James, list, James, welcome to the list.
James wrote: Peirce's non-foundationalism is expressed in his rejection of Cartesian and > Aristotelian First Principles I should probably understand this point better, but I am wondering whether this point might be further explained. In the case of Cartesian first principles, we use extreme doubt to get all the way to these principles, and then from them work out and justify the rest of all that is understood. I find that Peirce indeed rejects this. In the case of Aristotelian first principles, we certainly do not use extreme doubt, but work through a variety of considerations that ultimately lead us to first principles, not in the sense of principles which come first in understanding, but in nature. So there is this line from Aristotle to the effect that we reason from what is better known to us to what is better known to nature. After having gotten to such first principles, we can understand nature better. I am not so sure I find Peirce rejecting this. I'm sure that Peirce would want to add that there needs to be experimentation to really put the principles to the test. but as far as observation and deduction goes, I find Peirce mostly in agreement with Aristotle's point of view. Perhaps I have misunderstood what Aristotle is about, or why Peirce would have had some important issue to take with Aristotle, other than the need for experimentation? Also, James wrote: Scientific method for Peirce amounts to devising strategies for this to > happen in the most serendipidous way - hence the logic of abduction. I don't find that it makes sense to say that one devises a strategy for something to happen with something happening in a serendipitous way, Serendipity is really about some chance occasion that turns out fortunate. Devising a strategy, in Peirce's logic of science, is something that involves the selection of hypotheses for testing. We might say that abduction as an inference is itself serendipitous, although I think that there is some truth to the idea that continued observation will inevitably result in the development of better abductions. With respect to scientific method though, it is certainly not serendipitous, but aimed at the strategic selection of given hypotheses according to the principles of the economy of research, and would include deduction and induction. Hopefully the result of the method doesn't lead us to simply hope for a serendipitous result. Another way of putting it is that Peirce never really suggests how we can devise strategies to come up with better abductions, only strategies of what we can do once we have hypotheses to consider. I myself am interested in the idea of developing strategies for inducing better abductions, but I haven't found Peirce so interested. For him, it seems that an abductive inference is simply uncontrolled, and we can only begin controlled inquiry once we have already a hypothesis delivered from an abductive inference. Perhaps he would admit that psychology could discover something more about how we come up with the abductions that we do. That is to say, that we come up with abductions is the purview of logic, but why we come up with specific ones, and that some are more common than others in human inquirers, might be something that psychology could study. For instance, when unconscious social prejudices affect the kinds of guesses we're prepared to make in a given social context. -- Franklin P.S. -- I too hope for a positive prognosis and speedy recovery for John. -------------------------------------- On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 3:36 PM, James Crombie <[email protected] > wrote: > If rationalism is the view that the real is what-can-be-thought, then the > arch-rationalist is Parmenides. I would agree that Descartes is a > foundationalist rationalist - and opine that Peirce is a > non-foundationalist rationalist - and also a non-foundationalist > empiricist. Peirce holds that the real is definitely what-can-be-thought - > or at least a subset of what can be thought. But Peirce also holds that > under the influence of experience we can change what we think. Scientific > method for Peirce amounts to devising strategies for this to happen in the > most serendipidous way - hence the logic of abduction. Peirce's > non-foundationalism is expressed in his rejection of Cartesian and > Aristotelian First Principles - and in his simultaneous rejection of > empiricist First Sensations. See the end of Section IV in "The Fixation of > Belief". Non-foundationalism ("no first cognition") and fallibilism go > together very nicely. > > Greetings from Nova Scotia! > > James Crombie >
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