Jon, Gary F., List, Jon claims that the kind of determination that is at work in sign action is always triadic in character. He says: "Looking back over many previous discussions on the Peirce List, I think the most important and frequently missed point is that concepts like correspondence and determination in Peirce refer to triadic forms of correspondence and determination, and that these do not reduce to the dyadic structures that are endemic to the more reductionist paradigms."
I want to express a few reservations about this blanket statement, and then I'll offer some qualifications for the purpose of articulating an account of determination that fits better (I hope) with what Peirce says in essays such as "On the Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within" and "Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations." It might help if we note a contrast between two different points of view from which we might analyze and attempt to explain what it is for one correlate to be determined by another correlate in a dyadic, triadic or higher order relation. From the point of view in which we are looking at what is involved in sign relations, all such relations might--in one respect or another--be triadic in character. That is, all of the relations of determination that are essential for the success of the semiotic process--including those that appear to be dyadic in character-- are really (in the end, when looked at from the point of the view of successful acts of cognition) parts of larger triadic relations. >From the point of view of the evolution of the parts that come be connected >into larger wholes via sign action, my hunch is that there are dyadic >relations of determination--and these dyadic relations are essential for the >process. That is, over time, these dyadic relations are brought together into >larger complexes. Some of those larger complexes are individual existing >things that are brought together into larger dyadic relations, and some of the >larger complexes are made up of combinations of possibilities, existing >objects and general rules that are brought together into triadic relations. So, the reservation I am expressing can be summarized in the following way: from the point of view of the evolution of the essential parts that make up larger complexes of signs, objects and interpretants, it does not appear to be accurate to the texts to say that the kinds of determination that are essential are all triadic in character. In some cases, it is one existing thing determining another existing thing in some respect or other, and this determination is dyadic in character. That is, the relation can be analyzed in terms of relate A determines correlate B in some respect. There are quite a number of different sorts of dyadic determination, and that is the reason he sorts through them with such care in "On the Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within." The simplest sort of dyadic determination is for one quality to be contained within another quality (e.g. the feeling of scarlet is contained in the feeling of red). The richest sort of dyadic determination is for one individual thing to be the cause of the existence of another individual thing. This sort of determination is poietical in character. Here is the qualification I would like to add: over time, as the dyadic relations of determination between individual objects (e.g., a stove in kitchen before us now) and a indexical sinsign (e.g. a parent pointing at the stove) are formed, such dyadic relations of determination come to be part of larger complexes involving relations between possibilities, existing individuals and general rules. As these larger complexes are formed, the dyadic relations come to be parts of larger triadic relations and ultimately, the forms of determination that govern such processes of interpretation are predominately triadic in character. In a paradigmatic kind of case, three relatively separate dyads come to be joined together by a triad--and the kind of determination that governs that process is triadic in character because it is a general rule (e.g., a rule of comparison, a rule of time ordering, an inferential rule, etc.) that supplies the glue that combines and orders the correlates in the resulting triadic relation. As such, I do not believe that, on Peirce's account, all such forms of determination in the processes of representation are essentially triadic in character (e.g., of a token representamen by an existing object, of an immediate object by dynamical object, of a qualisign by immediate object, or of an indexical sinsign by a dynamical object, etc.). Some may evolve from dyadic forms of determination--especially the sort of referential relation that is essential in the last kind of case on the list. Hope that helps, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Jon Awbrey [[email protected]] Sent: Monday, April 04, 2016 6:40 AM To: Peirce List Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Determination, etc. Peircers, The subject of determination comes up from time to time. Here is a link to an assortment of excerpts I collected back when I was first trying to understand the meaning of determination as it figures in Peirce's definition of a sign relation. http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/User:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS Looking back over many previous discussions on the Peirce List, I think the most important and frequently missed point is that concepts like correspondence and determination in Peirce refer to triadic forms of correspondence and determination, and that these do not reduce to the dyadic structures that are endemic to the more reductionist paradigms. In this more general perspective, the family of concepts including correspondence, determination, law, relation, structure, and so on all fall under the notion of constraint. Constraint is present in a system to the extent that one set of choices is distinguished by some mark from a larger set of choices. That mark may distinguish the actual from the possible, the desired from the conceivable, or any number of other possibilities depending on the subject in view. Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
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