Thread: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16893 ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16894 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16895 MS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16898 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16898 TW:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16900 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16908 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16909 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16910 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16911 MS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16914 TW:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16915 ML:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16918 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16918 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16925 ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16926
Markku, List, No, I would not say that. Whatever the vicissitudes of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis over the years since I first tumbled to it I'm still too much the Sapir-Whorfian to say anything like that. And yet many a slip twixt the logos and the lip tells us there is play in the wheels of the cognitive train. But that is slightly off the track of what concerns me here. I am investigating the slippage that takes place in the gap between natural language, with the natural assumptions that it has evolved to take for granted, rightly or wrongly, and the artifice and discipline of logic as normative semiotics. Regards, Jon On 8/4/2015 11:40 PM, marccu s wrote: > Do you mean that our capacity for language has nothing to do > with our ability to create cognitive representations? > > Lähetetty laitteesta Windowsin sähköposti > > Lähettäjä: Jon Awbrey > Lähetetty: tiistai, 4. elokuuta 2015 23:45 > Vast.ott: Sungchul Ji > Kopio: Thomas, [email protected] > > Sung, List, > > General terms are terms like "man", "woman", "child", etc., > each of which applies to many individuals, in other words, > has a general denotation or a plural extension. Generally > speaking, a general term is treated as bearing an accessory > reference, indirect denotation, or other form of association > to a general property like man-ness, woman-ness, child-ness, > etc. and to a set of individuals like men, women, children, etc. > But a strict nominalist would hold that we have no need of these > properties or sets, that all we need are the individual terms that > denote individuals individually together with the general terms that > denote individuals in a general way. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On 8/4/2015 6:20 AM, Sungchul Ji wrote: >> Hi Jon, >> >> >> * In other words, we should not confuse a general term, one that applies >> to many individuals, with a term that denotes a general entity, property, >> or universal * >> >> Can you provide one or two concrete examples >> illustrating the point you are making ? >> >> Thanks. >> >> Sung >> >> On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Tom, List, >>> >>> Let me back up, refresh my memory, and try to remember what I had in mind. >>> >>> Nominalism takes its name from the idea that "generals are only names", >>> and it goes by the maxims: "Do not take a general name for the name of >>> a general" and "Do not multiply entities beyond necessity". In other >>> words, we should not confuse a general term, one that applies to many >>> individuals, with a term that denotes a general entity, property, or >>> universal, as those are dispensable in favor of individual entities. >>> >>> As far as the advice against confusing signs with objects and different >>> types or uses of signs with each other, and even the advice to economize >>> our budgets of entities to some degree, if not to the extreme of absolute >>> austerity, pragmatism can go a long ways with that. The fork in the road >>> comes with the degree to which general entities can be eliminated, wholly >>> or not so wholly. >>> >>> I will have to break for dinner here ... >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On 8/1/2015 11:52 AM, Thomas wrote: >>> >>>> Jon, List ~ >>>> >>>> Here is how I interpreted Markku's comment: Because a semiotics >>>> process underlies the logical thinking of people, animals and plants, >>>> then the logic/thoughts that are the subject of a philosopher's >>>> investigation/analysis are not themselves nominalistic. >>>> They are (intended to be) pragmatic. >>>> >>>> The nominalism label in the poem must, perforce, apply to the thinking >>>> of a confused philosopher. His/her analytical approach is the Object >>>> of "nominal" (a Sign) in the poem. The poem is a critique of (some) >>>> philosophers. >>>> >>>> Instead of a simple verse, I sense that Peirce's preferred >>>> poetic form would be a limerick comprised of palindromes. >>>> >>>> Regards, Tom Wyrick >>>> >>>> On Jul 31, 2015, at 10:00 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> Marccu, List, >>>> >>>> I sometimes use “nominal thinking” as another name for nominalism >>>> even as I use “pragmatic thinking” as another name for pragmatism. >>>> Now there is a punny bit of ribbing in that, as a nominal thinker >>>> is a “thinker in name only”, but how could a nominalist object to >>>> a general name without giving up the ghost of nominal philosophy? >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon >>>> >>>> On 7/30/2015 5:50 PM, marccu s wrote: >>>> >>>>> I do not understand how ‘thinking’ could be nominal? >>>>> I suppose there are not such a phenomenon as ‘nominal thinking’. >>>>> Misunderstanding and understanding (results of thinking) etc are >>>>> both based on information formation within society in relation to >>>>> other subjects and objects etc. >>>>> >>>>> kindly, markku >>>>> >>>>> Lähetetty laitteesta Windowsin sähköposti >>>>> >>>>> Lähettäjä: Jon Awbrey >>>>> Lähetetty: torstai, 30. heinäkuuta 2015 18:10 >>>>> Vast.ott: [email protected] >>>>> >>>>> Post : Zeroth Law Of Semiotics >>>>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/07/30/zeroth-law-of-semiotics/ >>>>> Date : July 30, 2015 at 10:00 am >>>>> >>>>> Peircers, >>>>> >>>>> New (if not exactly novel) discussions of the so-called "Liar Paradox" >>>>> have broken out at several places on the web in recent weeks and these >>>>> always bring to my mind at least a number of critical ways in which >>>>> the Peircean paradigm of logic as semiotics differs from the fallback >>>>> paradigm that bedevils the thinking of those who have yet to see by >>>>> Peirce's lights. >>>>> >>>>> And that brings to my mind at least the following oldie >>>>> but still goodie that articulates what I take to be the >>>>> issue at the root of this and many other pseudo-problems. >>>>> (I have revised the title a bit for this edition.) >>>>> >>>>> Zeroth Law Of Semiotics >>>>> ======================= >>>>> >>>>> Meaning is a privilege not a right. >>>>> Not all pictures depict. >>>>> Not all signs denote. >>>>> >>>>> Never confuse a property of a sign, >>>>> just for instance, existence, >>>>> with a sign of a property, >>>>> for instance, existence. >>>>> >>>>> Taking a property of a sign >>>>> for a sign of a property >>>>> is the zeroth sign of >>>>> nominal thinking >>>>> and the first >>>>> mistake. >>>>> >>>>> Also Sprach 0* >>>>> 2002 October 09 >>>>> http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=32824 >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> > -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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