Stephen, Helmut, List - We really don't even have randomness in the example as it was given. The photon and atom collided for unspecified reasons. My point is that the logic of the 'transaction' is contained in the interpretants of the atom and photon. If they collided for 'random' reasons, then I can work with that.
If we enter the story just as the collision occurs, then we can of course focus on the logic of what happens after that. Then, however, we need to consider such things as velocity, direction, energy levels, etc. for the two objects. That mechanism must be fleshed out, or it is a black box instead of logic. Collisions between photons and atoms don't only have one possible outcome. Regards, TW > On Oct 27, 2015, at 11:16 AM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Randomness can hardly be meaningless if it also implies chance which for > Peirce mean First. I suppose I am missing something. Usually do. > > "... chance ... a mathematical term to express with accuracy the > characteristics of freedom or spontaneity." Peirce: CP 6.202 > > Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl > Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3 > >> On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 11:19 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: >> >> You are right: It is random, i.e. meaningless. I had not focused on >> "meaning", but on "representation" (thirdness): I thought it was >> representation, because there is both an immediate and a dynamical object. >> But, as there is no meaning transmitted, it is nor real thirdness neither >> real triadicity, maybe. >> Regards, >> Helmut >> 26. Oktober 2015 um 23:24 Uhr >> Thomas <ozzie...@gmail.com> wrote: >> Helmut, List ~ >> "A photon hits an atom: The photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate >> object, the hitting event is the representamen, the effect (electron jumps >> to a higher orbit) is the interpretant ..." >> >> Why did the photon hit the atom? The collision ('hitting event') is the >> 'transaction' that produced the consequences. Consequences 'belong' to the >> the object(s) that triggered the transaction. It you shot a photon into the >> atom, then the electron's higher orbit is the interpretant of your logic. If >> you drop a bowling ball on your toe, we don't say your broken toe is an act >> of nature. >> >> If separate 'acts of nature' originally caused the photon and atom to >> collide, then it seems like a random event. The initial act of 'logic' was >> performed then, when the atom and photon were sent on a collision path. The >> result of the collision may, but may not, cause the electron to jump to a >> higher orbit. That adds a second random element. Assigning meaning to this >> random event does not seem the easiest way to explain/understand logic. >> >> If I'm looking at this wrong, feel free to set me straight. >> >> Regards, >> Tom Wyrick >> >> >> >> >> On Oct 26, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> Sung, List, >> And is a physical interaction a triadic Sign? Eg: A photon hits an atom: The >> photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate object, the hitting event is >> the representamen, the effect (electron jumps to a higher orbit) is the >> interpretant, and the types "photon" and "atom" are the dynamical object? >> "Type" may be replaced with "intension", but not the intension of the human >> concepts "atom" or "photon", but the intension in the natural laws´ >> conceptuality- so, if concepts were by definition affairs of the mind, this >> pansemiotism would lead to panmentalism. Or is this nominalism? I dont know >> what nominalism is, because I cannot imagine a non-nominalism. As Elvis >> sang: "It´s only words, and words are all I have..." >> Best, >> Helmut >> >> Supplement: Please forget what I wrote about nominalism, I have had the >> wrong idea about it: It obviously is not belief in names, but disbelief in >> types (universals)... >> >> 26. Oktober 2015 um 01:52 Uhr >> "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: >> >> Hi, >> >> Correction: >> >> Please change " . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any >> communication." in my previous post to >> ". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication." >> >> Thanks. >> >> Sung >> >> >> >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> >> Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM >> Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object? >> To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> >> Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary <g...@gnusystems.ca>, Peirce List >> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >> >> >> Helmut. lists, >> >> " . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of >> interaction- . . . " >> >> I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for "communication". >> Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We have seen many >> examples of this in married couples and among members of these lists. This >> is because "interactions" are dyadic and "communications" are triadic. In >> other words, dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication. Only >> triadic interactions can, as shown in Figure 1. >> >> >> f g >> Person A ------> Sign -------> Person B >> (Object) (Interpretant) >> | ^ >> | | >> |__________________________| >> h >> >> Figure 1. Distinguishing between "interaction" and "communication". A can >> interact with B by sending sound signals (i.e., through steps f and g) but >> A may not be able to send any message to B, if B's mind is unable to receive >> A's message for one reason or another (e.g., lack of a common language, or A >> is too obsessed with his own ideas). A is said to communicate with B IF and >> ONLY IF Steps f, g, and h are engaged, i.e., IF and ONLY IF, the interaction >> is triadic, not dyadic. f = sign production; g = sign reception or >> interpretation; h = information flow, i.e., communication >> >> All the best. >> >> Sung >> >> >>> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: >>> Frances, List, >>> You distinguish very accurately between what belongs to or is a sign, and >>> what doesnt. In Garys Peirce-quote below the sign concept is also limited: >>> "I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the >>> communication or extension of a Form (or feature)." So for Peirce it is >>> communication or extension (what is extension in this case btw?), and for >>> you it is representation, that makes something (eg. an object) belong to >>> the sign-sphere. Now I guess, that the concept of communication can be >>> widened to the concept of interaction- maybe this is, what Peirce means by >>> "extension"? And then everything belongs to the sign sphere, because >>> everything interacts. A physicochemical result might be seen as an >>> interpretant, a kind of representation, so then we have pansemiotics, I >>> guess. But of course it is helpful to distinguish between realworld- or >>> mattergy-Signs and mental Signs. Or is a physicochemical representation in >>> a result a quasi-mental Sign? Meaning: Had the universe not a quasi-mind, >>> nothing could happen? >>> Best, >>> Helmut >>> >>> 25. Oktober 2015 um 19:06 Uhr >>> frances.ke...@sympatico.ca wrote: >>> >>> To listers, here is my take on this snarl of twine for what it is worth. >>> >>> Objects emerging from pure phenomenal forms and their ideal things need >>> only be nonsign representamen that bear phenomenal continuence and yield >>> phenomenal existence. Objects that continue to exist as representamen can >>> be synechastic objects that are not signs, and even semiosic objects that >>> are either not signs or that are signs. Phenomenal objects can seemingly be >>> mystically phantural, or materially physical, or mentally psychical. >>> Existent synechastic objects initially are phenomenal representamen, but >>> are not yet signs nor semiotic tridents or terns in their formal structure, >>> until they become semiosic objects by way of representation; but some >>> existent semiosic objects also need not be signs, until enacted as signs by >>> signers. Existent semiosic objects are likely to become phenomenal >>> representamen that are signs by way of represented evolution, and whose >>> formal structure is hence a tridential tern; which is composed of a sole >>> represented vehicle in a medium, and a pair of referred objects in a >>> ground, and a tern of interpreted effects as a subject. >>> >>> The determinence and dependence in semiosis for the dyadic pair of objects >>> and the triadic tern of interpretants is not necessarily progressive or >>> hierarchical in a strict categoral manner. It seems that the immediate >>> referred object determines the immediate vehicular representamen, and that >>> this form of vehicle then determines and is embedded in the immediate >>> interpretant subject, and that this immediate interpretant subject >>> determines both the dynamic referred object together with the dynamic >>> interpretant subject, and that this dynamic interpretant subject determines >>> the final interpretant subject. The dependence of these semiosic forms >>> would seem to be in the reverse order. >>> >>> The whole wide world is felt by stuff to be a phenomenal representamen, but >>> not necessarily as an object nor a sign or signer. What makes forms and >>> things and beings and objects and mediums into signs, and as signs of other >>> objects and as signers of signs, is the act of representation, which is >>> felt to permeate the whole phenomenal being of the world. >>> >>> (In the first grand division of informative or grammatic semiotics and >>> semiosis, the common terms of sign and object and subject are often vague, >>> and perhaps for contextual clarity should therein be called representants >>> and referentants and interpretants. Furthermore, all semiosic forms as >>> vehicles and mediums and objects and subjects are in fact phenomenal >>> representamen and existent objects, and all such objects in fact are mostly >>> and usually signs of objects.) >>> >>> >>> >>> From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] >>> Sent: Sunday, 25 October, 2015 8:42 AM >>> To: 'Peirce List' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object? >>> >>> >>> >>> Helmut, >>> >>> Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate and >>> dynamic(al) object. >>> >>> [[ I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the >>> communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is >>> determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, >>> called its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be >>> borne in mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object >>> and by the Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or >>> communicated, it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a >>> Subject independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there >>> should be another subject in which the same form is embodied only in >>> consequence of the communication. The Form (and the Form is the Object of >>> the Sign), as it really determines the former Subject, is quite independent >>> of the sign; yet we may and indeed must say that the object of a sign can >>> be nothing but what that sign represents it to be. Therefore, in order to >>> reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it is indispensable to >>> distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. ]] —EP2:477 >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >>> } The map is not the territory. [Korzbyski] { >>> >>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway >>> >>> >>> >>> From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] >>> Sent: 25-Oct-15 07:16 >>> >>> List, >>> >>> I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common >>> understanding, and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main >>> trait is its permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an >>> entity, something that is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time). >>> But in the Peircean sense, an object is part of an irreducible triad: >>> Representamen, object, interpretant. So it is spatiotemporally limited to >>> this one sign, and therefore not permanent. On the other hand, Peirce >>> writes, that an interpretant can become a representamen again, which >>> denotes the same object. This is not consistent, is it? I might only solve >>> this problem by saying: An object is a temporary limited clipping/excerpt >>> of an entity, as it appears in one sign. In the following sign, the object >>> is a different one: Another clipping, but from the same entity. In a >>> similar manner, a representamen is a spatial clipping from an event >>> (limited in time, but not in space), and an interpretant a spatiotemporal >>> clipping from a result, which result is an event again. >>> >>> A second problem is, that an event can, and usually does, affect more than >>> one entity. So maybe an object is the sum of all clippings from entities, >>> that apeear in a Sign, i.e. that are interacting with an event at the same >>> time and place. The place in the semiosis with a dynamic object is a place >>> in real space, and the place of a semiosis/Sign with an immediate object is >>> a place in an imagined space. These proposals at least might make the whole >>> affair understandable for me. >>> >>> Best, Helmut >>> >>> Supplement: In case of dynamic object, the sign process is a mixing- or >>> otherwise combining-process of two or more matterginetic entities having >>> been positioned side by side from the start. This is somehow special, while >>> in the case of immediate object it is quite regular: More than one entity >>> (eg. ideas or memory contents), combined in the mind to one objective. >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" >>> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should >>> go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in >>> the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY >>> of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> -- >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >> >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >> Rutgers University >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >> 732-445-4701 >> >> www.conformon.net >> >> >> -- >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >> >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >> Rutgers University >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >> 732-445-4701 >> >> www.conformon.net >> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or >> "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go >> to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY >> of the message. 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