Jerry, you were ostensibly asking a question about Peirce’s text. Peirce’s text does not say, nor does it imply, that a sign is “embodied in two different objects.”
Therefore your original question, as it stands, does not pertain to Peirce’s text, which is the context I referred to. Gary f. From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 26-Oct-15 13:08 To: Peirce List <[email protected]> List: Gary writes, Your original question, “How is a sign embodied in two different objects?”, does not make sense in that context. Sense making? My original question stands; the additional text does not clarify the meaning for me. I understand that you (Gary) can not make sense of the question. Is it possible that from a wider perspective of symbol-making, that the sentence makes sense? Some find that it requires substantial imagination to follow CSP texts. Further, some find that different readers find different glosses for CSP's texts. When I phrased the question, I was seeking understanding of the text. Cheers Jerry On Oct 25, 2015, at 2:10 PM, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> wrote: Jerry, EP2:477 is from a 1906 letter from Peirce to Lady Welby, and the EP2 editors chose to omit part of it, including the paragraph preceding the one that I quoted. Restoring this context may help to clear up your confusion about Peirce’s usage of “embodied,” which is compatible with the first meaning you quote from the Apple dictionary. Here are the two paragraphs together: [[ I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I will try. A thought is notper se in any mind or quasi-mind. I mean this in the same sense as I might say that Right or Truth would remain what they are though they were not embodied, & though nothing were right or true. But a thought, to gain any active mode of being must be embodied in a Sign. A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better considered self of the immediate and of the general future. Now as every thinking requires a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must be a determination of a quasi-mind. This quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign. Consider for example a blank-book. It is meant to be written in. Words written in that in due order will have quite another force from the same words scattered accidentally on the ground, even should these happen to have fallen into collections which would have a meaning if written in the blank-book. The language employed in discoursing to the reader, and the language employed to express the thought to which the discourse relates should be kept distinct and each should be selected for its peculiar fitness for the purpose it was to serve. For the discoursing language I would use English, which has special merits for the treatment of logic. For the language discoursed about, I would use the system of Existential Graphs throughout which has no equal for this purpose. I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. The Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. ]] The one sentence that you quoted from this in your earlier post says that the Form (which is communicated or extended by the Sign) is embodied in two subjects, in one of them independently of the communication, and in the other as a consequence of the communication. Your original question, “How is a sign embodied in two different objects?”, does not make sense in that context. Gary f. } Wipe your glosses with what you know. [Finnegans Wake 304] { <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 25-Oct-15 13:57 To: Peirce List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > List: In a separate post, it is stated: Jerry, the sign is not embodied in two different objects, it is embodied in two different subjects.
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
