Helmut, List ~
"A photon hits an atom: The photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate
object, the hitting event is the representamen, the effect (electron jumps to a
higher orbit) is the interpretant ..."
Why did the photon hit the atom? The collision ('hitting event') is the
'transaction' that produced the consequences. Consequences 'belong' to the the
object(s) that triggered the transaction. It you shot a photon into the atom,
then the electron's higher orbit is the interpretant of your logic. If you drop
a bowling ball on your toe, we don't say your broken toe is an act of nature.
If separate 'acts of nature' originally caused the photon and atom to collide,
then it seems like a random event. The initial act of 'logic' was performed
then, when the atom and photon were sent on a collision path. The result of
the collision may, but may not, cause the electron to jump to a higher orbit.
That adds a second random element. Assigning meaning to this random event does
not seem the easiest way to explain/understand logic.
If I'm looking at this wrong, feel free to set me straight.
Regards,
Tom Wyrick
On Oct 26, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
Sung, List,
And is a physical interaction a triadic Sign? Eg: A photon hits an atom: The
photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate object, the hitting event is the
representamen, the effect (electron jumps to a higher orbit) is the
interpretant, and the types "photon" and "atom" are the dynamical object?
"Type" may be replaced with "intension", but not the intension of the human
concepts "atom" or "photon", but the intension in the natural laws´
conceptuality- so, if concepts were by definition affairs of the mind, this
pansemiotism would lead to panmentalism. Or is this nominalism? I dont know
what nominalism is, because I cannot imagine a non-nominalism. As Elvis sang:
"It´s only words, and words are all I have..."
Best,
Helmut
Supplement: Please forget what I wrote about nominalism, I have had the wrong
idea about it: It obviously is not belief in names, but disbelief in types
(universals)...
26. Oktober 2015 um 01:52 Uhr
"Sungchul Ji" <[email protected]> wrote:
Hi,
Correction:
Please change " . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication."
in my previous post to
". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."
Thanks.
Sung
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Sungchul Ji <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
To: Helmut Raulien <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected], Gary <[email protected]>, Peirce List
<[email protected]>
Helmut. lists,
" . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of
interaction- . . . "
I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for "communication".
Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We have seen many examples
of this in married couples and among members of these lists. This is because
"interactions" are dyadic and "communications" are triadic. In other words,
dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication. Only triadic
interactions can, as shown in Figure 1.
f g
Person A ------> Sign -------> Person B
(Object) (Interpretant)
| ^
| |
|__________________________|
h
Figure 1. Distinguishing between "interaction" and "communication". A can
interact with B by sending sound signals (i.e., through steps f and g) but A
may not be able to send any message to B, if B's mind is unable to receive A's
message for one reason or another (e.g., lack of a common language, or A is too
obsessed with his own ideas). A is said to communicate with B IF and ONLY IF
Steps f, g, and h are engaged, i.e., IF and ONLY IF, the interaction is
triadic, not dyadic. f = sign production; g = sign reception or
interpretation; h = information flow, i.e., communication
All the best.
Sung
> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
> Frances, List,
> You distinguish very accurately between what belongs to or is a sign, and
> what doesnt. In Garys Peirce-quote below the sign concept is also limited: "I
> use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the communication
> or extension of a Form (or feature)." So for Peirce it is communication or
> extension (what is extension in this case btw?), and for you it is
> representation, that makes something (eg. an object) belong to the
> sign-sphere. Now I guess, that the concept of communication can be widened to
> the concept of interaction- maybe this is, what Peirce means by "extension"?
> And then everything belongs to the sign sphere, because everything interacts.
> A physicochemical result might be seen as an interpretant, a kind of
> representation, so then we have pansemiotics, I guess. But of course it is
> helpful to distinguish between realworld- or mattergy-Signs and mental Signs.
> Or is a physicochemical representation in a result a quasi-mental Sign?
> Meaning: Had the universe not a quasi-mind, nothing could happen?
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 25. Oktober 2015 um 19:06 Uhr
> [email protected] wrote:
>
> To listers, here is my take on this snarl of twine for what it is worth.
>
> Objects emerging from pure phenomenal forms and their ideal things need only
> be nonsign representamen that bear phenomenal continuence and yield
> phenomenal existence. Objects that continue to exist as representamen can be
> synechastic objects that are not signs, and even semiosic objects that are
> either not signs or that are signs. Phenomenal objects can seemingly be
> mystically phantural, or materially physical, or mentally psychical. Existent
> synechastic objects initially are phenomenal representamen, but are not yet
> signs nor semiotic tridents or terns in their formal structure, until they
> become semiosic objects by way of representation; but some existent semiosic
> objects also need not be signs, until enacted as signs by signers. Existent
> semiosic objects are likely to become phenomenal representamen that are signs
> by way of represented evolution, and whose formal structure is hence a
> tridential tern; which is composed of a sole represented vehicle in a medium,
> and a pair of referred objects in a ground, and a tern of interpreted effects
> as a subject.
>
> The determinence and dependence in semiosis for the dyadic pair of objects
> and the triadic tern of interpretants is not necessarily progressive or
> hierarchical in a strict categoral manner. It seems that the immediate
> referred object determines the immediate vehicular representamen, and that
> this form of vehicle then determines and is embedded in the immediate
> interpretant subject, and that this immediate interpretant subject determines
> both the dynamic referred object together with the dynamic interpretant
> subject, and that this dynamic interpretant subject determines the final
> interpretant subject. The dependence of these semiosic forms would seem to be
> in the reverse order.
>
> The whole wide world is felt by stuff to be a phenomenal representamen, but
> not necessarily as an object nor a sign or signer. What makes forms and
> things and beings and objects and mediums into signs, and as signs of other
> objects and as signers of signs, is the act of representation, which is felt
> to permeate the whole phenomenal being of the world.
>
> (In the first grand division of informative or grammatic semiotics and
> semiosis, the common terms of sign and object and subject are often vague,
> and perhaps for contextual clarity should therein be called representants and
> referentants and interpretants. Furthermore, all semiosic forms as vehicles
> and mediums and objects and subjects are in fact phenomenal representamen and
> existent objects, and all such objects in fact are mostly and usually signs
> of objects.)
>
>
>
> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: Sunday, 25 October, 2015 8:42 AM
> To: 'Peirce List' <[email protected]>
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
>
>
>
> Helmut,
>
> Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate and
> dynamic(al) object.
>
> [[ I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the
> communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is
> determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called
> its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in
> mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the
> Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is
> necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently
> of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another
> subject in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the
> communication. The Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it
> really determines the former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet
> we may and indeed must say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what
> that sign represents it to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these
> apparently conflicting truths, it is indispensable to distinguish the
> immediate object from the dynamical object. ]] —EP2:477
>
> Gary f.
>
> } The map is not the territory. [Korzbyski] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
>
>
>
> From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: 25-Oct-15 07:16
>
> List,
>
> I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common
> understanding, and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main
> trait is its permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an entity,
> something that is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time). But in
> the Peircean sense, an object is part of an irreducible triad: Representamen,
> object, interpretant. So it is spatiotemporally limited to this one sign, and
> therefore not permanent. On the other hand, Peirce writes, that an
> interpretant can become a representamen again, which denotes the same object.
> This is not consistent, is it? I might only solve this problem by saying: An
> object is a temporary limited clipping/excerpt of an entity, as it appears in
> one sign. In the following sign, the object is a different one: Another
> clipping, but from the same entity. In a similar manner, a representamen is a
> spatial clipping from an event (limited in time, but not in space), and an
> interpretant a spatiotemporal clipping from a result, which result is an
> event again.
>
> A second problem is, that an event can, and usually does, affect more than
> one entity. So maybe an object is the sum of all clippings from entities,
> that apeear in a Sign, i.e. that are interacting with an event at the same
> time and place. The place in the semiosis with a dynamic object is a place in
> real space, and the place of a semiosis/Sign with an immediate object is a
> place in an imagined space. These proposals at least might make the whole
> affair understandable for me.
>
> Best, Helmut
>
> Supplement: In case of dynamic object, the sign process is a mixing- or
> otherwise combining-process of two or more matterginetic entities having been
> positioned side by side from the start. This is somehow special, while in the
> case of immediate object it is quite regular: More than one entity (eg. ideas
> or memory contents), combined in the mind to one objective.
>
>
>
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--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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