Gary, Helmut, List, Visual metaphors and perceptual analogies in general are very instructive -- I think they are my personal favorites -- but in logic, mathematics, and science our interest reaches up the abductive spectrum, from perception to where it shades off to concept formation, and on up again to where it takes off in theory formation.
Objects in logic and semiotics are any objects of discussion or thought, atoms and atomic clocks, bubbles and bubble chambers, clouds and cohorts, determinants and deuterium, electrons and ellipses, galaxies and ganglia, photons and positrons, quarks and question marks, ..., you get the picture. If we come to care that our signs make sense, and by this "sense" mean to say they have objects that are logically consistent, then we pass from the realm of mere semiotics, where literary clutches will dilletate till the twelfth of never on the Madness Of Prince Hamlet (MOPH_1) or the Method Of Prince Hamlet (MOPH_0), or the taste of Organic Martian Potatoes (OMPs), and leaving all that till the twelfth of never we enter the realm of formal or normative semiotics that we may hope to know as logic. Regards, Jon On 10/25/2015 7:15 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
List, I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common understanding, and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main trait is its permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an entity, something that is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time). But in the Peircean sense, an object is part of an irreducible triad: Representamen, object, interpretant. So it is spatiotemporally limited to this one sign, and therefore not permanent. On the other hand, Peirce writes, that an interpretant can become a representamen again, which denotes the same object. This is not consistent, is it? I might only solve this problem by saying: An object is a temporary limited clipping/excerpt of an entity, as it appears in one sign. In the following sign, the object is a different one: Another clipping, but from the same entity. In a similar manner, a representamen is a spatial clipping from an event (limited in time, but not in space), and an interpretant a spatiotemporal clipping from a result, which result is an event again. A second problem is, that an event can, and usually does, affect more than one entity. So maybe an object is the sum of all clippings from entities, that apeear in a Sign, i.e. that are interacting with an event at the same time and place. The place in the semiosis with a dynamic object is a place in real space, and the place of a semiosis/Sign with an immediate object is a place in an imagined space. These proposals at least might make the whole affair understandable for me. Best, Helmut Supplement: In case of dynamic object, the sign process is a mixing- or otherwise combining-process of two or more matterginetic entities having been positioned side by side from the start. This is somehow special, while in the case of immediate object it is quite regular: More than one entity (eg. ideas or memory contents), combined in the mind to one objective. "Jon Awbrey" <[email protected]> wrote: Peircers, What makes an object is a perennial question. I can remember my physics professors bringing it up in a really big way when I was still just a freshman in college. They always cautioned us then about extrapolating our everyday intuitions about everyday objects beyond their native realms. Anyone who has been graced or grazed by a modicum of process thinking, say Whitehead or Bucky Fuller, is aware of the trade-off between process thinking and product thinking that rules our descriptions of every domain of phenomena, but in a retrograde time like the one we are currently experiencing it takes a mighty effort to recollect the way that hidebound objects are precipitated from more primal processes. Here's an old post I happened on that may apply here: Ask Meno Questions • Discussion 1 http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/10/14/ask-meno-questions-%E2%80%A2-discussion-1/ http://web.archive.org/web/20121015213156/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8791 Regards, Jon
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