John, Yes, that's why I prefer to speak of “empirical” and “rational” as referring to “aspects of reality” or “tendencies of mind”. I gave that bit from Runes as a standard point of departure only because it seemed to me that some folks here might be thinking of rationalism in that vein. I'm not sure that creating more labels is the way to go but I thought I'd try using the phrase “philosophical rationalism” from Peirce that Clark quoted as a way to distinguish the more extreme position from the way the rationalistic tendency has figured in scientific contexts in more recent years. Here I am thinking of the way it came up during the cognitive revolt, notably Chomsky's review of Skinner, and maybe to a lesser degree the later debate between Chomsky and Piaget.
Curiously enough, we can still speak of rationalism as involving “an attempt to introduce mathematical methods into philosophy”, but mathematicians have been shifting how they view their methods since the middle of the 19th Century at least, as augured in part by the Symbolist Movement, and Peirce contributed a few shifts of his own to the prevailing sea change. A goodly part of mathematical inquiry retains its character as analytic, apodictic, à priori, axiomatic, deductive, exact, etc., but the essential ingredients of mathematical models and theories, namely, the primitives, definitions, axioms, and inference rules that one chooses, are no longer seen to spring from incontestable intuitions and self-evident truths but are relatively free choices, that is, abductive hypotheses. The systems we build on foundations like these are not necessary in any absolute sense but contingent on the choices we make. They will often seem unavoidable in retrospect, but that is just the nature of the synthetic à priori. Take good care of yourself and all our best wishes for a speedy recovery, Jon On 11/24/2015 2:03 AM, John Collier wrote: > Sorry for the delay in responding. I am catching up. I have had acute kidney failure and my time and energy are not > focussed on mailing lists right now. I am recovering fairly well, and the long term prognosis is unclear, but I am > assuming it will not be good. > > I disagree with the sharp division between empiricists and rationalists as Jon draws it. He quotes: >> Rationalism: A method, or very broadly, a theory of philosophy, in which the criterion of truth is not sensory but >> intellectual and deductive. Usually associated with an attempt to introduce mathematical methods into philosophy, >> as in Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza. (Vernon J. Bourke) > > This is not correct. Most rationalists allow for truth to be determined not only by reason but also by experience. > Extreme rationalists like Aristotle require that essential properties and their consequences be understood > rationally, but not accidents. Descartes, much less extreme, made most truths dependent on experience. Leibniz is > perhaps the most consistent rationalist (if we require the split with empiricism to be really deep) in that he > thought the nature of the whole universe was fully determined by rationality. However he also thought that because > our (some of) perceptions are confused we must rely on experience to determine at least some truths, even if on the > scale of God they are determined solely by reason. > > This why I defined rationalism as the belief that there are truths that are not analytic that can be ascertained by > reason. Empiricists like Locke (pretty much -- he vacillates a bit), Hume and Mill deny this. But most rationalists > allow for empirical determination of classes of truths, whether for ontological or epistemological reasons. > > John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]] >> Sent: Monday, 23 November 2015 4:25 AM >> To: Peirce List >> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific >> >> Thread: >> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17681 >> >> Peircers, >> >> I'm sure we all learned in one place or another that Locke, Berkeley, and Hume >> belonged to a group called “The Empiricists” while Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz >> belonged to a group called “The Rationalists”, where “empiricism” and “rationalism” >> were described or exemplified as positions or tendencies the former and the latter, >> respectively, bore in common. That's all very pat, and pat enough to content the >> mind for a time, but if one gets the idea that thinkers split in their practices >> as cleanly and deeply as gradgrinds teach undergrads to categorize their thought >> then that would be a mistake. >> >> Consulting my Runes, I find the following definition. >> >> <QUOTE> >> >> Rationalism: A method, or very broadly, a theory of philosophy, >> in which the criterion of truth is not sensory but intellectual >> and deductive. Usually associated with an attempt to introduce >> mathematical methods into philosophy, as in Descartes, Leibniz, >> and Spinoza. (Vernon J. Bourke) >> >> The history of rationalism begins with the Eleatics (q.v.), >> Pythagoreans, and Plato (q.v.) whose theory of the self-sufficiency >> of reason became the leitmotif of neo-Platonism and idealism (q.v.). >> >> </QUOTE> >> >> I will try to remember that people still attach those meanings to the >> word “rationalism” but I'm pretty sure I never thought of empiricism >> and rationalism as “never the twain shall meet” ways of approaching >> the world. So I'll take a cue from the passage that Clark quoted, >> and call the brand of rationalism that Peirce deprecated by the >> name of “philosophical rationalism”. Personally, I have never >> found much use for it, but I don't have much use for any ism >> that is taken to such extremes that it become a religion, >> so there is nothing very surprising about that. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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