
>>>>>
>>>>> Meaning is a privilege not a right.
>>>>> Not all pictures depict.
>>>>> Not all signs denote.
>>>>>
>>>>> Never confuse a property of a sign,
>>>>> just for instance, existence,
>>>>> with a sign of a property,
>>>>> for instance, existence.
>>>>>
>>>>> Taking a property of a sign
>>>>> for a sign of a property
>>>>> is the zeroth sign of
>>>>> nominal thinking
>>>>> and the first
>>>>> mistake.
>>>>>
>>>>> Also Sprach 0*
>>>>> 2002 October 09
>>>>> http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=32824
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
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> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>
--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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