Franklin,
Thanks for the reply.
First principles that we have to "work through a variety of
considerations to reach" are not the kind of first principles Peirce is
rejecting - although, like you, I don't pretend to speak with much
authority on how to accurately characterize Aristotle's actual position
on this matter. I grant you that Peirce often expresses sympathy with
Aristotle's approaches.
As for Descartes, we might say that he also "work[s] through a variety
of considerations" - but with a view to showing that we don't, in the
end, have to work through them since, as it turns out, on Descartes'
view, the clear and distinct deliverances of consciousness are the
ultimate arbiter. They are also examples of the kind of "first
cognition" which Peirce rules out. Peirce also rules out, on my view,
anything resembling uninterpreted sense data as the "foundation" of
anything.
There is no foundation, on Peirce's view (as I understand it), which we
can identify as the justification of our beliefs by tracing our beliefs
back to them. The Peircean truth-criterion looks forward and not backward.
I agree with you that Peirce devotes considerable attention to how to
(deliberately) choose which abductive conclusions to investigate first.
He also - perhaps it's in the "Law of Mind" series - speculates that
it's because the mind is a historical product of the evolution of the
universe that it tends to produce abductive guesses much closer to the
ultimate truth than mere chance would account for.
My use of 'serendipidous' was motivated by a reflection on Peirce's
definition of the scientific method in "The Fixation of Belief" - which
is perhaps not yet as clearly developed as it could be. The scientific
method is there described as a method which consists of allowing Reality
to affect the content of our opinions. To this we may object that our
opinions are always and invariably affected by the real conditions in
which they emerge, so that this definition does not tell us what is
distinctive about the scientific method. What we are talking about,
then, is a *particular* way in which Reality can be induced to affect
our opinions - namely a strategy that consists in creating situations
where the observed result can be expected to be different, depending on
whether our hypothesis is true or false.
As for experimentation in Aristotle, I now recall the experiment of
plunging one hand into cold water, the other hand into hot water and
then both hands into lukewarm water. I was also struck by Aristotle's
observation of how drops of water on, say, a red-painted surface, appear
to be red - and by the ingenious (but in the end incorrect) hypothesis
Aristotle advances to explain this phenomenon. This discussion occurs in
De Anima, where there is a lot of reflection on how light and vision
work. We now think of this phenomenon as being explained by refraction
- but Aristotle wanted to know how it was that the drops of water could
actually "become" red.
As for social prejudices, in "Fixation" Peirce notes as one of the
weaknesses of the a priori method that - in spite of all the deployment
of reason and argument this method involves - it turns out to be
subjected to the secular whims of fashion, passing from materialism to
spiritualism and back again in endless cycles, causing doubt to
re-emerge in those who observe that this is happening.
A serendipidous scientific strategy, on the other hand, will produce
convergence.
But if a controversy is not about something "real", there will be no
convergence. (Except by chance, and then only for a while.)
Cheers,
James
Le 2015-11-25 06:08, Franklin Ransom a écrit :
James, list,
James, welcome to the list.
James wrote:
Peirce's non-foundationalism is expressed in his rejection of
Cartesian and Aristotelian First Principles
I should probably understand this point better, but I am wondering
whether this point might be further explained. In the case of
Cartesian first principles, we use extreme doubt to get all the way to
these principles, and then from them work out and justify the rest of
all that is understood. I find that Peirce indeed rejects this. In the
case of Aristotelian first principles, we certainly do not use extreme
doubt, but work through a variety of considerations that ultimately
lead us to first principles, not in the sense of principles which come
first in understanding, but in nature. So there is this line from
Aristotle to the effect that we reason from what is better known to us
to what is better known to nature. After having gotten to such first
principles, we can understand nature better. I am not so sure I find
Peirce rejecting this. I'm sure that Peirce would want to add that
there needs to be experimentation to really put the principles to the
test. but as far as observation and deduction goes, I find Peirce
mostly in agreement with Aristotle's point of view. Perhaps I have
misunderstood what Aristotle is about, or why Peirce would have had
some important issue to take with Aristotle, other than the need for
experimentation?
Also, James wrote:
Scientific method for Peirce amounts to devising strategies for
this to happen in the most serendipidous way - hence the logic of
abduction.
I don't find that it makes sense to say that one devises a strategy
for something to happen with something happening in a serendipitous
way, Serendipity is really about some chance occasion that turns out
fortunate. Devising a strategy, in Peirce's logic of science, is
something that involves the selection of hypotheses for testing. We
might say that abduction as an inference is itself serendipitous,
although I think that there is some truth to the idea that continued
observation will inevitably result in the development of better
abductions. With respect to scientific method though, it is certainly
not serendipitous, but aimed at the strategic selection of given
hypotheses according to the principles of the economy of research, and
would include deduction and induction. Hopefully the result of the
method doesn't lead us to simply hope for a serendipitous result.
Another way of putting it is that Peirce never really suggests how we
can devise strategies to come up with better abductions, only
strategies of what we can do once we have hypotheses to consider.
I myself am interested in the idea of developing strategies for
inducing better abductions, but I haven't found Peirce so interested.
For him, it seems that an abductive inference is simply uncontrolled,
and we can only begin controlled inquiry once we have already a
hypothesis delivered from an abductive inference. Perhaps he would
admit that psychology could discover something more about how we come
up with the abductions that we do. That is to say, that we come up
with abductions is the purview of logic, but why we come up with
specific ones, and that some are more common than others in human
inquirers, might be something that psychology could study. For
instance, when unconscious social prejudices affect the kinds of
guesses we're prepared to make in a given social context.
-- Franklin
P.S. -- I too hope for a positive prognosis and speedy recovery for John.
--------------------------------------
On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 3:36 PM, James Crombie
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
If rationalism is the view that the real is what-can-be-thought,
then the arch-rationalist is Parmenides. I would agree that
Descartes is a foundationalist rationalist - and opine that Peirce
is a non-foundationalist rationalist - and also a
non-foundationalist empiricist. Peirce holds that the real is
definitely what-can-be-thought - or at least a subset of what can
be thought. But Peirce also holds that under the influence of
experience we can change what we think. Scientific method for
Peirce amounts to devising strategies for this to happen in the
most serendipidous way - hence the logic of abduction. Peirce's
non-foundationalism is expressed in his rejection of Cartesian and
Aristotelian First Principles - and in his simultaneous rejection
of empiricist First Sensations. See the end of Section IV in "The
Fixation of Belief". Non-foundationalism ("no first cognition")
and fallibilism go together very nicely.
Greetings from Nova Scotia!
James Crombie
--
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James Crombie, Ph.D.
Philosophie | Sciences humaines
Université Sainte-Anne <https://www.usainteanne.ca/>Tél. :
+1-902-769-2114 poste 7104
1695, Route 1, Pointe-de-l'Église (Nouvelle-Écosse) B0W 1M0 - CANADA
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<http://personnel.usainteanne.ca/jcrombie/>
Université Sainte-Anne
«Le rôle culturel de la philosophie n'est pas de fournir des vérités
toutes faites mais de bâtir l'esprit de vérité et [...] de ne jamais
laisser s'endormir l'énergie de la curiosité intellectuelle, de ne
jamais cesser de questionner ce qui paraît évident et définitif.»
- Leszek Kolakowski (1927-2009)
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