Sorry for the delay in responding. I am catching up. I have had acute kidney failure and my time and energy are not focussed on mailing lists right now. I am recovereing fairly well, and the long term prognosis is unclear, but I am assuming it will not be good.
I disagree with the sharp division between empiricists and rationalists as Jon draws it. He quotes: > Rationalism: A method, or very broadly, a theory of philosophy, in which the > criterion of truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive. Usually > associated with an attempt to introduce mathematical methods into > philosophy, as in Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza. (Vernon J. Bourke) This is not correct. Most rationalists allow for truth to be determined not only by reason but also by experience. Extreme rationalists like Aristotle require that essential properties and their consequences be understood rationally, but not accidents. Descartes, much less extreme, made most truths dependent on experience. Leibniz is perhaps the most consistent rationalist (if we require the split with empiricism to be really deep) in that he thought the nature of the whole universe was fully determined by rationality. However he also thought that because our (some of) perceptions are confused we must rely on experience to determine at least some truths, even if on the scale of God they are determined solely by reason. This why I defined rationalism as the belief that there are truths that are not analytic that can be ascertained by reason. Empiricists like Locke (pretty much -- he vacillates a bit), Hume and Mill deny this. But most rationalists allow for empirical determination of classes of truths, whether for ontological or epistemological reasons. John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier > -----Original Message----- > From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Monday, 23 November 2015 4:25 AM > To: Peirce List > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific > > Thread: > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17681 > > Peircers, > > I'm sure we all learned in one place or another that Locke, Berkeley, and > Hume belonged to a group called “The Empiricists” while Descartes, Spinoza, > and Leibniz belonged to a group called “The Rationalists”, where “empiricism” > and “rationalism” > were described or exemplified as positions or tendencies the former and the > latter, respectively, bore in common. That's all very pat, and pat enough to > content the mind for a time, but if one gets the idea that thinkers split in > their practices as cleanly and deeply as gradgrinds teach undergrads to > categorize their thought then that would be a mistake. > > Consulting my Runes, I find the following definition. > > <QUOTE> > > Rationalism: A method, or very broadly, a theory of philosophy, in which the > criterion of truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive. Usually > associated with an attempt to introduce mathematical methods into > philosophy, as in Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza. (Vernon J. Bourke) > > The history of rationalism begins with the Eleatics (q.v.), Pythagoreans, and > Plato (q.v.) whose theory of the self-sufficiency of reason became the > leitmotif of neo-Platonism and idealism (q.v.). > > </QUOTE> > > I will try to remember that people still attach those meanings to the word > “rationalism” but I'm pretty sure I never thought of empiricism and > rationalism as “never the twain shall meet” ways of approaching the world. > So I'll take a cue from the passage that Clark quoted, and call the brand of > rationalism that Peirce deprecated by the name of “philosophical > rationalism”. Personally, I have never found much use for it, but I don't > have > much use for any ism that is taken to such extremes that it become a religion, > so there is nothing very surprising about that. > > Regards, > > Jon > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: > http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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