Randomness can hardly be meaningless if it also implies chance which for Peirce mean First. I suppose I am missing something. Usually do.
"... chance ... a mathematical term to express with accuracy the characteristics of freedom or spontaneity." Peirce: CP 6.202 Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3 On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 11:19 AM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > You are right: It is random, i.e. meaningless. I had not focused on > "meaning", but on "representation" (thirdness): I thought it was > representation, because there is both an immediate and a dynamical object. > But, as there is no meaning transmitted, it is nor real thirdness neither > real triadicity, maybe. > Regards, > Helmut > 26. Oktober 2015 um 23:24 Uhr > Thomas <[email protected]> wrote: > Helmut, List ~ > "A photon hits an atom: The photon and the atom (tokens) are the > immediate object, the hitting event is the representamen, the effect > (electron jumps to a higher orbit) is the interpretant ..." > > Why did the photon hit the atom? The collision ('hitting event') is the > 'transaction' that produced the consequences. Consequences 'belong' to the > the object(s) that triggered the transaction. It you shot a photon into > the atom, then the electron's higher orbit is the interpretant of your > logic. If you drop a bowling ball on your toe, we don't say your broken toe > is an act of nature. > > If separate 'acts of nature' originally caused the photon and atom to > collide, then it seems like a random event. The initial act of 'logic' was > performed then, when the atom and photon were sent on a collision path. > The result of the collision may, but may not, cause the electron to jump to > a higher orbit. That adds a second random element. Assigning meaning to > this random event does not seem the easiest way to explain/understand > logic. > > If I'm looking at this wrong, feel free to set me straight. > > Regards, > Tom Wyrick > > > > > On Oct 26, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > Sung, List, > And is a physical interaction a triadic Sign? Eg: A photon hits an atom: > The photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate object, the hitting > event is the representamen, the effect (electron jumps to a higher orbit) > is the interpretant, and the types "photon" and "atom" are the dynamical > object? "Type" may be replaced with "intension", but not the intension of > the human concepts "atom" or "photon", but the intension in the natural > laws´ conceptuality- so, if concepts were by definition affairs of the > mind, this pansemiotism would lead to panmentalism. Or is this nominalism? > I dont know what nominalism is, because I cannot imagine a non-nominalism. > As Elvis sang: "It´s only words, and words are all I have..." > Best, > Helmut > > Supplement: Please forget what I wrote about nominalism, I have had the > wrong idea about it: It obviously is not belief in names, but disbelief in > types (universals)... > > 26. Oktober 2015 um 01:52 Uhr > "Sungchul Ji" <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi, > > Correction: > > Please change " . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any > communication." in my previous post to > ". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication." > > Thanks. > > Sung > > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> > Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM > Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object? > To: Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > Cc: [email protected], Gary <[email protected]>, Peirce List < > [email protected]> > > > Helmut. lists, > > " . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of > interaction- . . . " > > I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for > "communication". Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We > have seen many examples of this in married couples and among members of > these lists. This is because "interactions" are dyadic and > "communications" are triadic. In other words, dyadic communications cannot > lead to any communication. Only triadic interactions can, as shown in > Figure 1. > > > f g > Person A ------> Sign -------> Person B > (Object) (Interpretant) > | ^ > | | > |__________________________| > h > > *Figure 1. * Distinguishing between "interaction" and "communication". A > can interact with B by sending sound signals (i.e., through steps f and > g) but A may not be able to send any message to B, if B's mind is unable to > receive A's message for one reason or another (e.g., lack of a common > language, or A is too obsessed with his own ideas). A is said to > communicate with B IF and ONLY IF Steps f, g, and h are engaged, i.e., IF > and ONLY IF, the interaction is triadic, not dyadic. f = sign production; > g = sign reception or interpretation; h = information flow, i.e., > communication > > All the best. > > Sung > > > On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Frances, List, >> You distinguish very accurately between what belongs to or is a sign, and >> what doesnt. In Garys Peirce-quote below the sign concept is also limited: >> "I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the >> communication or extension of a Form (or feature)." So for Peirce it is >> communication or extension (what is extension in this case btw?), and for >> you it is representation, that makes something (eg. an object) belong to >> the sign-sphere. Now I guess, that the concept of communication can be >> widened to the concept of interaction- maybe this is, what Peirce means by >> "extension"? And then everything belongs to the sign sphere, because >> everything interacts. A physicochemical result might be seen as an >> interpretant, a kind of representation, so then we have pansemiotics, I >> guess. But of course it is helpful to distinguish between realworld- or >> mattergy-Signs and mental Signs. Or is a physicochemical representation in >> a result a quasi-mental Sign? Meaning: Had the universe not a quasi-mind, >> nothing could happen? >> Best, >> Helmut >> >> 25. Oktober 2015 um 19:06 Uhr >> [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> To listers, here is my take on this snarl of twine for what it is worth. >> >> Objects emerging from pure phenomenal forms and their ideal things need >> only be nonsign representamen that bear phenomenal continuence and yield >> phenomenal existence. Objects that continue to exist as representamen can >> be synechastic objects that are not signs, and even semiosic objects >> that are either not signs or that are signs. Phenomenal objects can >> seemingly be mystically phantural, or materially physical, or mentally >> psychical. Existent synechastic objects initially are phenomenal >> representamen, but are not yet signs nor semiotic tridents or terns in >> their formal structure, until they become semiosic objects by way of >> representation; but some existent semiosic objects also need not be signs >> , until enacted as signs by signers. Existent semiosic objects are likely >> to become phenomenal representamen that are signs by way of represented >> evolution, and whose formal structure is hence a tridential tern; which >> is composed of a sole represented vehicle in a medium, and a pair of >> referred objects in a ground, and a tern of interpreted effects as a >> subject. >> >> The determinence and dependence in semiosis for the dyadic pair of objects >> and the triadic tern of interpretants is not necessarily progressive or >> hierarchical in a strict categoral manner. It seems that the immediate >> referred object determines the immediate vehicular representamen, and >> that this form of vehicle then determines and is embedded in the >> immediate interpretant subject, and that this immediate interpretant >> subject determines both the dynamic referred object together with the dynamic >> interpretant subject, and that this dynamic interpretant subject >> determines the final interpretant subject. The dependence of these >> semiosic forms would seem to be in the reverse order. >> >> The whole wide world is felt by stuff to be a phenomenal representamen, >> but not necessarily as an object nor a sign or signer. What makes forms >> and things and beings and objects and mediums into signs, and as signs >> of other objects and as signers of signs, is the act of representation, >> which is felt to permeate the whole phenomenal being of the world. >> >> (In the first grand division of informative or grammatic semiotics and >> semiosis, the common terms of sign and object and subject are often >> vague, and perhaps for contextual clarity should therein be called >> representants >> and referentants and interpretants. Furthermore, all semiosic forms as >> vehicles and mediums and objects and subjects are in fact phenomenal >> representamen >> and existent objects, and all such objects in fact are mostly and usually >> signs >> of objects.) >> >> >> >> *From:* [email protected] [mailto:[email protected] >> <http://[email protected]>] >> *Sent:* Sunday, 25 October, 2015 8:42 AM >> *To:* 'Peirce List' <[email protected]> >> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object? >> >> >> >> Helmut, >> >> Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate >> and dynamic(al) object. >> >> [[ I use the word “*Sign*” in the widest sense for any medium for the >> communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is >> determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, >> called its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be >> borne in mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object >> and by the Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or >> communicated, it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a >> Subject independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there >> should be another subject in which the same form is embodied only in >> consequence of the communication. The Form (and the Form is the Object of >> the Sign), as it really determines the former Subject, is quite independent >> of the sign; yet we may and indeed must say that the object of a sign can >> be nothing but what that sign represents it to be. Therefore, in order to >> reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it is indispensable to >> distinguish the* immediate* object from the* dynamical* object. ]] >> —EP2:477 >> >> Gary f. >> >> } The map is not the territory. [Korzbyski] { >> >> *http://gnusystems.ca/wp/* <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> }{* Turning Signs* >> gateway >> >> >> >> *From:* Helmut Raulien [*mailto:[email protected]* >> <http://[email protected]>] >> *Sent:* 25-Oct-15 07:16 >> >> List, >> >> I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common >> understanding, and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main >> trait is its permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an >> entity, something that is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time). >> But in the Peircean sense, an object is part of an irreducible triad: >> Representamen, object, interpretant. So it is spatiotemporally limited to >> this one sign, and therefore not permanent. On the other hand, Peirce >> writes, that an interpretant can become a representamen again, which >> denotes the same object. This is not consistent, is it? I might only solve >> this problem by saying: An object is a temporary limited clipping/excerpt >> of an entity, as it appears in one sign. In the following sign, the object >> is a different one: Another clipping, but from the same entity. In a >> similar manner, a representamen is a spatial clipping from an event >> (limited in time, but not in space), and an interpretant a spatiotemporal >> clipping from a result, which result is an event again. >> >> A second problem is, that an event can, and usually does, affect more >> than one entity. So maybe an object is the sum of all clippings from >> entities, that apeear in a Sign, i.e. that are interacting with an event at >> the same time and place. The place in the semiosis with a dynamic object is >> a place in real space, and the place of a semiosis/Sign with an immediate >> object is a place in an imagined space. These proposals at least might make >> the whole affair understandable for me. >> >> Best, Helmut >> >> Supplement: In case of dynamic object, the sign process is a mixing- or >> otherwise combining-process of two or more matterginetic entities having >> been positioned side by side from the start. This is somehow special, while >> in the case of immediate object it is quite regular: More than one entity >> (eg. ideas or memory contents), combined in the mind to one objective. >> >> >> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" >> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should >> go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" >> in the BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> > > > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
